

THE PRAGUE GROUP OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALIST WRITERS AND THEIR IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS

What Ukrainians need most is "to know Europe and to be known in Europe." This observation was made in 1873 by the editor of *La République française* in commenting on an article about Ukrainian literature.¹

The truth of the observation never struck Ukrainians more clearly than immediately after their failure of 1917-21. The leading representatives of the Entente displayed such obviously meagre knowledge and understanding of Ukrainian aspirations that all Ukrainians could see plainly why their cause had received so little consideration, in spite of the proclaimed principle of self-determination. From that time on, Ukrainians were keenly conscious of their separation from the rest of Europe and their lack of contact with their neighbors.

The generalization quoted is probably as fallacious as any other, but the two aspects it suggests played a considerable role in shaping Ukrainian attitudes and literary trends. Some Eastern

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Ukrainian writers urged their colleagues to orient themselves toward "the civilization of Newton, Goethe, Byron, Darwin and Marx" and, on that foundation, to build a truly Ukrainian concept of communist culture.² For Western Ukrainians, to be known in Europe, and to know Europe, was to become part of Europe, assimilating European technical and cultural achievements to further the aspirations toward national identity of a people who had for centuries belonged to Europe.³

The post-Versailles order offered Ukrainians few opportunities for significant contacts with Western Europe. Internal developments in the Soviet Union hardly favored any practical application of the idea of an independent "Ukrainian road to socialism," and even less, one based on European culture. The Ukrainians living in Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia were also compelled to struggle for their existence as a distinctive national and cultural group. Indeed, "the 1919 settlement roughly reversed the earlier (pre-war) positions, with the single exception that the Ukrainians remained the underdogs."⁴

Here was fertile soil for breeding resentment and revisionism. A Ukrainian nationalist literature, as much concerned with ideology as with art, developed in the early 1920's and reached its maturity in the late 1930's. One aspect of this development is of special interest today: the Prague center was the most productive and influential of the three emigre centers of Ukrainian nationalist literary production; the other two were in Lviv and Warsaw.

To a student of Czech-Ukrainian cultural relations, the statement should not be altogether surprising. Beginning with Havlíček-Borovský, Czech men of letters have sympathized with Ukrainian yearnings for Western Europe and a European cultural *risorgimento*. When the Ukrainian language was suppressed by the czarist regime, Taras Shevchenko's works were published in Prague in 1876. Ivan Franko's activity in Ukrainian-Czech relations found hearty support among Czech intellectuals,⁵ and during the Ukrainian war of liberation, Czechoslovakia maintained a friendly neutrality toward the Ukrainian National Republic.

When the Ukrainian effort collapsed, thousands of Ukrainian refugees flocked to Czechoslovakia. Units of the Ukrainian national army, unwilling to surrender to either the Red Army or

the victorious Poles, retreated in military formation into Czechoslovakia. Some refugees came from Vienna; many drifted from the Polish prisoner-of-war camps. Eventually, Prague, Mecca of the Slavic emigres, absorbed most of them.

The Czech government treated emigres of various nationalities generously and supported them financially. The economic aspect of this aid has been discussed elsewhere.⁶ Here, it suffices to say that the Ukrainian emigres received their share of help and tried to make the most of it. Soon there were more than twenty Ukrainian professional, educational, and scholarly institutions; among them were the well-known Ukrainian Free University, the Ukrainian Economic Academy (at Poděbrady), Drahomanov Teachers Institute, Artistic Studio Mako and the Ukrainian Historical-Philological Association. Ukrainian emigre scholars held two congresses in Prague (one in 1926, another in 1932) because there they were able to express their views freely and without any interference from the government.⁷ Although Ukrainian enthusiasm for their national cause is proverbial, without the financial assistance of the Czechoslovak government, and without its support in their ventures, many of the Ukrainian plans would not have been realized.

Most Ukrainian students had lost their best years during the war and needed retraining in order to cope with modern society. To take care of the influx of penniless Ukrainian students, the Czecho-Ukrainian Committee was formed in 1921; Dr. Jaroslav Bidlo was its chairman, and Dr. Jan Kapras (later minister of education in the Prague government), its treasurer. The Committee administered government assistance to Ukrainian students, of whom there were 1,896 in March 1924, with 1,255 in Prague alone. "The living conditions for Ukrainian students were best in Czechoslovakia, where the cultural efforts of the Ukrainian emigres had the most secure basis," says Symon Narizhnyi, historian of Ukrainian emigration.⁸ By 1931, over 1,660 Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia had received their diplomas from Czech and Ukrainian institutions of higher learning, and the graduates succeeded in integrating themselves in the life of the Republic or that of the neighboring countries. Among them were some of the writers whose ideological background and artistic efforts we are going to discuss. They had grown up in the free, expansive atmosphere of Prague's academic life, circumscribed

only by the organizational and ideological limits set by the Ukrainians themselves.

Most of the students were members of the Ukrainian Academic Association, founded in 1919. Soon the Association initiated a central council of all Ukrainian student organizations in Europe (CESUS). Thus, Prague became the hotbed of Ukrainian nationalistic thought; there, plans were laid for the "opening of the window into Europe" and into the sources of Western European culture and socio-political thought.⁹ In these efforts, such as they were, the Ukrainians were helped by Czech student organizations. Because of this help, Ukrainian student representatives were able to present their case to the International Students Confederation and to secure for their Association a seat in the assembly of the Confederation (1921). When, at the All-Slavic Student Congresses held in Prague (1922 and 1928), other Slavic delegations attempted to eliminate the Ukrainians by means of the nation-state principle, the Ukrainian representatives received support from the Czech student delegation.¹⁰

In 1923, the Ukrainian students in Czechoslovakia founded a monthly magazine, *Studentskyi vistnyk* (Student Herald), as a forum for the expression of their ideas. In addition to news and organization affairs, the contents included ideological, social, literary, and historical topics in the late 19th-century tradition of Eastern-European journalism. Its circulation was small, but it reached most of the emigre Ukrainian students in Europe.

Thus the student movement in Prague joined, and to some degree preceded, the nationalist student movement in Lviv. There, another group of Ukrainian nationalist writers began to form around the journal, *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk* (The Literary and Learned Herald). That venerable monthly was founded there in 1898 as a scientific and literary publication of the Shevchenko Scientific Society. Mykhailo Hrushevsky, Ivan Franko, and Volodymyr Hnatiuk had made it an outstanding magazine that attracted the best of Ukrainian writers and intellectuals at the beginning of the century. Its significance and influence in the development of Ukrainian literary and political thought was immense.

After the revolution of 1905, when control of the press was somewhat relaxed, publication of *LNV* moved to Kiev, but in 1914 it was suppressed, like all other Ukrainian publications in

Russia. In 1917, Hrushevsky resumed publication of *LNV*, but he was never able to rebuild its former influence and significance.¹¹

In 1922, *LNV* was reestablished with financial help from a group of former officers of the Ukrainian National Army, and Dmytro Dontsov became its editor-in-chief. For the next decade, *LNV* became the forum of Ukrainian writers living and working outside the Soviet Union. These poets, novelists, historians, critics, and scientists represented all shades of literary and political views. Soon Dontsov's rightist views were challenged by three venerable Ukrainian democrats then living in Prague, the poet, O. Oles, the historian, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, and the publisher, M. Tyshchenko-Siry.¹² Eventually, Dontsov's views prevailed in *LNV*, and by 1933, he had gained complete control of the publication; it then appeared under the shortened title of *Vistnyk* (The Herald).

Dontsov's ideas were akin to, and partly borrowed from, the ultraconservative French writers, Maurice Barrès and Charles Maurras. Ukrainian liberalism he defined as an "atrophy of the instinct to dominate." He summoned the Ukraine's younger generation to a "reappraisal of values;" a complete break with the "effeminate ideas of the nineteenth century;" the acceptance of the concept that only "the stronger has the right to survive;" the primacy of will over reason. In 1924, he posed a dilemma to his readers: "Unless we cease to behave like a herd of cattle," he said—unless there emerged a group of people able to provide manly leadership—the Ukrainian masses would follow the communists, who seemed able to satisfy them in that respect.¹³

In the reappraisal, the most urgent task of the elite was to free themselves from the tenets of "foreign ideologies." The worst of these was the Tolstoyan philosophy of non-action, or the *sansara* of the Indian philosophers. It was necessary to revive and fortify the energy of the Ukrainian people, to make every Ukrainian conscious of his soil, his race, his traditions, and national group. "In our historic controversy with Muscovy," he said, "we do not combat any particular form of government or empire. What we face is the philosophical concept of the nation-as-conqueror, a messianic nation which, beneath the most diverse transfigurations, will always find expression for that concept."¹⁴

In the reappraisal of values, and in the regeneration of the

Ukrainian nation, literature should play the chief part. But as Dontsov saw it, Ukrainian literature was struggling through a crisis, its aesthetics crippled by a "worship of only one god, Beauty;" "the god of Energy" was neglected, heroic emotions were rejected, and the truly tragic was missing from Ukrainian art. The only salvation for the Ukrainian people and their literature was a return to the dynamic traditions of the 17th century and the Kievan Rus' period of Ukraine's history. He had no quarrel with the forms of Ukrainian art, but the content, he alleged, was poisoned by Russian and "Eastern" influences.

Now, these were clear-cut statements and slogans, even if they were biased; and they found a responsive audience, especially among the emigre students and all those young Ukrainians who resented the inability of the older liberal generation to reestablish the Ukrainian sovereign state, and who found consolation in the revisionist mood that had begun to creep over Europe. But in terms of literature and aesthetics, Dontsov would have been crying in the wilderness had not the young writers in Prague embraced his ideas as their own.

All that united the group of nationalist writers in Prague was the place where they lived and worked, and their sharing of the hazy *Weltanschauung* known as Ukrainian nationalism.¹⁵ When, in the early 1920's, Dontsov was making his "revivalist" calls from Lviv, the writers of the group were still studying or just making their first steps toward Parnassus. Indeed, some passed away, leaving behind only fiery traces like falling meteors, mere promises of what they might have produced.

Among the latter were Maksym Hryva, Mykola Chyrskiy, and Iurii Darahan. Hryva, once a nationalist insurgent in the northern regions of Ukraine, left only a few poems in *Derzhavna natsiia*, published in Poděbrady. Chyrskiy wrote short dramatic works and poems. But of much greater talent was the other veteran of the Ukrainian national army, Darahan.¹⁶ Like Hryva and Chyrskiy, he began writing poetry in a Polish prisoner-of-war camp; he might be regarded as the founder of the Prague group. His contribution was the poetic infatuation with the Kievan and Galician periods of Ukraine's history which, until then, had been seen from a strictly Populist point of view. Darahan was the first to extol the romanticism of princely statehood and the vitality of Rus-Ukraine. His only collection of

poems, *Sahaidak* (The Quiver), appeared just before his untimely death in 1926.

Another "discoverer of our history," as Malaniuk called him, was Oleksa Stefanovych, whose poems show a strange eschatologic mood and little overt nationalism. Although he lived and worked in Prague, Stefanovych actually belongs to the Catholic group of Lviv. In Prague, there appeared two collections of work by this none-too-prolific, but original, writer: *Poezii* (Poems), in 1927, and *Stefanos*, in 1939.

Darahan and Stefanovych, in a way, influenced Oksana Laturynska, who revived the dim Lithuanian period in the history of Volhynia. She "reached accomplishments only attained by exceptional artists. The accomplishment is in her personal style. . . a severe sparsity of words, symbolism, and historicism," says Malaniuk.¹⁷ Moreover, she successfully translated some poems by the Czech poet, Pavel Javor.

O. Olzhych was an archaeologist with a degree from Charles University, and associate editor of the nationalist monthly, *Proboiem*, published in the capital from 1933 till 1943, when it was suppressed by the Nazis. For his anti-Nazi activities, Olzhych was arrested by the Gestapo and tortured to death in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp, in July 1944. The second of his three collections of superb poems, *Vezhi* (Towers), was published in Prague.

Akin to Olzhych in her association with the nationalist group, but at the opposite extreme as an artist, stood Olena Teliha. She studied art in Prague and had begun to publish her poems in *LNV* by 1928. She was a faithful follower of Dontsov's ideas, and never tired of explaining the role of women in developing the new energetic Ukrainian. In 1942, she was arrested by the Gestapo in Kiev and summarily executed, along with other Ukrainian nationalists including her husband, and Ivan Irlavsky, a young Carpatho-Ukrainian whose poems, *Moia vesna* (My Spring), appeared in Prague in 1940. Teliha's ideological views and the aesthetics of her art were undoubtedly formed during her stay in Prague, that true forge of Ukrainian nationalism in the 1920s.

The greatest poet of the period, and "one of the finest craftsmen in the Ukrainian language" today,¹⁸ Evhen Malaniuk, also passed through Czechoslovakia on his way up to the Ukrainian

Parnassus. While still studying for his degree in hydro-engineering at the Ukrainian Economic Academy in Poděbrady, he published his first collection of poems *Stylet i stylos* (Stiletto and Stylus) (1925). Malaniuk was responsible, more than anyone else, for the development in the Prague group of a highly cultured style. His influence was also felt in the Soviet Ukraine; indeed, he served as a spiritual bridge between the Kievan Neoclassicists and the new generation of Ukrainian writers abroad. He also tried his hand at translating the poems of Josef S. Machar¹⁹ and *Pisně otroka* by Svatopluk Čech; moreover, he seems to have developed close relations with both Machar and Karel Čapek. Even if his influence seemed to wane in the 1930s (with the rise of Iurii Lypa, O. Olzhych, and Leonid Mosendz), Malaniuk always commanded the respect of all Ukrainian nationalists.

Unlike Malaniuk, who settled eventually in Warsaw, Leonid Mosendz spend most of his writing life in Czechoslovakia. But, like Malaniuk, he obtained his degree (in chemistry) from the Poděbrady Academy and contributed poetry and prose to *Vistnyk* in Lviv. In his short stories, he convincingly depicted human beings in marginal situations—torn between heroism and the weakness of their human nature. During the war, he cooperated with the Ukrainian anti-Nazi and anti-Soviet underground. Mosendz's long novel on a biblical theme *Ostannii prorok* (The Last Prophet), shows the author's disillusionment with the nationalist extremism of the pre-war period.²⁰

Ulas Samchuk, a Western Ukrainian who is now in Canada, lived in Czechoslovakia from 1929 to 1939 and studied at the Ukrainian Free University in Prague. Though he was published in *LNV*, he did not see eye-to-eye with Dontsov on many issues. The first part of his trilogy, *Volyn*, and the novel, *Maria*, have been translated into French. *Volyn*, which deals with the life of Ukrainian peasants under two foreign regimes, is the finest novel of the inter-war period and belongs among Ukrainian classics.

Mention should be made of Iurii Lypa, who really belongs to the Warsaw group of Ukrainian nationalist writers, but who made his mark on the outlook of the writers in Prague, as well. His first short story, published in *Studentskyi vistnyk* (in 1927), surprised Ukrainian readers in Czechoslovakia. Vasyl Koroliv, a writer of the older generation, who lived in Prague, commented

in dismay: "Our editor-critics do not know their trade; they do not notice Lypa at all. But he is unusually versatile and expert in the Ukrainian folk-style narrative."²¹ Lypa certainly proved that Koroliv was right, and he captured the imagination of readers with his incisive essays. True to his ideas, Lypa died in a fight against the Soviets, in the ranks of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) in 1944. It may have been because of Lypa's influence that the Prague group, with the passing years, somewhat mollified its attitudes and grew critical of Dontsov's extremism and his "war of all against everybody."

To what degree the atmosphere of the only truly democratic country in central eastern Europe helped to modify the views of the group, and how much the sight of the freely flourishing literary life in Prague spurred on the young Ukrainian writers, it is difficult to tell now. There is not enough supporting material to risk any clear-cut statement. We do not really know whether the young emigres had any regular contacts with Czech literati, and there Ukrainians were emigres, first of all. They were firmly oriented toward the theme, "Ukraine and we,"²² and were too involved in current Ukrainian events to be able either to follow the path of their Czech colleagues or to "open the window into Europe," as they had intended.

They formed a psychologically insulated group within the body of a foreign, though friendly, nation. They believed, with Malaniuk, that during those periods when a nation is deprived of a political leader, "the poets are her leaders," just as Mickiewicz and Pushkin had envisioned the futures of their respective nations.²³ These "tragic optimists" believed that the regeneration of their people depended on the abandonment of the quietist way of life and on acquiring the energetic approach of Western man. Above all, they believed that the artist should live within his own nationality, while he tried to transform it, and that he must give his life, if need be, for the ideals of his people. And they were true to their word; that cannot be said of some of their ideologist critics.

The most admirable thing about them was that they succeeded in attaining relatively high standards, in spite of, rather than as a result of, their ideology of integral nationalism. Their art grew through the tenets of the doctrine like green grass among forbidding rocks. Perhaps the Prague group was able to

save their art from ideological corrosion by unconsciously embracing Malaniuk's view of art, expressed as early as 1923: "Dontsov speaks of literature as a consumer, an exploiter, while we speak of it as artists, as producers. . . ."²⁴ They contributed substantially to the growth of Ukrainian literature in the period when, as George Luckyj put it, "modern Ukrainian literature came of age."²⁵

The Prague group of Ukrainian nationalist writers were little known in Czech society. In this respect, perhaps the group failed to grasp an opportunity—a failure we should not repeat here and now.

There is a long tradition of friendly Czech-Ukrainian relations. Even under communist oppression today, Czechoslovakia and Ukraine manage to find a common language. The Czechoslovak Republic is one of the two nations that have consulates in Kiev; nowadays, Czech translations of Ukrainian writing are the most numerous of all foreign translations.²⁶ There is also a genuine interest, among readers in Ukraine, in the cultural life of Czechoslovakia. Ukrainians and Czechs abroad should, perhaps, do even more: they could actually supplement the work carried on in their respective countries and, in a way, straighten what is being warped by the communists there.

As far as Ukrainians are concerned, their greatest need today is less "to know Europe and to be known in Europe" than to know their neighbors and be known by them. To know is to understand and appreciate. With this purpose in mind, the author has presented this sketch of the Prague group of Ukrainian nationalist writers as one of the aspects of life in the Czechoslovak Republic of the inter-war period.

REFERENCE NOTES

¹*La République française*, 523 (April 16, 1873), p. 3. The comment referred to Mykhailo Drahomanov's article on contemporary Ukrainian literature under czarist Russian censorship; the article had appeared in *Revista Europea* earlier in the year.

²Mykola Khvylovyi, *Kamo hriadeshy* (Kharkiv, 1929), p. 42.

³Borys Krupnytskyi, "Istorychni osnovy evropeizmu Ukrainy,"

Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk, I, (May, 1948), hereafter cited as *LNV*.

⁴C. A. Macartney, *Problems of the Danube Basin* (Cambridge, 1942), p. 120. Hans Kohn, "The Impact of Pan-Slavism on Central Europe," *Review of Politics*, XXIII, No. 3 (July, 1961), 323.

⁵*Z dejín československo-ukrajinských vzťahov* (Bratislava, 1957). Cf. M. M. Mundiak, "František Řehoř i Ukraina," *Mizhslovianski literaturni vzaiemyny* (Kiev, 1958), pp. 279-87.

⁶V. E. Andic, "The Economic Aspects of Aid to Russian and Ukrainian Refugee Scholars in Czechoslovakia," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, XXI, No. 2 (July, 1961), 176-87.

⁷Symon Narizhnyi, *Ukrainska emigratsiia* (Prague, 1942). Cf. Roman S. Holiat, "Short History of the Ukrainian Free University," *Ukrainian Quarterly*, XIX, No. 3 (Autumn, 1963), 204-226.

⁸Narizhnyi, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

⁹M. M., "Pratsia ukrainskoho studentstva sered chuzhyntsviv," *Studentskyi vistnyk*, No. 12 (December, 1925), pp. 7-12.

¹⁰Narizhnyi, *op. cit.*, pp. 107-111.

¹¹V. Doroshenko, "Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk," *LNV*, Vol. 32, No. 1 (May, 1948), p. 48.

¹²*Ibid.*, pp. 52-53.

¹³D. Dontsov, "Agoniia odnoii doktryny," *LNV*, Vol. 82 (January, 1924), pp. 56-57.

¹⁴*LNV*, Vol. 82 (February, 1924), p. 177.

¹⁵D. Dontsov, *Natsionalism* (Lviv, 1924).

¹⁶See also a brief review of the writers of the Prague center in *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, I (Toronto, 1963), pp. 1060-1063.

¹⁷E. Malaniuk, "Oksana Laturynska," *Kyiv*, VI, No. 3 (May-June, 1955), 118. For the translations of Javor's poems by Laturynska, see *Porohy*, No. 72-75 (December, 1956), p. 2.

¹⁸George S. N. Luckyi, "Ukrainian Literature: The Last Twenty-five Years," *Books Abroad*, No. 2 (1956), p. 139.

¹⁹E. M., "Z liryky J. S. Machara," *Studentskyi vistnyk*, No. 3-4 (1931), p. 2.

²⁰Bohdan Kravtsiv, "Leonid Mosendz i ioho *Ostannii prorok*," *Ostannii prorok* (Toronto, 1960), pp. xxix-xxxi.

²¹Quoted in M. Mukhyn, "Iasnozoryi Iurii," *Kyiv*, IV, No. 1

(Jan.-Feb., 1953), 44.

²²Yurii Sherekh, "Styli suchasnoi literatury na emigratsii," *MUR* (1946), p. 72.

²³E. Malaniuk, "Poslannia," *LNV*, Vol. 93 (1926), p. 302.

²⁴E. Malaniuk, "Pro dynamizm," *Veselka*, No. 11-12 (1923), pp. 46-47.

²⁵Luckyj, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

²⁶Bohdan Osadczuk, "Współczesna Ukraina," *Kultura* (Paris), No. 5 (1964), p. 83. M. I. Molnar, "Ukrains'ka literatura v Chekhii i Slovachchyni," *Mizhslovianski literaturni vzaiemyny* (Kiev, 1958), p. 288; M. I. Molnar, "Ukrainistyka v Chekhoslovachchyni," *Literaturna Ukraina* (Kiev), August 18, 1964.

CANADIANS WITH A DIFFERENCE

If the romance between the immigrants from the Ukraine and the Canadian Prairies at the turn of this century has resulted in a reasonable harmonious marriage, it was due to the fact that—fortunately for Canada—the judgement of astute administrators prevailed against that of some opinionated but less-than-clairvoyant editors.

The wooing began with the arrival in Winnipeg of two West Ukrainian farmers, in 1891. Ivan Pylypiw and Vasyl Eleniak went to see first the lands around Yorkton, Saskatchewan, and Calgary, Alberta, before they became enchanted with the farming prospects in southern Manitoba where the Mennonites had made a striking success out of their 15-year-old agricultural venture.

Upon returning to the Austrian-held part of the Ukraine, Pylypiw was jailed for a month for “spreading tales” about the “free and fertile lands in Canada” among the Ukrainian peasants. But the “damage” had been done and nothing could have stopped the land-and-freedom-hungry farmers from going overseas.

The first Ukrainian-Canadian was born at Winnipeg in 1893. But the first Ukrainian rural settlement in Manitoba was founded August 11, 1896, when immigration from the Ukraine to Canada began in earnest. The first Ukrainian school district

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was organized in the area of Dauphin, where now an annual Ukrainian Festival of Manitoba is held, usually in the first days of August. (Over 5,000 Ukrainian-Canadian youth swelled the ranks of the older generation there this year.)

Most of Manitoba

Thus, when Canada entered the First World War conflict, about 100,000 Ukrainians had already settled in the West, with Manitoba taking the bulk of the immigrant wave.

They came in a somewhat subdued mood as their hearts still remained with the people in their own country subjugated by Austria and Russia. And they never ceased thinking of returning, some day, to their Old Country because they saw themselves regarded as a less-than-desirable element in this part of North America. To quote one example of the then prevalent attempts at arousing public opinion against the settlers, here are two excerpts from a Winnipeg newspaper, *The Daily Nor'Wester*:

The southern Slavs are probably the least promising of all the material that could be selected for nation building. . . (Dec. 23, 1896).

By their unintelligent methods of farming they will lower the reputation of the products of the community. . . and their farms will be a centre from which weeds and animal disease will be disseminated in the fields and herds of their neighbours. (Aug. 3, 1897).

The *Toronto Mail* added much to the stir by spreading a canard story about some 50,000 undesirable Ukrainians coming to Manitoba via the United States.

But the sagacious Clifford Sifton, Minister of Immigration in Sir Wilfrid Laurier's government, held to his belief that the impoverished farmers from the Ukraine were indeed a “good quality.” In this he was supported by the president of the Canadian Pacific Railway, Van Horne, and such immigration inspectors as Hugo Carstens who reported: “These people seem to me on the whole very frugal and industrious, and would get along well in this country, if they only had some means to start farming with.”

Gradually, the attitude of the populace toward the newcomers began warming up, as they more than fulfilled the expectations of Canada's administrators. Indeed, they became modest but important co-builders of this nation — a fact recognized by one of the present government's spokesmen, Mitchell Sharp: "As a Westerner, born in Winnipeg, whenever I think of my Ukrainian friends I think of the great role (their) people played in opening and developing the West."

At first they received some of the poorest land, refused by the settlers from the British Isles as too uneconomic. But soon they would acquire better land from the discouraged settlers who moved to urban centers or to more profitable occupations. Eventually, the Manitoban Ukrainians, together with those of Alberta and Saskatchewan, came to share in the ownership of about 10 million acres of land.

The inter-war period saw more Ukrainians coming to Canada, and Manitoba absorbed most of these former soldiers, laborers and intelligentsia who vitally strengthened the Ukrainian community there.

Today, out of the half-a-million Ukrainian-Canadians about 115,000 call Manitoba their homeland, with Winnipeg harboring the largest concentration of them — 65,000. Being second only to the Manitobans of British stock as to the percentage (12 percent), the Ukrainians have made their presence felt in every field of that prairie community. Mind you, in 1951 there was only one judge of Ukrainian origin; today there are a number of them, including one woman — Judge Mary Wawrykiw. The first Ukrainian member of the Manitoba legislature was elected in 1913; today, there are seven — two of them cabinet ministers and one the Speaker.

Professional men — doctors, lawyers, pharmacists, engineers, ecologists and university professors — together with businessmen and thousands of highly trained persons in industry and commerce have changed the complexion of the Manitoba Ukrainian community once dominated by farmers. The community has been sending their representatives to the House of Commons and have their spokesman in the Senate — Dr. Paul Yuzyk, a man who was born in Manitoba and wrote a well-documented history of the Ukrainians in that province.

The post-war influx of about 40,000 Ukrainians transformed

Manitoba into a central Ukrainian region in Canada and Winnipeg into a virtual capital of this ethnic group.¹

No wonder then that in that city a monument to Taras Shevchenko, the greatest Ukrainian poet-revolutionary, was erected on the grounds of the Provincial Legislature.

When the unveiling of the monument took place in July, 1961, (with Canada's Prime Minister John Diefenbaker taking part in this partly tri-lingual ceremony), I had an ample opportunity to observe the impact of the event on the Manitoba Ukrainians, old and young alike. A former rural school teacher told me: "This is the day that I have become a full-fledged citizen of Canada, in fact and not only in form, as one of our own people is being recognized as equal with the English and French men of culture."

And Capt. Stephen Pawluk expressed the feelings of the thousands of Manitoba Ukrainian war veterans at their convention held the day before: "This is our land and our country because we were born here, our ancestors rest in peace here, in the soil they had been toiling on and which we defended in two World Wars. And our cultural heritage is being respected by our fellow-citizens."

To be sure, in the First World War about 10,000 Ukrainian Canadians joined the Canadian force overseas. In the Second World War, the same number of Ukrainians from Manitoba alone fought under the Red Ensign for the cause of Canada, along with over 30,000 Ukrainians from other provinces. And they did this in spite of their aversion to the fact that one of Canada's allies was Soviet Russia, the oppressor of the Ukraine.

By sharing in the destinies of all Canadians, the Manitoba Ukrainians have found a good response among the multi-lingual citizens of the province. Often, there is a much better rapport between, let's say, the Polish-Canadians and Ukrainian-Canadians than there ever was between their grandparents when those lived side by side in East Europe. Inter-marriages with other ethnic groups are a common occurrence as well as the cases where members of such mixed families speak both their languages passably.

From my encounters with Manitobans of various ethnic extractions, I have got an impression that they feel first of all Canadian. Only then and there I understood the sentiments of a

statement made by Senator Yuzyk last year in Winnipeg: he professed to never be able to accept that he be English or French but that he felt a Canadian first and above all. These sentiments are shared by most of the Manitobans, and they make them Canadians with a difference. Their Canadian patriotism is undiluted by the reminiscence of being the descendants of some great power; and it is devoid of the ridiculous anti-Americanism which spoils the stature of many a Canadian in the non-prairie provinces.

But what worries many a Manitoban of Ukrainian origin, is the question of the preservation of their culture to which their language is the essential key. Their hopes were raised in 1965, when the then Quebec Premier Jean Lesage made a sincere attempt at establishing French-Ukrainian cooperation in the field of teaching the two languages in the two provinces.

Now, the Manitoba Ukrainians are asking to have implemented the recommendations of the Fourth Report of the B and B Commission, no matter how limited these appear to them.² Fortunately, once again Canada seems to have astute administrators whose judgment may yet prevail against the opinionated editors of some Western Canadian newspapers.

Forum

The B and B Commission's recommendations were discussed at the forum of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee at Winnipeg last July, in the presence of Robert Stanbury, minister responsible for citizenship. The Ukrainian spokesmen stressed the point that they did not wish to become—as Dr. I. Hlynka put it—"pawns in the struggle between French and English Canadians."

But their approach to the issue is both constructive and optimistic as they put great store on the vitality of their own ethnic group as well as on the wisdom of Canada's leaders. "Professional and business people, and—what is more important, students—are joining our organized community in ever larger numbers. And no matter how assimilated they may be into the social fabric of Canadian life they still want to preserve and develop Ukrainian culture and language," said Dr. S. Kalba,

executive director of the committee, while explaining to me the significance of the "Manitoba Cultural Mosaic Congress" to be convened at Winnipeg next week.

This congress, arranged by the federal and Manitoba governments, is promising to become the most effective in-depth study ever undertaken in Canada of the methods of promoting and preserving multi-cultural values. Manitoba Ukrainians are going to play an important part in this effort thus proving once again the sagacity of the builders of this nation who had envisaged the country as a free land of a free people for all the freedom-loving people of every cultural background sharing in its tremendous opportunities.

REFERENCE NOTES

¹According to the 1971 census, there were in Canada 580,000 Canadians of Ukrainian origin, 114,000 of them living in Manitoba.

²In Volume IV of its report, the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism reported on the economic, social, and political position in the life of Canada of those groups other than of British or French origin and made recommendations for its strengthening.

A LIFE OF DISTINCTION

The Gazette Editor's Note: *How does a Ukrainian-Canadian feel about living and working in Quebec? What does he feel about bilingualism and biculturalism and the French fact? Most importantly, what does he feel about his own identity?*

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There are more than 500,000 Ukrainian-Canadians in Canada, and 15,000 in Montreal.

We are Quebecers.

This is the prevalent mood among Ukrainian-Canadians living in this beautiful province and seems by no means unique. Other ethnic groups in Quebec take the same stance.

In the same manner, the Ukrainian-Canadians of Manitoba are Manitobans, those in Alberta or Ontario are first of all Albertans or Ontarians respectively.

What else could be expected in such a huge country as Canada with its different geographic and climatic regions, with a population of numerous cultural backgrounds, all subjected to different trends and pressures?

Reprinted with permission from *The Gazette* (Montreal), January 20, 1972, where it appeared under the title "Ukrainian-Canadians Pin Hopes on Life of Distinction, but Without Separatism."

To develop their own region into a better place to live is the desire closest to the hearts of the people in this province.

Without diminishing loyalty to Canada as a whole, any segment of the population in a given province can and should have a full life only by integrating into both provincial and municipal activities and by accepting sincerely the particular way of life of that region.

Participation

Thus, a Ukrainian-Canadian in Quebec will have a full life only through his participation in the affairs, events and interests of Quebec—be they economic, political or cultural. This includes also an intrinsic recognition of the aspirations of the Quebecois aimed at preserving and developing their language, their culture and their specific political identity as well.

But does a Ukrainian-Canadian have such an opportunity in a dignified manner? Does he feel really wanted and accepted by the French-speaking society here? And, for that matter, is he expected to take his rightful place in developing this particular province into a recognized unit with a special rights and a distinctive status within the Confederation?

Unfortunately, as of now, the answer to these important questions must be no.

As used to be the case in the English-speaking provinces up to the early 1950s, a Ukrainian-Canadian in Quebec still lives behind a "glass curtain of *desinteressement*."

All that is expected from him is (as it was in other provinces, 20 years ago) to work, to produce goods, to consume, and thus create more opportunities for the majority of the population.

Moreover, the more the fighting mood envelopes the younger generation of the French-language community, the more often one hears of old, familiar cry for assimilation of third-language groups.

Persecutions

Such a demand on the part of those who feel endangered by the 250-million strong English-speaking North Americans is more than strange to these small ethnic groups. Most of their members still remember cultural, religious, and political persecutions they or their kin suffered in Europe.

The calls for an outright assimilation of the third-language groups in this province puts before them a weird dilemma: either to become French-speaking or English-speaking persons without any right to preserve and develop individual characteristics of their own particular background.

Such a right means a great deal to any human being, even if the person may never exercise the right. It grants him a very intimate instrument of communication and self-expression as represented by the particular language and traditional customs of his original nationality. It was the very lack of such right in their own countries that prompted parents and grandparents of the third-language citizens of Canada to settle in this country.

What these settlers, and later on other immigrants, expected to find here was not merely a larger or tastier piece of their daily bread which could be consumed in more comfortable surroundings. A human being seldom wants to live by bread alone.

Consequently, the immigrants from Eastern Europe came here in search of equal opportunities both for themselves and their descendants, because these were denied to them in their own countries.

More than anything else, these immigrants to Canada desired a chance to develop themselves into complete human beings who, while being full-fledged citizens of this country, would preserve their own cultural heritage that would be respected and, perhaps, even utilized by their co-citizens for the common good.

No Separatism

No third-language group in Canada has ever aspired to establish here "a nation of its own." None ever aimed at taking over a slice of this country or developing it for its own exclusive use.

"You won't find another Ukraine in the whole world," Taras

Shevchenko, the great Ukrainian poet and patriot of 100 years ago warned his countrymen.

Every Ukrainian-Canadian believes this statement to be valid and applicable today. Thus, what the Ukrainian-Canadians desired here was a decent place to live in dignity and harmony with the people who pioneered this wilderness land.

The average Ukrainian-Canadian in Quebec is fully aware of, and has a great admiration for, the pioneer achievement of the Quebecois, for their development of their own way of life.

That they have achieved this on a continent dominated by the English has only strengthened our admiration.

But the admiration the Ukrainian-Canadians have for the Quebecois achievement results from a peculiar affinity they feel with the people of Quebec.

From the Plains of Abraham has arisen a distinctive Franco-Canadian people with specific culture and political identity of its own. This could have happened only within the peculiar English sphere of influence, in which fair play is practiced more often than in any other colonial empire.

It is worth noting, that in this context, the Ukraine lost its political autonomy and was deprived by Russia of its own legal institutions at about the same time as New France became a British dependency—in 1764. Yet, even today the Ukraine—formally a founding member of the United Nations—has not been able to regain as much of its autonomy in its internal affairs as Quebec had in 1867.

And the Ukrainians in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, all appearances to the contrary, have much less freedom and fewer opportunities than the Ukrainian-Canadians in Quebec.

More French

While comparing the two unequal entities, and while observing the economic, cultural and psychological developments in Quebec today, the Ukrainians in this province are willing to say together with the rest of the population here: "We are Quebecers indeed."

More and more of them are becoming able to express themselves and work in French. More and more are acquiring a deeper insight into the aspirations of their French-Canadian co-citizens.

But does the French-Canadian society at large, comprehend this frame of mind of the people who never expected to face the present-day dilemma: either become English or French-speaking citizens of Canada with no chance to preserve your own cultural identity.

It seems that the average Quebecois, and the elite of this French speaking province as well, are too involved in their own affairs to notice this plight of a large segment of Canada's population.

But the fact is that the better the conditions for preservation of the so-called ethnic cultural heritage in Quebec, the stronger will be the bonds connecting these third-language groups to the destinies of the province.

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THE CANADIAN OPTION FOR 1975 AND BEYOND: UNITY THROUGH DIVERSITY

As we are about to enter the final quarter of the 20th century, two trends make themselves more and more evident in various parts of the world. Humane nationalism and socio-political diversity are replacing the great-state nationalism, and the imperial concepts of unity through uniformity, respectively. The cumulative result of these two inter-acting forces is reflected both in the rise of minorities and the emergence of hitherto "invisible nations."

Contrary to all the earlier predictions by publicists, politicians and scholars, almost every minority is holding its ground as tenaciously in the age of nuclear energy and space flights as it did in the earlier, less technological centuries. Nowadays, scholars at last concede that in spite of all the technology and rational organization modern states possess, conflicts in various parts of the world are still "tribal" rather than ideological. That is why world opinion is compelled to recognize, no matter how reluctantly, the existence of such "written off" minorities as the Crimean Tartars, the Soviet Jews, the Volga Germans, the

The keynote address delivered at the Montreal Conference on "The Future of Ukrainian-Canadians in Quebec," June 10, 1972.

people of Biafra and Bangladesh along with the more visible nationalities such as Belorussians and Ukrainians.

To be sure, forces of reaction are still waging a strong rear-guard action. They find their main support in the innate inertia which causes almost every society in any region and at any time to lean backwards and oppose the forward moving forces of the new age. That is why the idea that (to quote James A. Froude) "the superior part has a natural right to govern" and "the inferior part has a right to be governed",¹ still survives in most majority-societies. It is usually accompanied, and sustained, by a prevalent pseudo-scholarly practice of the majority ethnocultural groups to describe themselves in universalist terms while reducing "ethnicity" to a term descriptive of minorities and irregularities only — that is, of *deviations from the norm*.

(Whenever I use the term "ethnic" here, I refer to a nationality in the sense it is being more and more referred to by sociologists.)

Fortunately, new ideas (as that original economist Keynes found) have a strange and beneficial habit of spreading by osmosis — the tendency of fluids to pass through porous partitions and become diffused through each other; in our case, the two fluids are the two different streams of human thinking. If such ideas contain the stuff of life, they eventually inseminate the human mind and prompt a society to get rid of its outdated concepts.

We are witnessing such processes in many regions of the world where ethnic and other minorities become noticeable, respectable and acceptable; some of them are well on their way to reasserting themselves as equals among the majority-nationalities.

People of Ukrainian civilization are in the midst of that confrontation between the two camps — that of progress and that of reaction — both in Ukraine itself and in the countries of their settlement. Since they have been involved in their own struggle for identity for about two centuries, there would seem to be hardly anything new for them in the process.

But there is something essentially new and encouraging indeed. It is an unusually favorable situation for all the people interested in a more humane concept of inter-ethnic relations, which is evolving primarily here, in Canada. This confederate country composed of various ethnocultural entities is trying to

attain two goals at the same time: to establish a harmonious all-Canada multicultural society which would be unified in spite of the diversity of its demography, and while doing so, to make its own imprint on the surrounding mankind within which the battle for human rights is far from having been won yet.

In that double-pronged effort, in which Ukrainian-Canadians are certainly more than mere spectators, many people are tempted by some pace-slowng desires. To quote Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, there is this desire "either to abandon the past or to resist tenaciously anything unfamiliar."² While either course would be disastrous to opt for by any society, the third option is even more perilous because of its superficial acceptability: it is to remain comfortable without budging from the position the group of citizens had occupied long ago or which it acquired by the sheer inertia of negative traditionalism.

Well, none of us here wants to become as fossilized as those who simply have chosen to sit on their legacy. Neither do we intend to oppose new constructive trends or remain satisfied with the past which is still being presented to us as the only plausible solution of the life complexities on the North American continent.

What is then *the past* in this case of ours — that of Canadian citizens and residents of Quebec at the same time?

Essentially, this past is the old worn-out image of Canada as consisting of British institutions alone with the Anglo-Saxon element dominating the political, cultural and economic life of the population, with individualistic puritan-based approach to beliefs, and an immigration policy trimmed to the principle of "the natural selection of immigrants with the same qualities."

Such a concept of Canada, fortunately opposed by as many citizens of this country as it is cherished, still prompts Canadians of British background to view Canada's population as if it were composed of two unequal groups of citizens: the Canadians and the ethnics. By the same token, a Scandinavian immigrant regards himself and is tolerated by the majority group as a regular citizen without ethnic label. But a Ukrainian, Polish or Slovak Canadian remains an "ethnic" in spite of being a descendant of Canada-born parents.

It is obvious that any further continuation of the belief that ethnicity is descriptive of "deviation from the norm" rather than

of distinctive nationality would only strengthen the psychological barriers dividing the two segments of Canadian citizens. These barriers are felt as visible signs of discrimination especially today when Ukrainian-Canadians, for one, are more than 80 percent Canada-born and are aware of the fact that thousands of their kinsmen fought in two world wars for the interests of Canada as their native country.

Thus, it is almost a truism to say that there has been an urgent need for a new concept of Canadianism, one that would manifest itself by a new sensitivity on the part of every Canadian as to his ethno-cultural background. Nevertheless, it is useful to reaffirm once again some obvious truths.

First, that all Canadians are immigrants or their descendants.

(While we accord the title of indigenous Canadians to Eskimos and Indians, this is only a recognition of these people being the original settlers on this continent. But to be a truly indigenous Canadian in the contemporary meaning of the term requires much more than nomadic or even settled residence on a given territory. It requires a conscious effort on a people's part to acquire and develop their own socio-political identity under the given name and within their own cultural and economic institutions. In that respect, only French-Canadians have a justified claim to call themselves a distinctive "nation," in the French or continental European meaning of the term.)

Second, most Canadians are descendants of immigrants who, at a certain point in their history, were either defeated or oppressed minorities.

Many Maritimers and Ontarians trace their origin to the United Empire Loyalists, the people who were expelled from the American colonies when these had chosen to secede from the British Kingdom. French-Canadians were conquered by the British and found themselves in the position of a minority. Ukrainians came to Canada to find freedom they did not have in their own country within the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires. So did the Poles who also searched for more human conditions because of the same reasons. The German-speaking and Russian non-conformists were looking for a place where they could practice their own beliefs without any state interference.

Our conclusion then is as obvious as are the two premises.

There is hardly any good reason for clinging today to the old concept of Canada as it had been formed under the influence of the British political concept in which state and nation became interchangeable terms. One should not forget that the concept has been solidified here by the melting-pot ideas imported from the United States, the very country many a would-be Canadian shied away from because of its growing assimilatory practices.

But being realistic, as we are trying to be, we must also be aware of two important factors which continue to favor the retention of this concept in the minds of our majority co-citizens.

To begin with, there is geography.

Distances and climate create regions and regionally-minded people. The regionalism of the British Columbians is easily noticed and understood. But the existence of other regional enclaves—such as Anglo-Saxon Toronto or Southwest Ontario—may escape the attention of many a Canadian. Yet, the regional thinking is as much alive there as it used to be about 50 years ago in spite of the influx of European and other immigrants. Indeed, various groups of our population in one and the same province may, and often do, live separated from one another by the distances of race, origin, religion, cultural and political traditions or even socio-economic standing.

Consequently, Canada of the early 1970s still resembles a picturesque archipelago of human islands which exist in self-contained solitudes. Out of necessity, federal authorities seem to be cast more and more into the role of a sea captain who, by his regular visits to various islands, tries to keep communications open among them and encourages those who seem to be, or feel, neglected or discriminated against. It is only fair to admit that nowadays more and more ships of mutual contact and information reach the shores of these communities thanks to the modernized system of our government and the existence of developed mass media.

Nevertheless, these macro- and micro-societies retain a great deal of their insular character no matter what their designation is—be it British-Canadians, French-Canadians or any of the "others." Therefore, Mr. Trudeau hardly exaggerated when he said recently in Toronto:

"In this age of universal literacy, of professional communicators and electronic wizardry, a Canadian living in Nanaimo,

B.C., understands less of his fellow citizen in Sherbrooke, Que., than did a Spartan of events at Carthage."³

If this is true, as I believe it to be, then how much less by comparison does a Canadian of British or French stock know about his fellow citizens of Ukrainian, Polish, Czech, Greek, Italian or Serbian origin even though they may live in the same city or town?

But this regionalism—in geographic and psychological meanings—has been steadily intensified by the somewhat static constitution of Canada, the B.N.A. Act. It deals essentially with group rights rather than with individuals and their human rights.⁴

(By stating this, I do not mean we should blame the Fathers of Confederation for not having foreseen the complex demographic structure Canada would acquire a century later. And Ukrainian immigrants and their descendants in particular would refrain from raising such a charge, for the simple reason that it was under that "static constitution" that Canada gave them a better chance to live in freedom and dignity than they would have had on the Ukrainian territory under any of the foreign regimes).

But the fact remains that today's needs of Canada's population, as it developed over the last century, are essentially different from those in 1867. It is being widely felt that an important element is missing in our constitutional system and in our socio-political infrastructure because of that difference. What is needed is a deliberate stress on the rights of an individual citizen without regard to his ethnocultural background, with written-in guarantees for—and a practical acceptance by the majority—of a free use he can make of the total sum of his possibilities for becoming a complete person in a community of equal citizens.

Well, there is more practical sense to this statement than meets the eye. This postulate is deeply rooted in a fact of life fairly recently re-discovered by social sciences. It appears that "man has no other way to cope with the reality in which he finds himself, than by differentiating it." Thus, according to a sociologist, Professor Harold Isaacs, basic group identity "is not merely related to a need to be special, or unique, or different from others; but is fundamental to an individual's sense of *belongingness* and the level of his self-esteem." From works by such prominent linguists and anthropologists as Noam Chomsky

and Claude Levi-Strauss respectively, one concludes that diversity is indeed "structured into the human experience itself."⁵

It is to be regretted then that the idea of "unity through uniformity" still finds a wide acceptance among Canadians. To an editorial writer on the west coast, "a pure, frank and unadulterated Canadianism" still seems to be superior to any multiculturalism even though the latter may grant a more dignified position to every individual citizen of any ethnocultural background.⁶ Recently, the *Globe and Mail* editorialized on the protest by the vice-chairman of the Etobicoke Board of Education in Toronto against the Board's decision to permit a course in Ukrainian at Royal York Collegiate. That official argued: "If one ethnic group gets its language taught, there is no way we could say no to others."⁷

That educator still clings to the idea of compulsory uniformity in the same manner as his predecessors did in relation to the French language and culture in Canada a decade or so ago.

The two quoted instances from among many illustrate the ambivalence of the English-speaking majority of our citizens who extoll values of human rights on United Nations Day, demand granting unimpeded cultural development to any minority in other countries but themselves are torn by doubts and fears whenever similar rights are demanded by their own co-citizens.

Although enlightened in many other respects, Canadian English-language papers would not bother quoting from editorials in Ukrainian, Polish, German or Italian papers here though even these may comment reasonably on essential all-Canadian or provincial issues. The language is not the sole obstacle holding them back; it is rather the belief that the ethnic papers are "a deviation from the norm" and will soon disappear anyway. Perhaps they will cease to exist some day, as some English-language newspaper enterprises disappear from time to time; but as of now, the ethnic papers do represent a living, a numerous and an active part of the Canadian public opinion.

As to other mass media, these appear to be opposed to the B & B Commission's recommendation that the ethnic groups be given a chance to produce and receive programs in their own languages by means of modern technical arrangements.

In theory, thus, Canada has rejected the American melting

pot concept years ago. But in fact, pressure to conform is strong and the survival of other cultures is questionable.

Hence the growing craving for constitutional guarantees and public recognition felt so painfully by both the immigrants and their descendants. Hence the numerous cases of rejection of their ethnicity by immigrants' children while in their formative years. Hence the frustration they feel after having realized their own ambivalence in their adult age. Hence the striking cases of eventual returning to the "ethnic roots" by many of them in later years or by those in the second and third generations. All that combines to produce an unsteady citizenship, a kind of "dead souls" with the citizenship certificates in their pockets but ever ready to exchange these for another country's citizenship documents as soon as an opportunity knocks at their door.

Obviously, something had to be done, and quickly, if the erosion of Canadian citizenship was to be stopped. Listening to the voices of the young who had been clamoring for such a change, Parliament endorsed unanimously—in principle at least—the policy of multiculturalism proposed by the Trudeau Government of October 8, 1971.⁸

Since then we have heard and read a great deal about the policy, its benefits and shortcomings. The Ukrainian-Canadian point of view has been presented, in its natural variety, by a number of authors and organizations, including the students. For our purpose here, I must say briefly this:

In spite of all its shortcomings and temporary limitations, pointed out by our critics, the policy represents an important step forward on the road to Canadian citizenship with a more human face. For the first time in Canada's history, the non-English and non-French Canadians are being officially recognized as human beings whose cultural background is as valuable as that of the two "founding nations;" and because of that their cultural development deserves a legitimate support from this nation's treasury.

Modest as it is, the aid means much more than the actual amount of money assigned for ethnocultural projects. In fact, it is a recognition of the diversity itself which exists in our midst in spite of the pressure for conformity of modern technology and economy. It also helps re-vindicate the faith our ancestors had in this country in which they hoped to find personal freedom and

prosperous life in dignity. Those hopes included, of course, the right to teach their children their language, with the given province concurring in the effort by administrative and financial measures, as was the case in Manitoba up to 1916.⁹

One might imagine the frustration felt by these people upon seeing their hopes turn into dust. That anticipation is behind the very acute sensitiveness of the "ethnics" to every sign of recognition or rejection of their cultural roots and achievements by the majority. The feeling of inferiority acquired in that painful process by the descendants of these immigrants is responsible for both the dejection felt by many among them and the demands, sometimes overstressed, to recognize them in words and deeds as fullfledged citizens; the feelings and the demands often puzzle the Anglo-Saxon majority as they would puzzle any dominant majority in any multinational country.

If only to free these people of their feeling of inferiority, as human beings, it would have been worthwhile to initiate a policy of multiculturalism; because such a policy is a manifest proof of the changing character of Canadian citizenship in step with the changing times. In this way, an end may be put to the division of Canada's citizens into two classes—the true Canadians and the ethnics. Provided, the words of the policy will be translated into action and find their reflection in Canada's citizenship requirements, the right to vote and stand for election, in census practices, in civil service employment, etc.

Seen in these terms, the policy of multiculturalism should be instrumental in changing the prevailing mood within the two majorities. As of now, however, both public opinions—English and French—look somewhat askance at the policy of multiculturalism, though for different reasons.

The English majority regards the multicultural policy as merely another maneuver of the party which wants to remain in power. In addition, there is a latent feeling of underestimation of the people of so-called foreign cultures. Thus, the majority simply refuses to discuss the issue of multiculturalism in a serious manner and treats the issue as non-existent or menial at best.

The French-speaking majority is concerned lest the Anglo-phone element in this dual confederation overwhelms, numerically and politically, the French element by means of the "bought off ethnics".

Neither objection should be underestimated by us because both rest on past experiences and on the ambivalence of Canadian politics. Ethnic voters had been placated in one way or another before every election, and not only in this country alone. The French-Canadians used to be balanced and contained with the help of immigrants—those “similar to the basic strain” and those from other nationalities. The newest figures on the 1971 census imply that the number of French-speaking persons has declined even in Quebec province. Small as it is, the decline intensifies the concern of the French-Canadian public as to its chance of surviving in the English-language ocean of North America.

These are the facts of life the Ukrainian-Canadians must be aware of in order to be able to act reasonably and practically toward the attainment of the objective which they have set before themselves, and which is envisioned as desirable by Canada’s government as well.

Indeed, there exists a considerable amount of good will in the governmental circles towards finding a satisfactory solution to Canada’s multi-ethnic problems. Some understanding is not lacking in the better informed segments of the two majorities either. But these segments are too weak yet to call the tune. That is why a great deal will depend on what use the third-language groups will make of the initial framework of the multicultural policy and to what degree they will be able to expand and upgrade it.

Numerous papers on multiculturalism by Ukrainian-Canadian authors—especially the elaborate essays by Senator Paul Yuzyk, Professor J. Rudnycky, Professor M. R. Lupul — have already contributed to the purpose.¹⁰ Without prejudicing the rightful demands expressed in all these papers, I feel somewhat concerned with one feature latent in them: much too great a reliance on, and belief in, the change by a governmental decree. They seem to believe solely in the change from above. But our democratic system, and the age we are living in, calls for strong and sustained initiatives from below. What is needed, is an ever-growing awareness among the average Ukrainian-Canadians that the desired change would come first of all through their direct participation in every sector of this country’s life, even in a direct competition with other co-citizens. No governmental decree, no parliamentary law and no constitutional guarantee

will be enough to save our ethnocultural group from extinction if there won’t be enough young people getting involved in the Ukrainian-Canadian cause and letting our presence felt in political parties, in economic and cultural enterprises, in federal and provincial fields of thought and action.

Herein lies the significance of such conferences as this one. They should help us in preparing ourselves for such an action from below without limiting ourselves to our rightful demands and proposals for action by federal and provincial authorities. But this means also a great deal of soul-searching and as much tearing down of our own outdated concepts and prejudices as concomitant acquisition of new ideas and new, positive approaches.

If so, then any concept of unity through uniformity (that is, through negative assimilation) is a costly proposition to any multi-ethnic society. All the attempts at destroying diversity lead to linguicide and often to genocide with a subsequent impoverishment of mankind itself. Thus, the well-known poetic words of John Donne from the 17th century acquire today a new and very modern meaning: “Any man’s death diminishes me, because I am involved in Mankind; And therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; It tolls for thee.”

Of paramount importance is to realize the fact that our demands for recognition as a viable minority are based on the needs of human nature as understood and accepted by recent scholarly research. These demands are necessary, dignified and rightful because they are proof—often the only one possible—that a given ethnocultural group refuses to commit a voluntary mass suicide.

It means that our aspirations to be humanly different are not a sentiment cherished by old immigrants alone; neither is it the wishful thinking of a people who are not able to integrate themselves in the modern developed society, as it is often claimed by the spokesmen of the governments in various centralist states. No, we have been integrated in this country for over half-a-century, perhaps more sincerely than even some immigrants from the British Isles. Some of our predecessors built Canada in the regions where Canada had existed in name only.

Consequently, the Ukrainian-Canadians (individually and collectively) must recover their self-esteem by getting rid of their

useless receptiveness to the ideas of negative assimilation. Many a good Ukrainian, Pole, Slovak or Italian went astray because he succumbed to the temptations of pseudo-universality and to the pressure from those who advocated a pseudo-scholarly argument that an immigrant is supposed to discard his own identity for the sake of a superior majority. Many a dead soul had been thus manufactured also in this country during the period of an official immigration policy based on negative assimilation. But neither Canada nor Quebec would profit from such dead-soul citizens, particularly in the epoch of the resurgence of minorities and invisible nationalities.

To achieve a higher standard of Canadian citizenship—the citizenship with a more human face—we ourselves must preserve and develop our ethnocultural educational facilities, our voluntary organizations, our churches, our traditional gatherings and customs, as well as our press. These institutions must regain their rightful place in our minds, as being useful and honorable instruments of human self-expression. Even the term “ethnic cultural ghetto” must be rehabilitated to mean what it truly is: a fertile ground for bringing up healthy individuals who, in their mature age, won’t be chasing psychiatrists as do all the dead souls. It is regrettable that for too long they have been the butts of sarcastic remarks by those cynics among us who had been steeped in assimilatory practices. In that respect, our intellectuals must carry out a great deal of re-thinking.

To the timid ones who are staggering under the weight of the argument that such an approach would create a new Tower of Babel here, we must say the following:

On the contrary, by giving an individual citizen as much sovereignty in his cultural-linguistic development as he can reasonably manage, we would open up most of the enclosures which had been erected around each minority exactly because of the lack of true cultural equality among our citizens. In the new conditions which are being created now with the aid from our governments (federal and some provincial), an individual of each culture should feel safe to take a voluntary swim to another cultural island without any qualms that he would betray his own group; and he may return at any time to his group, for some constructive activities there, without being regarded by the majority as a person that is stepping down from a higher plateau.

There is also an economic aspect involved in the concept as this approach would create job opportunities for the young within their own open ethnocultural communities. These are, in fact, developed cultural and economic microcosms which are able to support a large number of talented and well-educated social workers, teachers, librarians, organizers, artists, editors, radio and TV specialists. As of now, the inferiority stigma, attached to every ethnic group by the majority-society as much as by the ethnic groups themselves, tends to keep quite a few young people from getting involved on a full-time basis in their ethnic institutions and ventures. The regained status by ethnicity itself should encourage the young people to engage themselves in the field they had always felt they could excell in and improve upon.

Canadian federal and some provincial leaders have already contributed to creating the preconditions conducive to such a full participation of all citizens in this nation’s life as equals and mutually respected. The Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada specifically recommends that “a new Constitution should recognize in the preamble that Canada is multicultural rather than bicultural or unicultural.” The third languages of Canada ought to receive both provincial recognition and a federal guarantee in the form of “an umbrella provision in the Constitution to give them their due acknowledgement as one of the constituent elements of our country, ethnically and linguistically.”¹¹

These recommendations, combined with the official policy of multiculturalism which is based on the Report of the B & B Commission (Volume Four), ought to spur on the public opinion of the two majorities to re-thinking the desirability of uniformity. But the main burden of achieving that change will fall, I am afraid, again on the ethnocultural minorities themselves, especially on provincial levels. There, in each province, our interests are touched upon more directly and more regularly than in the federal scope of government; and there we must come out with some positive programs of action, we must make our presence felt.

This requires at least two basic ideas to direct our own thinking.

First, our own aspirations and demands must form part of

similar aspirations and demands of all other ethnocultural groups. They must be rooted in the principle of human rights for every group regardless of their size. Consequently, it would be advisable to refrain from making much ado about the number of Ukrainian-Canadians as a fact entitling them to some special consideration within the framework of multiculturalism. Even if there were 500 Ukrainian-Canadians, instead of 500 thousand, they would, and should have to, press for the same needs for human rights and constitutional guarantees and would have the same aspirations for equality with the majority-citizens as they do today as one of the larger ethnocultural groups.

This means that we must lend our unqualified support to the aspirations of every minority group in this country no matter what size the group is.

Second, we must acquire—and show—a sincere understanding of the situation our majority groups are in. And we should contribute to solving their problems or reaching their own goals because we are involved in their destinies as well.

This proposition brings us to the crucial, and somewhat neglected issue of the Ukrainian-Canadians vis-a-vis the French fact in Canada as a whole and in Quebec in particular. Within each of the two groups there do exist various preconceived ideas about one another, and some prejudices are not lacking either. Most of them are harmful to cooperation and hardly do any justice to the better qualities of each group and their individual members. Without going into details, which could and should be dealt with on another forum, I would rather confront you with a Kiplingian question. In his well-known poem “The English Flag”, Rudyard Kipling wrote: “And what should they know of England who only England know?”

Applied to our own situation, that line may run like this: “And what should they know of Ukraine who only Ukraine know?”

If we continue to be preoccupied, as we are, with the Ukrainian issue alone, we won't be able to grasp the complexity of our neighbor's problem. And more often than not we *do* miss some essential points because our own issues loom so large in front of our eyes—often without any connection with the surrounding reality. While the majority society is a loser in this proposition, it is not the only one: the loss in good relations is ours as well because, for one, the Ukrainian-Canadian problem

may have been taken out of the contemporary context by our isolationist attitudes and practices.

If we want to improve our own situation and put our relations with the French-Canadians on a practical level, we had better remind ourselves of some basic facts concerning the role of our French-speaking co-citizens.

To begin with, let's say to ourselves: Thank God there are the citizens who call themselves French-Canadians. Without them, and without their problem of preserving their linguistic and cultural identity, the Ukrainian or any other ethnocultural group in Canada would have faced almost insurmountable difficulties in surviving under the life conditions of English-speaking North America. Thanks to the successful self-assertion of the French-Canadians, this Confederation is on its way to becoming a bilingual country in practice, and it has begun evolving a concept of multicultural society as well.

Another fact, often forgotten by the French-Canadians themselves, is that it was the French who pioneered education in every province — from Newfoundland to British Columbia. Logically, one should expect from our contemporary French-speaking co-citizens a similar pioneer spirit in bridging all the different micro-worlds in this country by means of their language and educational facilities, and in a progressive manner corresponding to the new demographic face of the Confederation.

But above all, the Ukrainian-Canadians must recognize the fact that the French-Canadians are not as any other ethnocultural group of Canada's population, be it the English, the Scots, the Irish, the Ukrainians, the Italians or any other. Moreover, Quebec is not a province like any other province.

It means that we ought to recognize in practice now what we have known in our hearts all the time to be true—that this is a distinctive people with its own language and a viable culture practised in every day life and not in letters or for entertainment alone. This province is populated by over 80 percent French-speaking majority which elects its own legislators and administrators within its own constitutional and judicial systems; and it possesses an economic personality of its own. But what is more important, the French-Canadians living in Quebec possess that inner unity of purpose and that sense of their common past and present which are required for any people that desires to be

called a distinct nation. So, while accepting bilingualism in federal affairs, we should support the demand that French be the working-language of Quebec.

Only by recognizing these facts, we may hope for a parallel recognition of a similar socio-political truth by the French-Canadians, and by the Quebecois in particular: that our or any other ethnocultural group which possesses a similar self-awareness is indeed a micro-nationality even if it does not have its own territory or legal institutions or both. As Professor Arthur Lerner of Sir George Williams University pointed out in his article, there is a world-wide need for accepting the definition of a nation as it had been formulated by East European sociologists almost 70 years ago rather than to continue using the definition of the sociologists of Anglo-Saxon origin.¹²

Relying on these facts and propositions, let's open up towards our French-speaking co-citizens and say:

We understand your struggle for the survival of your language and culture. We are able to grasp the nuances of that issue because our own people have been involved in a similar struggle for about two centuries. Different as they are, the Ukrainian and the Quebecois cases still bear enough resemblance to elicit from our people a sincere sympathy and active support for your cause.

By the same token, we expect the French-speaking co-citizens to understand and appreciate the motivations of the Ukrainian community here or elsewhere. The Ukrainian-speaking citizens of Canada are trying to preserve and develop their ethnocultural heritage without intending, or causing, any damage to a similar French heritage. There are other just and reasonable motives behind that effort. First, the Ukrainians are individuals, just like French-Canadians, who want to feel and be complete human beings; this aspiration could be achieved only with the help of their own ethnocultural traditions. Second, the Ukrainian-Canadians are preserving their language and culture also for the sake of Ukrainian civilization as such; they want to strengthen the Ukrainian fact in the collective mind of contemporary mankind.

In this respect, the Ukrainian case of ethnocultural identity is much tougher than that of the French-Canadians, difficult though theirs is too. The Ukrainians have been denied, for many decades, even the right to call themselves Ukrainians. Even in

Canada, the term was introduced officially (by Federal Minister of Immigration J. Pickersgill) as late as May 1955, and only after a protracted pressure from all the Ukrainian-Canadian organizations.

The official policy of Russification in the Soviet Union threatens even the 40-million strong Ukrainian nationality there with a linguistic and cultural genocide. Hundreds of Ukrainian intellectuals, professional people, peasants and workers have been recently put behind prison bars in the Soviet Union only because they stood up to the Kremlin which deprives the Ukrainian people of their human rights on their own soil. Unfortunately, many scholarly institutions and mass media in the West still tend to favor the policy of pressing the Ukrainians into the mould of Russian uniformity.

By standing up for the Ukrainian civilization, as a part of their own ethnocultural personality, the Ukrainian-Canadians are standing up for survival of one part of mankind in the same manner as do the French-speaking Canadians, in their own way and for their own kind.

Thus, it would be fair enough to address a Kiplingian question to our French-speaking co-citizens as well: "And what should they know of Quebec who only Quebec know?"

An absolute preoccupation with one's own cause may lead to losing perspective of things and neglecting both natural friends and potential allies. More understanding for the spiritual needs of other ethnocultural groups in Canada and Quebec by the French-speaking society would only help finding practical solution to our common problems, national and provincial. Any lack of such an understanding, and especially any attempt at negative assimilation of these minorities (as once the English majority tried unsuccessfully to impose upon the French here) would only increase the estrangement of these groups from the French fact. Both sides would be losers in the outcome.

Various proposals could be, and will be, forwarded for developing better French-Ukrainian relations here. I would suggest only the following:

— In the field of education, let's proceed from that practical starting point which had been agreed upon in 1965 by the then Quebec Premier Jean Lesage and Senator Paul Yuzyk, as the spokesman of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, in Winnipeg:

Ukrainian language classes should be offered and financed by the Province of Quebec wherever there is a reasonable demand for them.¹³

—In the field of communication, Quebec French papers and other mass media should devote more space and time to informing the public about their Ukrainian-speaking co-citizens. A French-Ukrainian journal of a most modest size and circulation would be of tremendous importance in developing the mutual reconnaissance. Ukrainian-language papers and radio programs should pay more attention to the French-Canadian issues.

—Regular summer camps and youth exchange programs which would bring together young people of French and Ukrainian milieus both from Quebec and other provinces should be established as soon as possible.

—A Quebec Institute for French-Ukrainian Studies and Research is a must for students and scholars of the two nationalities. If lectures on Ukrainian civilization, literature and language were offered at lower university levels at least; if a scholarly publication were started, in the French language, for the discussion of French-Ukrainian subjects; if scholarships were awarded for those active in studies and research of the two cultures; if journalists and writers would acquire a more sophisticated knowledge of the two civilizations in relation to one another, then—a substantial number of Ukrainian students not only from the Quebec area but also from other provinces would be attracted here to get immersed in the atmosphere of the new inter-ethnic relations. In a few years' time, a number of bilingually-minded young people would be busy spreading the influence of French-Canadian culture across the whole country or even continent. Thus, the number of Quebec friends would be growing while the French-speaking society would acquire a substantial insight into the Ukrainian-speaking element and the Ukrainian civilization with its Canadian aspects.

Seen in this light, multiculturalism must not and need not become a tool for ancient designs aimed at limiting or subduing the French-speaking people on their own territory. On the contrary, this may become a potent instrument for mutually gaining friends. To those who advocate, for Canada or Quebec, a concept of dual uniformity by ordering every minority to select one

of the two official melting pots—either English or French—we must address our reasonable appeal:

Only diversity opens up new prospects for all citizens to co-exist and co-operate in mutual respect. The French-speaking people on this continent may get a much better chance of preserving and developing their ethnocultural sovereignty within the concept of diversity than within a system of uniformity—acquired from outside or self-imposed.

Even the United States, for centuries the largest melting pot in the world, is slowly abandoning the concept of uniformity in favour of a dynamic citizenship of culturally different minorities. The Soviet Union is the only, and the last, multinational empire in which uniformity is being effected by coercive methods. The Kremlin leaders, doctrinaires as they are, still are clinging to the dialectical formula of Lenin who, before he knew better, wrote in 1913:

A struggle against oppression of any nationality—unconditional yes. A struggle for every ethnic development, for any national culture—unconditional no. The proletariat refuses to defend the national development of every nation; on the contrary, the proletariat favors every kind of assimilation of nationalities excepting a forced one or which is rooted in a privilege.¹⁴

Out of this vicious formula, refuted by science and life itself, grew up the present Soviet system of cultural oppression within which the Ukrainians are carrying the heaviest burden. It would be a pity if in our Confederation, or in any single province, a similar idea of “unity through uniformity” took hold of the informed public opinion. This would lead only to dehumanization of, and subsequent conflicts in, our multicultural society which otherwise has an excellent opportunity to develop itself into a viable example of humane inter-ethnic relations.

Because of their unique experiences, the French-Canadians and Ukrainian-Canadians have a particular responsibility for achieving this desirable and dignified objective.

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THE INVISIBLE ETHNIC

During the past decade or so, I have sometimes stayed awake late thinking of Canada as a living concept. A growing anxiety would then envelop me—an anxiety I believed that millions of Canadians shared. They still do so, I think, even though I myself have somewhat subdued my own fearful worries.

Mind you, not that any of us ever felt nightmarishly afraid! We have encountered too many dangers in our earlier lives to be "scared." But, thinking about tomorrow's Canada (which must be an outcrop of today's Canada) our anxiety concerned our descendants in the maple-leafed country we had chosen as home.

We never wanted them (our children) to trudge the same path—the hard trail of uprooted persons—we had been obliged to follow. Nor did we wish them to be exposed to the undisguised and disguised discrimination and assimilatory patterns many of us had had to face in the not too distant past.

We sincerely and naturally hoped they would be treated as Canadian citizens without any kind of stigma attached to them because of their origin or variegated cultural background.

That's why we had been searching, as once our predecessors did, for a country where a man or a woman would

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feel a whole person—sovereign in thought and in legal act: Equals among equals pragmatically speaking.

As we looked for firm ground in which to plant our family roots, hopefully to flourish in a new climate, we were also deeply concerned about the constitutional guarantees that would preserve the rights which had been denied to many of us in our countries of birth. Above all, *the right to be one-self*.

For this reason so many “third-language” Canadians, impressed by John Diefenbaker’s Canadian Bill of Human Rights in 1960, found the measure a hopeful vista.

From then on we were able to hope to become, and remain, loyal citizens of this country without losing, or having to mislay, our own identity.

Similarly, the policy of multiculturalism, announced by Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau in October 1971, found even stronger resonance in the hearts of about five million Canadians whose cultural background was other than British or French. In that policy, acclaimed by the leaders of the opposition parties in Parliament, we saw a step on the road towards what might be called human expression on its face.

The latter observation should not be taken as a dubious reflection on the quality of the citizenship about which many well-deserved praises have been sung by native and adopted citizens of this country.

In comparison with other countries, Canadian citizenship certainly ranks high in the minds of “ethnic” people.

Ukrainian immigrants, for one, have found here, more than anywhere else, the most favorable conditions for their survival, even compared with those in the United States.

But no eulogy should camouflage frailties. Even the most silvery cloud has its dark lining, they say.

And in this case *the dark lining* is that still far too many “third-language” Canadians feel rootless, appearances to the contrary.

Not that “ethnics” are visibly discriminated against, but rather because they are at worst ignored, or at best sedulously tolerated by what are called Canada’s two founding nations.

This feeling of rejection is familiar to French-Canadians who, it is obvious, still nurse the wounds inflicted by centuries-long confrontation with Anglophones both in their own “pays” Quebec and in other provinces of a vast land they helped to discover, explore, and construct.

The “third-language” Canadians, to their own consternation, rarely realized the schizoid nature of the French-Canadian plight until the early 1960s: A neglect demonstrating how removed they had been from one of the realities of Canada’s social structure.

Neither “founder” regarded their interest or sympathy worthwhile enough to be recruited.

As potential allies, as participants in debate, *we were paper puppies*.

British-oriented Canadians regarded it the only duty of any “third-language” Canadian—immigrants and their descendants—to merge with the Anglophone ranks, thus balancing the French-Canadian strategy based on high birth-rate and known as “revenge of the cradle”—their fecund means of gaining advantage over the British.

The French-Canadians on the whole detested the newcomers from Europe because they seemed much too eager to play the role of psychological mercenaries in that indigenous war of two cultures. The “neos” were too easily mustered to swell the opponents’ ranks.

No wonder then that the powerful resurgence of the French-Canadian fact, and its subsequent meek acceptance (almost overnight) by the mighty “British-Canadians,” took the non-English and non-French-Canadians by surprise. Soon, however, their amazement was replaced by the realization that there would be two melting pots to cope with instead of the previous single cauldron.

Now, how can we explain to “belligerent” French-Canadians that their claim to an equal share in the spoils of assimilation of the “other-language settlers,” and their descendants, leaves the latter with the same spiritual trauma the French-Canadians themselves had suffered, and, as they claim, are still suffering from?

What is unpalatable sauce for the goose is equally unpalatable for the gander.

And how can we explain to English-Canadians—by now haunted by the specter of the growing French fact—the feeling of dejection felt by the “third-language” Canadians left in a pointed dilemma after decades of having been mobilized against a determined French resurgence of cultural identity?

As American sociologists begin discovering something of value in Canada’s “cultural islands” and “Canadian cultural ghettos”

(to quote Vance Packard among others), “third-language” Canadians find themselves abandoned in a no man’s land between two opponents—by now formally raised to the status of two founding nations.

The “third-language” Canadians have no constitutional guarantees shoring up either their desire or their right to be themselves as sovereign human beings.

Yet, they do not wish to continue existing as “ethnics,” especially in a world of the increasing visibility of once “invisible” nationalities, and hence “invisible” individuals who oppose any shattering of their cultural values.

To be regarded as an “ethnic” was, and still is, to be in an even harsher position than that occupied by the French-Canadians in the stone age of a complacent unilingual Canada.

It means—for a Pole, a Ukrainian, a Slovak, or any other non-British Canadian—the danger of being relegated to the bottom rung of the cultural, social, and political ladder.

Cultural treasures of these people have been treated as folklore oddities rather than as specific achievements rooted in the soul of a distinctive nationality with a centuries-long civilization of their own.

Thus, no one I know in Canada would disparage English square dances, kilts, or shamrock. No one would urge the abandonment of these stirring symbols of three different groups in the English-language segment of Canada’s population.

But Ukrainian dances, embroideries, and artistic Easter eggs are still regarded by many as a sign of “old country” parochialism to be shed like dust from shoes as soon as one’s foot touches the Canadian shore. The more sympathetic regard them as quaint whimsicalities.

Moreover, the prejudiced view that Ukrainians are an unhistoric nationality devoid of its own culture still prevails even in the enlightened circles here.

The decision of the secretary of state department to drop the term “ethnic” from all its documentation last year was, therefore, a milestone on the road to Canadian citizenship with a more human face. On that road, either no one or everybody should be regarded as “ethnic”—be they English, French, Welsh, Irish, Jewish, Polish, Slovak, Ukrainian, Italian, Greek, etc. No one should be put outside the pale of the Canadian

cultural spectrum, bilingual yet multicultural, for the sole reason of not belonging to one of the founding nations.

The program of financial support for the preservation and development of all viable “third-language” cultures has a greater value than the actual money involved—that originally assigned early in 1972 and the increased sum granted by the reconstructed government of Pierre Trudeau.

It is a clear sign of an official recognition—to be eventually approved by the taxpayers at large—that being a Polish-Canadian (any hyphenated Canadian) is as dignified a status as that of being an English- or French-Canadian.

The psychological impact of such a notion (organized in a practical manner), on the minds of young Canadians of any language group can hardly be overestimated.

Bilingualism would get a boost because young people would start believing that the concept is not just another gimmick intended to keep together artificially something which could not have been preserved by a former imperial idea. Aiming at loyalty through personal dignity, one would say: Strengthen the individual citizen by recognizing and allowing him to express what is his cultural core, and you will strengthen the confederate state more successfully than by any other set of policies.

That is the thesis.

However, what worries “third-language” Canadians is the growing suspicion that the policy of multiculturalism may equally be viewed as just another stratagem for wooing the “ethnic” voters.

To be sure, no one doubts the sincerity of the architects of the policy; they did what they believed to be just and necessary for Canada. Nevertheless, there was no debate during the last election campaign, which would have clarified the primary issue of the problem: the need for constitutional guarantees for the “third-language” groups.

More specifically, neither the Progressive Conservative Party nor the New Democratic Party has included in its program any form of multicultural policy. The silence may be interpreted strategically as an attempt not to alienate French-Canadians in Quebec who had declared themselves against multi-culturalism.

Such an approach is mistaken and shows the inability of the two parties to fathom the mood of their French-Canadian co-

citizens. The present-day government of Quebec, like any other future government there, would do a great deal—and does—for the “third language” groups of the province. What it opposes is the encroachment of the federal authorities in the field. And this means that the old fear of the “ethnics” of being used as a balancing factor against the French by the “centralists of Ottawa” is still very much alive in Quebec.

But even the English-language provinces which have put a great effort into the elucidation of a multicultural Canada are lagging.

The Ontario government supported a large Heritage Ontario Congress last June. A similar conference on multiculturalism was held in Alberta and its recommendations were upheld by the new Conservative administration. But, as Professor M. R. Lupul¹ of Alberta University remarked, neither has lifted a finger yet to put into practice the precepts they seemingly have embraced.

As to the enlightened Canadian public, the “dialogue” between the spokesmen of the two founding nations continues as a series of monologues. Almost without exception they talk over the heads of the “ethnics” as if no “third-language” groups really existed in Canada’s population. They speak solely about and for their respective melting pots.

Thus, after a decade of searching for a workable formula of Canadianism, inspiring loyalty through personal dignity, millions of Canadians sit and think late into the night.

They know it to be true what Ortega y Gasset understood so well—*that language and culture are something more than just labels.*

Since they are not sure whether their legislators and public opinionmakers know this and hold it to be true, they are wondering: Must Canada become a nation of strangers . . . ?

That’s what they are still afraid of.

Can you blame them?²

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¹Professor M. R. Lupul, Director of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies established at Alberta University with a financial grant from the Alberta Provincial Government in 1975.

²This article was quoted extensively in the Canada’s House of

Commons debates on May 30, 1973 by Dr. Stanley Haidasz, Minister of State for Multiculturalism, and Marcel Prudhomme, Parliamentary Secretary to Minister of Regional Economic Expansion. See, *House of Commons Debates*, Vol. 117, No. 92, 1st Sess., 29th Parliament of Canada, May 30, 1973.

Freed by John

Eventual release from the Soviet prison system was arranged for Cardinal Slipyj, then the Metropolitan of Lviv, by a man named John, better known as Pope John XXIII.¹

To the spiritual princes of the Roman Catholic Church, gathered at their Second Vatican Council in 1963, it must have been quite an experience to see and hear the former Soviet prisoner pleading for the establishment of an autonomous Ukrainian Patriarchate within the framework of the Universal Church.

But unusual as it might have seemed to their legalistic minds, proposal was yet another proof of the man's steadfastness that makes him, perhaps, the strongest personality in the modern Catholic world.

Pope John XXIII was well aware of the fact. He appeared to favor the idea of a Ukrainian Patriarchate, which would unite all the bishoprics in Canada, the United States, Argentina, Brazil, Australia, France, Britain, and West Germany. Its autonomous existence would enhance the Vatican's credibility among the Eastern Christians, and particularly among the Ukrainians who persist in their fidelity to the Holy See even under the Soviet regime.

Altered Scene

That is why Metropolitan Josyf Slipyj was nominated Archbishop Major, a title close in authority to that of Patriarch.

But the untimely death of Pope John made way for a more conservative leadership in the Vatican. Under Pope Paul, it believes more in *Realpolitik* than in martyrdom. And ecumenism, being a form of rapprochement between various Christian denominations, favors the established churches, the Roman Catholic, the Anglican, and the Russian Orthodox rather than the Ukrainian Uniate Church, which has been living between the hammer of militant Polish Catholicism and the anvil of militant Russian Orthodoxy since its union with Rome in 1596.

Thus, while Archbishop Major Josyf Slipyj was made a

TO UKRAINIANS, HE IS A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS

The man who withstood Stalin's pressure and nowadays, like Samson pushing against two columns in a Philistines' temple, continues keeping the Vatican and the Kremlin apart, recently has visited his faithful in North America. And both the Canadian and the American Ukrainian Catholics, together almost 1,000,000 persons, are paying him the respect reserved only for a living martyr.

Well, His Beatitude Archbishop Major Cardinal Josyf Slipyj is indeed a martyr.

But meeting him face to face, as I did in early May in Toronto, you wouldn't even guess that the stately-looking 81-year-old prelate spent almost 18 years in the prisons and hard-labor camps of Soviet Russia. And, as he told me himself, at a crucial point during his imprisonment his life was saved by a Jewish camp doctor in the vicinity of the nefarious Vorkuta slave-camps center.

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cardinal and was allowed to build the Ukrainian Church of St. Sophia as well as to organize a new Ukrainian Catholic University in Rome, mostly with funds sent by Ukrainians around the world, he has been hampered in his efforts to establish a working Ukrainian Catholic Patriarchate.

Duties Impeded

"We are impeded in our duties," Archbishop Slipyj told the Third International Synod of Bishops in 1971. "The Ukrainian Catholics who have suffered so much and for so long as martyrs and confessors are ignored by the Vatican as inconvenient witnesses of past evils."

True enough, the Ukrainian Catholic, or Uniate Church, was liquidated by the Kremlin in 1946. Five bishops and many of the higher clergy died in Soviet prisons and hard-labor camps. Its faithful and some priests were compelled to join the Russian Orthodox Church. Metropolitan Josyf Slipyj was the only senior member to survive the ordeal.

But the martyrdom of a whole church failed to carry the day for him in the Vatican. When the Ukrainian Catholic bishops from every country of Ukrainian settlement, at their own Synod of Rome in 1969, unanimously supported his demand for putting into practice what the Second Vatican Council decreed on the issue, the synod was declared "invalid" by the Vatican authorities. Yet, it continues to exist as a unit in spite of the invalidation.

Moscow's Price

The main reason for that somewhat strange behavior of the spokesmen of the Universal Church is the Vatican's desire to arrive at some *modus vivendi* both with the Moscow Patriarchate and the Kremlin.

And the two—"the most orthodox" Russian hierarchy and the "godless" Kremlin establishment—go hand in hand whenever the Ukrainian question of spiritual sovereignty is concerned.

Being centralist by its nature and mindful of its precarious

symbiosis with the Soviet regime, the Moscow church hierarchy demands from the Vatican, as a price for the offered detente with Roman Catholicism, the abandoning of the Ukrainian Catholics in the Soviet Ukraine altogether and suppression of all the efforts of the emigre bishops at the unification of all Ukrainian Catholic bishoprics in the countries of the West.

Unconsulted

The Vatican has responded in kind. When the Russian Patriarch Pimen declared at Zagorsk, on June 2, 1971, that the Ukrainian Catholic Church had ceased to exist, Cardinal Willebrands, present at the gathering as a guest, remained silent. And there was no reaction of the Vatican authorities to Patriarch Pimen's unilateral declaration. Moreover, Pope Paul VI started nominating new Ukrainian bishops for Brazil and the United States without even consulting Archbishop Major Slipyj, the only one entitled to make such a decision for the Ukrainian Church.

I had known Archbishop Slipyj many years before his imprisonment as an eminent scholar, talented administrator, and a man of great integrity. Meeting him in Toronto again, I was impressed by his undiminished purposefulness.

As if honed by the martyrdom in Stalin's Russia, Archbishop Slipyj is more than ever bent on saving the Ukrainian Catholic Church from the two-pronged danger: from getting buried under the structure of the Russian Church in the Soviet Union and from being submerged under the assimilatory sea of Roman Catholicism in the West.

Nothing Illegal

"We are not doing anything revolutionary or illegal by demanding a patriarchate for our beleaguered church. On the contrary, we only demand what is due to the church according to the agreements made by our predecessors with the Apostolic See... and what was acknowledged by the Second Vatican Council," said Archbishop Slipyj at a conference during his visit to Toronto.

In this resolve, he is enthusiastically supported by about two million Ukrainian Catholics residing in the countries outside the Kremlin's immediate influence.

Meanwhile the Orthodox Ukrainians, whose autocephalous church was savagely destroyed by the Soviet regime in the early 1930s, are watching in disbelief the tribulations of their Catholic brethren caught between the Moscow hammer and the Vatican anvil.

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