

PART VI

**INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM AND
UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM**

EDITOR'S NOTE

The improbable happened. The once monolithic communist camp has splintered into separate nation-oriented and competing communist power centers.

National communism has become a reality in almost every communist ruled state as well as among non-ruling communist parties.

Two of these—the Soviet Union and China—have locked themselves in an ideological and political struggle. Political propaganda and polemic have become the main instrument of this internicine cold war.

Inevitably, the Ukrainian question became involved.

UKRAINIAN DISSENTERS BEING HEARD

Leaders of the 66 Communist parties who were trying in Budapest to strengthen communist unity in the world were not surprised when they received an appeal signed by a dozen Soviet citizens on behalf of the imprisoned Russian dissenters. What some Western observers had suspected for some time, these communist leaders had known all along—in even more detail. For the last seven years the Soviet leadership has been striving to stem the revisionist trend both in Russia and in the Ukraine, the largest republics in the Union.

Uncensored publications, petitions and protest letters, written by young Ukrainian Marxists—both imprisoned and those still at large—have been circulated all over the Soviet Union, and recently they have spilled over into the West.

Some party officials of the communist countries actively helped the Russian and Ukrainian dissenters in bringing their messages to the attention of “the civilized world’s opinion.”

When Svyatoslav Karavansky, a Ukrainian poet-translator from Odessa, wrote a Petition¹ addressed to First Secretary Gomulka of the Polish Communist Party, asking him to arrange for an “international conference of the Communist parties of the world,” Polish officials forwarded the petition to Warsaw. There, the Poles did not mind leaking its contents to the West. Karavansky proposed that Gomulka use his “prestige and influ-

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ence" to call a conference which would ban, once and for all, "anti-Semitism, Ukrainophobia, and discrimination against minorities" practiced by various Communist parties in their lands.

Czech communist officials were not too eager to help, but they did diligently study the case of the non-Russian nationalities in the USSR. So did the Hungarians and Bulgarians; even the East Germans showed an appreciable interest in the problem. Romanians, though not too enthusiastic about Ukrainians (Bucharest still covets the Ukrainian province of Bukovyna, united with the Soviet Ukraine since 1940), thought it useful to transmit Karavansky's Petition and other uncensored information to the West as it raised the question of the Moldavians in the Soviet Union.

Chinese Voice

The Chinese leadership ventured even further. Having watched inscrutably the Soviet scene for a number of years, Peking decided to put a word in defense of Ukrainian and other non-Russian dissenters.²

Last November, when the Soviet Union celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, a Peking broadcast in Russian hurled accusations directed at the Moscow leadership: mass arrests had been conducted in the Ukraine and "many people are still kept in fascist-like concentration camps." The reference was to the camps of hard labor in the Mordovian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (part of the Russian Federation) where Daniel and Siniavsky are kept, along with about 40 Ukrainian dissenters sent there between 1961 and 1966; last November Vyacheslav Chornovil joined the group for having exposed the secret trials of these Ukrainians in a pamphlet that has just reached the West.³

Thanks to these and other publications, all the communist countries became aware of the one, and perhaps the only, true Marxist axiom which states that no people oppressing other nationalities can be free. Moscow trials of Russian intellectuals demonstrated the truth of the statement once again as the Russians themselves were faced with the "peril caused by trampling

on man in our country," to quote the appeal sent to the Budapest meeting in February.

But there are other nationalities suffering in the Soviet Union from recidivist Stalinism. Svyatoslav Karavansky, in his second Petition addressed to the Council of Nationalities of the USSR, lists some "pressing problems that should have been of primary concern" to the Council.⁴

He asks, "Where are the Jewish theaters now, the newspapers, the publishing houses, and schools?" And what about "Ukrainians and Moldavians being severely restricted in their right to a higher education. . . ." In his opinion, the expulsion of 900,000 Tartars from the Crimea was an "act of open injustice that no argument can excuse." And he rejects the notion that "the Germans of the Volga region were responsible for the Hitler's crimes."

Baltic Injustice

Undeterred by the severe sentence of eight years and seven months of hard labor he received at a secret trial in 1966, Karavansky reminds the Council of the injustices committed on Baltic peoples. Estonians "were deported *en masse* to Siberia," and "even at this time, 25-year sentences were being served primarily by Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, and Moldavians. Why is there no pardon for them?" charges Karavansky.

Another Ukrainian writer, Ivan Dzyuba, made an impassioned appeal to the Jews and Ukrainians, calling on them to cooperate because, living side by side, they have been faced with the same danger of cultural and physical obliteration. The address, given during the memorial service in the sinister Babi Yar on the outskirts of Kiev on September 29, 1966, was not published by the Soviet papers, but it is being read avidly in transcripts in the Ukraine, and recently it has reached the West.⁵

This is another hopeful aspect of the ferment within the communist camp and particularly in the Soviet Union. In spite of the fact that these young people grew up under a totalitarian regime, they have developed a deep human understanding of their neighbor's plight.

Thus, Ukrainian patriots of today are not possessed exclusively with the problems of their own people; they are able to pick up the cause of other nationalities as well and to raise the issue before their own authorities and the leaders of other communist countries. The latter showed enough wisdom not to suppress the truth.

Victory of Spirit

And this is the greatest victory of the human spirit over both fascism and Stalinism. It explains the mystery of the cracks in the walls which up to now have divided the communist countries from one another; that is why some vital information on what the Peking broadcast referred to as "police terror" over the non-Russian peoples in the USSR was able to reach the West more quickly.

But what about the nations of the West? In this respect they have fallen somewhat behind the communist countries. A few years ago a group of Ukrainians tried to pass on some information about "mass arrests in the Ukraine" to the embassy of a Western country in Moscow, for transmitting to the "civilized world's opinion."

After a brief exchange of words with the embassy staff the young men left and, in the street, they were immediately arrested right in sight of the embassy. No Western paper ever printed a word either about the incident or about the arrests going on at that time in the Ukraine. "The civilized world" has only recently become aware of the struggle raging on the barricade of human rights within the Soviet Union.

REFERENCE NOTES

¹For a complete text of the *Petition*, see V. Chornovil (Comp.), *The Chornovil Papers* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), pp. 180-86.

²See article No. 33 in this collection.

³Source cited in note 1 above; see also article No. 22 in this collection.

⁴For a complete text, see S. Y. Karavansky, "To the Council of

Nationalities of the USSR," *The New Leader*, LI, No. 2 (January 15, 1968), 12-15.

⁵For a complete text of I. Dzyuba's address at Babi Yar, see "Ivan Dzyuba on Jewish and Ukrainian Destiny," *Commentator* (Toronto), XII, No. 2 (February, 1968), 12-15.

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PEKING'S INVOLVEMENT WITH THE UKRAINE PROBLEM

Throughout its history, the Ukraine has been a bone of contention between her powerful neighbors more often than any other European country.

In the old days, the Mongolians, Hungarians, Poles, Turks and Muscovians had made their claims upon the Ukraine; in more recent time, Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia crossed swords over it.

Today, Red China seems to enter cagily into the fray by consistently raising the Ukrainian problem against Peking's enemies in the Kremlin.

At the very outset of economic and political differences between the two communist giants, Peking was reluctant to use the plight of the oppressed Ukrainians (or any other East European nationality) in the Soviet Union as its lever in the ever deteriorating relations with Moscow. The difficulties caused by Chinese occupation of Tibet had put Peking somewhat off balance in this respect. The year was 1959.

But the Chinese strategists could not have overlooked the Russian build-up along the Soviet-Chinese border and especially

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in the region facing the province of Sinkiang. Using the much-publicized Nikita Khrushchev's pet project of making "the virgin lands of Kazakhstan" a wheat producing land, the Russian strategists have transferred well nigh a million young Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Belorussians, Estonians and Latvians to the region. Promises of better wages, threats and harsh administrative measures helped to make the project a bureaucratic success.

Thus, two objectives were achieved. The unruly non-Russian republics were somewhat cowed by the removal of many potential rebels against Kremlin domination. At the same time, the Soviet Union's "soft underbelly" in Central Asia has been considerably hardened to balance the industrially more developed and militarily stronger Sinkiang with its nomads crossing the border to and fro.

When ideological issues had topped all the other Peking-Moscow controversies, the Red Chinese began adding to their verbal arsenal the accusations about Russia's non-Marxist nationality policy toward its minorities. The Ukrainian problem came up at an appropriate time. When the Soviet Union celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, Radio Peking informed its listeners in the USSR about the "fascist-like concentration camps" in the Russian Republic where many Ukrainians were still being kept.

After this and similar propaganda fencing failed to achieve much result, the two fell to actual armed conflict. The encounter on the Ussuri River this year was indeed a bloody one, even for such ideologically related countries. And both have been eager since to make the most of it in the propaganda department.

The Kremlin leaders tried to steal a march on the Chinese by placating the Ukraine's public opinion and arousing patriotic feelings in every section of the Soviet society. They have recently pardoned Vyacheslav Chornovil, after 18 months in prison, the Ukrainian journalist who defied, in 1967, Soviet authorities by reporting on secret trials of intellectuals in the Ukraine.

At the same time, *Literaturnaia Gazeta* of Moscow, in an unprecedented move, published (in its March 12, 1969 issue) a photo of a plaque erected at the graves of the fallen Soviet soldiers on the Ussuri River. Any reader can tell from the names on the slab that about half of the slain soldiers were Ukrainians.

Peking then came out with its own long-range charge. In a broadcast directed to the Soviet Union and later in a special article published by the *Peking Review* of April 4, 1969, the Chinese charged outright that the Kremlin leaders were continuing the chauvinist policies of the czars: "Fascist white terror reigns in Soviet society today," says the article entitled significantly "New Czars' Social-Fascist Tyranny."

Ukrainians have been known as tough soldiers and produced able military leaders. Such names as Marshal A. Grechko, Marshal K. Moskalenko, Marshal A. Ieremenko, the chief defender and liberator of Stalingrad, or the late Marshal R. Malynovsky who led the impressive campaign against the Japanese Kwantung Army in 1945, are familiar not only to the Europeans but to the Chinese as well. So are the Ukrainian partisans who have carved for themselves quite a niche in the history of insurgency by their exploits both against the Nazi Germans and the Soviet Russians during World War II and immediately after it.

It would be unwise to provoke the feelings of these warrior people and to mobilize them "on the wrong side of the front" in a Soviet-Chinese military conflict when and if it comes. This explains the double approach of the Kremlin strategists trying to please the Ukrainians with a carrot of liberalization and, at the same time, arousing their wrath against "the Chinese atrocities."

The Chinese may soon step up their campaign of words and point out that the present-day leaders of Moscow are trying to bleed the Ukrainians white by pushing them into the frontline against China, a more progressive and friendlier nation than Russia. And the Chinese strategists will perhaps think twice before arranging for an attack on a post manned by the non-Russians, so as not to force them against their own will into the arms of the Russian bear.

Ukrainian-Canadians have had conscientious objections against Canada's intention to establish diplomatic relations with Red China. Today, they may have second thoughts about the issue. Some, at least, see an advantage in bringing to another country's attention the true facts about the Ukraine. Ukrainians may yet find an unexpected ally in Communist China.

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CANADIAN REDS HAVE HARDEST TIME EXPLAINING POLICIES

Of all the Communist parties toeing the Moscow line today, the Communist Party of Canada has the hardest time explaining its course to the motley crowd of its multi-ethnic followers.

At the 20th convention of the CPC, held in Toronto last month, Secretary-General William Kashtan was pressed by various members to clear up the "striking contradictions between the party's stand on the nationality question and the harsh reality prevailing in the Soviet Union."

As usually happens, his woes were partly of his own making.

On the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, William Kashtan declared in Moscow's *Pravda* that "the very existence of the Soviet Union strengthens national and democratic forces in Canada that are fighting for the real independence and sovereignty of our country and its foreign policy. . . ." Moreover, according to the Secretary-General of the feeblest of all the political parties in this country, French-Canadians have been "studying attentively solutions of the question of nationality in the Soviet Union."¹

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Youth Wondering

But it is exactly this realm in which Kremlin leaders have fared worst during the first half of a century of the Soviets in power. The Russo-Czechoslovak confrontation has only brought into the open the problem which is still puzzling young minds in the Soviet Union.

One of the Soviet Ukrainian intellectual dissenters whose voices have reached the West, Ivan Dzyuba, put it squarely before the tough Kiev leader, Petro Shelest: "Many people in the Ukraine, especially those of the younger generation, are wondering what is amiss with the nationality policy in the Soviet Union."²

Himself a sincere believer in Marxism-Leninism, this 37-year-old literary critic came out with a somewhat startling answer. Quoting extensively from the works by Marx, Engels, Lenin and even Stalin, Dzyuba—in his scholarly study *Internationalism or Russification*²³—has demonstrated that in fact there is no internationalism in the communist commonwealth of equal nations, called the Soviet Union; sheer forced Russification of the non-Russian peoples is applied there as systematically as it was ever done by czarist governments before the Revolution.

Linguicide is the order of the day. In addition to anti-Semitism, crass "Ukrainophobia" pervades the country of victorious socialism, says Dzyuba. A 6,000,000 Russian minority in the Ukraine has all the privileges of the dominant nationality which shows no consideration either for the Ukrainian language or culture.

Although millions of books and newspaper copies are imported into the Ukraine from Russia, that minority has its own newspapers and local supply of Russian books published at the cost of the Ukrainian republic. Russian language schools are created in the Ukraine as fast as it is possible to build them; Ukrainian schools are converted into bilingual ones.

The Russian minority succeeded even in preventing the teaching of science subjects in Ukraine's institutes and universities in Ukrainian; Russian is used in spite of protests by students, teachers and parents, expressed in individual and collective appeals to the Kiev and Moscow authorities.

No Ukrainian

At the same time, the Ukrainian minority in Russia (about 7,000,000 strong) has no Ukrainian classes in their local schools, no newspapers or books published in Ukrainian. For a Ukrainian in the Russian SFSR, it is even difficult to subscribe to a paper from the Ukraine.

A "special mechanics" of Russification tends to disperse Ukrainians all over the Soviet Union. The vacuum created thus in the Ukraine is immediately filled by Russian migrants or Russified minorities.

The Soviet Army still remains the most potent single Russifying factor in the USSR. Even the Russian Orthodox Church has a role to play in the "process of merging" various nationalities into a monolithic Russian super-state.

What Stalin admitted to have been unable to achieve by purges and mass resettlements, his successors are trying to attain by a system of inner economic pressures and cultural discrimination. No wonder then that, as Dzyuba shows it, since 1913 the number of Ukrainians has increased only by 3,000,000—from 37 to 40 million, in 55 years.

Although hit the hardest, Ukrainians are not the only victims of the process of a forced assimilation glossed over by the clichés extolling the "brotherly union of peoples" under the Marxist-Leninist flag. From the works by other Ukrainian dissenters—like S. Karavansky, V. Chornovil, V. Moroz—the tragic fate of Soviet Jews, Latvians, Lithuanians, Estonians, Belorussians, Moldavians and Germans has also become known to the people beyond Soviet borders.

That is what has caused ferment among the communists both in the Satellite countries and in the West. Their leaders and intellectuals had acquainted themselves with appeals and protest essays written by Soviet Ukrainian dissenters and calling for "outlawing of any discrimination against minorities in all communist countries."

Thus, fear of the potential Russification of the whole communist bloc prompted Romania, Czechoslovakia and Poland to readjust their policies in this respect. But the Kremlin leaders acted under an even greater stress; they were afraid to lose their grip on all of the non-Russians in Eastern Europe, and

therefore they decided on a military intervention in Czechoslovakia.

The Communist Party of Canada has been watching the events in Eastern Europe with great apprehension. Its ethnic membership has been pressing on the leadership to explain "What is wrong with the nationality question in the Soviet Union."

When their outcry about the ruthless suppression of Ukrainian intellectual dissenters between 1961-67 has become too loud to be silenced by disciplinary measures, the CPC sent a special fact-finding delegation to the Ukraine. Headed by Tim Buck, the delegation returned from its visits to Moscow and Kiev with more doubts than it had when leaving Canada.

It has seen Russification on the march everywhere, promoted by the ageless Russian bureaucracy Lenin had complained about more than once; it has learned that the Ukrainian communist dissenters had been dealt with more harshly than anybody else in the Soviet Union, and for a lesser offence: their sentences ranged from two to 15 years of hard labor, and at least one of them received a death sentence (later commuted to 15 years prison term).

No wonder then, that the Report of the delegation published last year in Canada, both in English and Ukrainian, could not stem the exodus of Ukrainian-Canadians from the party ranks.⁴ Moreover, the whole Slavic wing of the CPC has been badly shattered since.

The confrontation between Czechoslovakia and Russia has put an even greater strain on the Communist Party of Canada, as events have decidedly proven that both in the Soviet Union and in the communist camp of the allegedly equal nations the internationalist god is as dead as his prophets, Marx and Lenin.

What is alive, however, is—according to Ivan Dzyuba—the spirit of the Old Russia, with its all national and international objectives. Canadian communists have hardly any reason to boast about the Soviet Union being a perfect example of a multi-national and multi-lingual nation. Russia still is, as Lenin used to say, "a prison of nations."

REFERENCE NOTES

¹*Pravda*, November 7, 1967.

²I. Dzyuba, *Internationalism or Russification?* (London: Weidenfeld-Nicolson, 1968), p. 5.

³See article No. 23 in this collection.

⁴"Report of Delegation to Ukraine," (Central Committee Meeting, Communist Party of Canada, September 16, 17 and 18, 1967), *Viewpoint* (Toronto), V, No. 1 (January, 1968), 1-13.

KREMLIN STRATEGISTS WORRIED ABOUT ETHNIC VARIETY

If the Soviet Union ever goes to war with China, the Russians will have to strike at the enemy with all their might just to survive the conflict. By now, the Kremlin leaders must be aware of their predicament: they cannot allow themselves the luxury of the mistakes Nazi Germany committed in her war against the Soviet Union, by hitting their enemy—as Dr. Goebbels ruefully put it—with their “left hand.”

But even if they decide upon using nuclear weapons, it will remain doubtful whether the Kremlin would be able to master the needed “right-hand-blow” against China. With their own empire seething with discontent, there are reasons to believe (and the Chinese seem to know this) that Soviet Russia’s “right-hand” would be then partially disabled by the problem that has been dogging Moscow leaders for over 50 years. It is the same, as yet unresolved, nationality problem which Lenin was frantically trying to solve in his dying day.

Out of necessity, a Soviet-Chinese war would be fought solely for Russian nationalist aims, with preservation of Russia’s last territorial acquisitions in Asia being the foremost among them.

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Public opinion among the international Left, to say the least, would favor Peking rather than Moscow in such a conflict, because the Chinese appear to have preserved a closer affinity with “true Marxism-Leninism,” especially when cast in the role of a victim of Russian aggression.

The Kremlin rulers would then be left with very little, if any, room for maneuvering. In spite of its self-assumed title of defender of the proletarian class, its proud army bears too deep an imprint of nationalist stigma. Under a new name and led by a new set of commanders, the Soviet Army still is the most conservative of all the Soviet state institutions, rivaled in its conservatism perhaps only by the established Russian Orthodox Church. Under the Soviets, the allegedly internationalist army has not shed a single feather from its inherited plumage of czarist military traditions.

Mindful of these traditions, the Kremlin leaders deprived the Soviet Ukraine of its own Red Units even before Stalin made himself an undisputed master in the USSR. The same thing happened to the Don and Kuban Cossacks, as well as to the Transcaucasian republics. Military traditions of no other nationality are recognized or permitted to take root within the union of allegedly sovereign socialist republics. Thus, in various positions both in the USSR and within the Warsaw Pact system, Ukrainian and Belorussian generals and marshals must represent the “single and indivisible Russian Army,” without any hint at military contributions to defense by the Ukraine or Belorussia, the two republics most exposed to any attack from the west and south-west.

And it was the Soviet Army’s objections that prevented the Soviet government from implementing its own constitutional amendments of 1944, which restored the Union Republics’ right to establish their own defense departments. Even Belorussia and the Ukraine, the only two other Soviet founding members of the United Nations, were not allowed to make use of this constitutional prerogative.

The looming Russian-Chinese conflict prompted the party and military leaders to drop almost all internationalist pretenses. They are doing their utmost to instill strong Russian patriotic convictions into the minds of all Soviet citizens, old and young alike.

Since January 1968, when a revised Universal Military Service Law was put in force, military indoctrination of school children — between 14 and 16 years of age — has been intensified. The program of physical fitness in public schools includes instruction in hand grenades, fencing, judo and some forms of close combat. Special classes of “young guardists” are being formed in various schools and these are put under supervision of local military colleges.

(One such group at the 71st Kiev school is attached to the Suvorov Military Academy.)

Young student clubs, “Friends of the Soviet Army,” maintain close relations between their schools and local military establishment. Excursion to military barracks are more and more superseding the once obligatory visiting of kolkhoz farms by school groups and their teachers. Councils for Military and Patriotic Education have been hastily organized in colleges and universities, with professors — veterans of the Second World War — and the senior students who have finished their regular military service as obligatory members.

In this military preparedness campaign for Soviet youth, the Chinese are projected as the most dangerous potential enemy of the Soviet Union’s territorial integrity. It can hardly escape the attention of reflective people there that this potential external threat is being exploited by the Kremlin leaders in a similar manner, and for the same objective, as it was exploited by the czarist regime about 65 years ago, as a unifying factor for the Russian empire strained by social, economic and political dissent.

The potential Soviet-Chinese war conflict would be a “patriotic Russian war” and as such it is viewed by many non-Russians in the USSR with great misgivings.

“But what is in it for us?” asks a Soviet Ukrainian when asked about the possibility of such a shooting war. “Give me one reason why we should die for the Ussurian or Vladivostok region as our grandparents were compelled to die for Manchuria and Port Arthur in the war of 1904 or for the Dardanelles in the war of 1914-17?”

Indeed, there has been hardly any tangible progress in the relations between the dominant Russians and the other nationalities of the Soviet Union, that would justify a repetition of such

a supreme effort by the latter. The traditional policy of Russification of the old and newly acquired non-Russian territories make Soviet reality today essentially the same as it was in the pre-revolutionary times. In this respect Russia has not changed.

But what has changed, is the non-Russian nationalities themselves. They still occupy areas of major economic and military importance and numerically they are much stronger than their “grandparents” were under the czars. Today, there are more non-Russians than Russians in the Soviet Union, no matter how doctored their census is. And the national self-awareness of Ukrainians, Belorussians, Georgians, Armenians and of various Asiatic peoples has a much wider popular basis than it had at the dawn of Soviet power. Their political aspirations have struck roots into each stratum of their advanced societies.

To be sure, they have ceased to be just amorphous masses of semiliterate peasants of 1917-21, that would fall prey to the dialectics of a more advanced urban proletariat of Russia. Today, the non-Russians possess a considerable technical know-how of their own, and their republics have highly developed industries. Their experts — from agriculture through industry to chemical and space research — could not be easily replaced by Russians, if, for example, Ukrainians and Estonians decided on starting passive resistance or slackening the effort in a war (using Lenin’s terminology) labelled an “anti-peoples war.”

The manpower of the non-Russian nationalities is vital to the Kremlin in any confrontation with China.

Their potential military value to the Russian strategists could be calculated on the basis of the contribution made by the Ukrainians in the Second World War. Although no absolute figures were published on the subject, it is at least known that over 4,500,000 Ukrainians fought in the ranks of the Soviet Army, over 2,500,000 of them were decorated for bravery; and, of the latter, 2,300 received the order Hero of the Soviet Union, the highest Soviet military award.

It is significant, that these scanty data were made public by the present leaders of the Soviet Union right after they had removed Khrushchev from his power position, in October 1964.

There was, evidently, some concern in the Kremlin as to the attitude of at least one non-Russian nationality, if the new leaders felt the need for wooing the Ukrainians.

But could they be sure of a loyal response of the non-Russians in case of a Russian patriotic war against China?

What with their haunting memories of the destructive German *Drang nach Osten*, combined with an apparent unwillingness of the West to recognize their countries as distinctive nations, Ukrainians and Belorussians seem to be cast in the role of the most natural allies of the Russian people. But who wants to be taken for granted or treated as a subordinate nationality, insulted daily and deliberately Russified in the same confederation he is supposed to uphold and defend with his own blood?

Certainly, the younger generation of the non-Russians would not acquiesce in the status of second-class citizens as readily as their fathers (terrorized by the Stalin-Yezhov-Beria gangs) used to do for about three decades. On the contrary, the young people want the Soviet constitution to be amended so that it would be more representative of the changed role and mood of the non-Russian ethnic components of the Union.

Some of their speakers took recourse to Lenin's theoretical teaching and reminded the Kremlin leadership of the fact that Lenin never underestimated the danger of alienating the non-Russians by the chauvinist policies so much in use in the Old Russia. Unfortunately, says Ivan Dzyuba, a prominent Soviet Ukrainian dissenter-author, nothing has changed since the time when in the 1920s Lenin's comrade-at-arms, M. Skrypnyk, charged that the Russian Army under the Soviets still remained "an instrument for the Russification of the Ukrainian and the whole non-Russian populace."¹

Recently, another Soviet Ukrainian dissenter, Anton Koval, addressed an appeal to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR in which he urged this legislative body to recover the Ukraine's right to possess its own armed forces within the framework of the Union army. The demand must have come as a shock to the meek members of this republican council used to acting only as a rubber stamp for the party leaders.²

But similar charges and demands to abandon the traditional policy of building a monolithic Russian empire out of a dozen distinct founding nations, have been ringing in the last few years through all the non-Russian republics. The critics of the Kremlin policies point out in particular Moscow's attempts at satur-

ating the non-Russian regions with Russian immigrants while the local population is being enticed or forced to leave for Siberia, central and far eastern regions of Soviet Asia.

As a result of this compulsory migration, between 1945 and 1959, the number of Russians in Latvia rose from 10 percent of the total population to 26 percent; in Lithuania, from two percent to eight percent; in Estonia, from eight percent to 20 percent. In the Ukraine, the number of Russians increased by 300 percent as compared with the census of 1926. At the same time, Ukrainians are strongly represented in Kazakhstan and in the Amur-Ussuri region, opposite China.

The partial results of the 1970 Soviet census confirm the trend.³

But spreading of Russians all over the non-Russian republics creates social and political problems rooted in inter-ethnic and economic discrimination. Ukrainians, Moldavians, Belorussians and the Baltic nationalities complain that Russian immigrants tend to occupy all the more important administrative positions in their republics and grab all the lucrative economic possibilities for themselves. Bad blood thus produced will not contribute to the inner strength of the multinational empire facing a Chinese colossus of the same ideological hue.

This weakness of the Soviet Union is well known to the Chinese strategists and they are hitting at the giant's clay foot represented by the non-Russian element. Some time ago, the Peking *People's Daily* did not hesitate to revive Lenin's description of Russia as being "a prison of nations," and the Ukrainians are repeatedly mentioned in the Chinese polemics, as being oppressed by the "new czars." To counter the charge, a Soviet-operated Radio Peace and Progress had been trying to exploit the theme of the allegedly unjust treatment of the non-Chinese minorities by the Peking regime. The accusation concerns a sprinkling of Uighur and Turkic tribes in Singkiang and the Mongols of Inner Mongolia.

Peking, however, has a much tighter case for the non-Russian nationalities to put at the Kremlin door, and long before a shooting war would start the Russians could lose the war of words.

There is enough evidence for the charge that the Soviet federal system has been watered down to a meaningless constitu-

tional formula on paper. And there is a wealth of documents written by Soviet dissidents who furnish proof that even the slightest indication of cultural or political aspirations on the part of the non-Russians is being treated by the Kremlin as treason against Russia.

To quote only two cases, a KGB interrogator (as reported in Dzyuba's essay *Internationalism or Russification?*) derided his Ukrainian victims in a Russian concentration camp: "Why, you seem much too anxious to become a Bulgaria of your own . . ." ⁴ And Anatoly Marchenko, in his book *My Testimony*, tells of three Lithuanian students being tortured to death in the same concentration camp. The KGB officers kept yelling at them: "Come on, free Lithuania. Crawl on, you are about to get your independence." ⁵

How long people can take it in peacetime is hard to tell. But in wartime these animosities may assume dangerous proportions. A situation may arise not unlike one forecast by Lenin for the enemies attacking his Soviet state. He said: "As soon as the international bourgeoisie raises its hand against us, its own working class will grab tightly the same hand and hold it."

Whenever the Soviet Union faces China as its ideologically related enemy, the Russian aggressive war effort may be stalled by the hand of the angry non-Russian peoples.

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¹I. Dzyuba, *Internationalism or Russification?* (London: Weidenfeld-Nicolson, 1968), p. 136.

²Anton Koval, "Open Letter to the Deputies of the Soviets of the Ukrainian SSR," (April 1969), *Suchasnist* (Munich), IX, No. 10 (October, 1969), 99-103.

³Reference is made to the initial report on the Soviet census issued at the time this article was published. Subsequently, complete census report was published. See, *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1970 goda* (Results of the All-Union Population Census of 1970) (Moscow: 1972), Vol. I.

⁴Dzyuba, *op. cit.*, p. 211.

⁵A. Marchenko, *My Testimony* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1969), 415 pp.

THE ESCALATORS OF MADNESS

Responding to a telephone call from the secretary-general of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians in Toronto, Russian academician Andrei Sakharov promised to take up the case of the imprisoned Ukrainian historian, Valentyn Moroz, along with other similar cases on the list of his Moscow Committee for Human Rights in the Soviet Union.

Professor Walter Tarnopolsky of the Toronto York University, has already collected an impressive list of prominent Canadian names under a petition on Moroz's behalf prepared by the Committee for Human Rights he is heading.

The expulsion of Nobel prize winning writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn from his homeland was but a surgical operation that resulted in chopping off only the tip of a large multinational body of a newly-formed public opinion in most of the 15 Soviet republics.

While Solzhenitsyn, for a change, was going up on an escalator to be spirited out of the Soviet Union, many Soviet citizens were riding the escalators which were bringing them down to prisons, asylums for the insane, hard labor camps, or the districts of "voluntary settlement" in remote regions of the Kremlin empire.

Reprinted with permission from *The Gazette* (Montreal), April 13, 1973, where it appeared under the title "While Diplomats Smile, Soviets Are Imprisoned in Stalinist Madness."

The Ukraine, the second largest and most developed among the Soviet Republics (with a population of 47 million on a territory comparable to that of France), once again appears to be the main supplier of the "human goods" for the escalators of totalitarian madness.

After the mass arrests of Ukrainian intellectuals last year, a selective system of imprisoning Ukrainian patriots has been applied since. That system is netting more and more men and women from both intellectual and peasant-worker strata of the society.

Both the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and Amnesty International have, independently, collected impressive records of the identified prisoners in the known post-Stalin places of detention.

Plight Neglected

But while the cause célèbre, that of Alexander Solzhenitsyn and of his two famous supporters, Andrei Sakharov and Roy Medvedev, is being given well-deserved publicity in the West, the plight of these lesser known freethinkers of various ethnic backgrounds is neglected.

Consider the case of Valentyn Moroz, a 37-year-old Ukrainian historian and essayist. He is being kept in the toughest Russian prison at Vladimir on the Kliazma River. His prison term of nine years has an additional rider: Five years of banishment from the Ukraine to an undetermined place, probably in the Arctic region of the Soviet Union.

The harsh punishment was meted out to Moroz, at his second secret trial, for his outspoken advocacy of the sovereignty of any individual, that is: The right to think, to speak, to do creative work and arrange personal affairs according to one's own national and cultural background.

Valentyn Moroz made some headlines in Canada three years ago.

Mass Demonstration

First, when Prime Minister Trudeau was caught on the horns of a dilemma — to raise Moroz's issue with the Kremlin authorities or not to raise it during his visit to Moscow and Kiev in the spring of 1971. Then, retreating before the unyielding Ukrainian-Canadian students in Winnipeg, Mr. Trudeau agreed to intercede in Moroz's behalf during his talks with Soviet Premier Kosygin visiting Canada later in 1971.

Recently, Ukrainian-Canadian students staged a new mass demonstration in front of the Soviet embassy in Ottawa, proving that their interest in the fate of that freethinker has not diminished.

(They were moved to confront once again the silent walls of the embassy by the reports received from former inmates of the prison at Vladimir in which Moroz is being kept prisoner.)

"Some of the criminals set upon Valentyn Moroz with their knives, apparently having been goaded by the prison authorities. . . . Raise your voice in defence of this great humanist," — urge recent Jewish emigres from the Soviet Union who, like Anatol Radygin,¹ have settled in Israel.²

Thus, Jewish escapees from the escalators of madness are in a way, repaying their moral debt to this Ukrainian intellectual who once rose to urge the Soviet regime to grant a more humane treatment to the Jews in the Ukraine. Moroz wrote in part: "All of us condemn the Nazi crimes perpetrated on the Jews, but, at the same time, we all nonchalantly stroll on the sidewalks paved with the tombstones which had been taken out of the Jewish cemeteries in quite a few of our towns."³

In a similar way Valentyn Moroz accused Soviet authorities of wilfully destroying Ukrainian landmarks, including the cemeteries of Ukrainian soldiers at the city of Lviv.

When members of the Komsomol (Soviet youth organization), on orders from "the center" (in Moscow), began confiscating and destroying even the traditional Ukrainian Easter eggs (*pysanky*) — in stores and on village bazaars, Moroz publicly denounced that barbaric attempt to obliterate the most essential symbol of Ukrainian culture, with its roots imbedded in the pre-Christian era.⁴

Preserve Identity

Not unlike Alexander Solzhenitsyn defending the very essence of Russian culture, Valentyn Moroz seems to epitomize by his protests the will of the Ukrainian people to preserve their own identity in spite of all the attempts of a foreign establishment at annealing the Ukrainians and other nationalities into an amorphous mass.

It is, then, to the credit of Canadian young people that they have been able to recognize the value in the heroic stand of the two intellectuals of two different nationalities.

Solzhenitsyn's case took a more favorable turn, as he is at least safe himself and his family has joined him in exile.

Meanwhile, Valentyn Moroz, like thousands of other free-thinkers within the Soviet Union (Ukrainians, Jews, Estonians, Georgians, Latvians, and many Russians as well) is facing the KGB inquisitors who are not satisfied with keeping him behind bars.

What they want from Moroz is a confession of his "guilt" and a written declaration of his repentance. These used to be conveniently extracted from most of the prisoners in the good old days of Stalin's rule.

Now, any Canadian who is sincerely yearning for a lasting peace and cooperation between the nations of the East and the West must keep in mind the harsh fact of hardly changing Soviet reality.

Diplomatic Game

While the diplomats exchange smiles and pieces of paper, many Soviet citizens are being brought into prison wards by the escalators of the same Stalinist madness.

To acquiesce in Solzhenitsyn's expulsion would mean to become an involuntary accomplice in the crime which was recently defined by that intrepid Russian lady writer, Lydia Chukovskaia. She called such silence, supporting the only important Soviet law — "the law of the preservation of muteness."

The least one may do is to ask oneself the question Professor James Eayrs of the University of Toronto put before his Canadian

readers two years ago: "Khrushchev denounced the crimes of Stalin. Kosygin denounced Khrushchev's crimes. Who denounces the crimes of Kosygin?"

REFERENCE NOTES

¹Anatol Radygin, Soviet captain of a fishing vessel and a poet; arrested and tried in 1962 for attempting to flee from the USSR, he spent ten years in Soviet prisons and labor camps; released and permitted to emigrate to Israel.

²This portion of the article was inadvertently omitted during printing in *The Gazette*.

³*Boomerang; the Works of Valentyn Moroz*, ed. by Ya. Bihun (Baltimore: Smoloskyp, 1974), p. 31.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 118.

THE SECOND CIRCLE OF TERROR

This is one of the weirdest and, in Canada, least understood paradoxes of the grim Soviet reality: The heartier the handshakes Soviet diplomats exchange with their Western counterparts at various "peace and co-existence" conferences, the harder becomes the pressure of the Kremlin rulers on their own citizens. The more free-thinking people of that Union of the 15 allegedly sovereign republics are the first to bear the brunt of increased oppression.

Against such an unwanted result of the much praised but somewhat sterile detente a Soviet Russian writer, Vladimir Maksimov,¹ warned West Europeans just a few weeks ago.

In his "open letter" to Heinrich Boell, the West German Nobel prize laureate, Maksimov wrote that "only the Almighty knows what price are we going to pay" for the current rapprochement between West Germany and the Soviet Union.

Soon his uncensored opinion was strengthened by a more familiar and, perhaps, more authoritative voice from behind the *detente curtain*. The voice of the Soviet nuclear physicist Andrei Sakharov.

Almost at the same time, Piotr Iakir and Viktor Krasin, two Soviet Russian protesters better known in the West, were put on

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trial in Moscow, after having been softened by the secret police sufficiently to plead "guilty to anti-Soviet agitation."²

In these circumstances, novelist Alexander Solzhenitsyn deemed it wise to tell two Western reporters that his life was in danger.

"If I am declared killed or suddenly mysteriously dead, the world could conclude I have been killed with the approval of the KGB or by it," declared the author of the novel *The First Circle*.

Thus, screened by diplomatic smiles and wrinkles from the public eye of the West, Soviet Russian dissent has entered its second circle.

Until recently, mostly the non-Russians had been on the receiving end of the poisoned fruit from the detente plant. Several hundred Ukrainians—most of them intellectuals, students, and journalists, as well as many Baltic nationals, were sent to jails and hard-labor camps after Prime Minister Trudeau and President Nixon made their separate visits to both Moscow and Ukraine's capital Kiev.

Now, the Russian free-thinkers begin to feel the backslaps of the official Soviet hand swinging towards "peaceful co-existence" with various countries of the West. Apparently, the Kremlin leaders have concluded that it was safe for them to strangle the dissent movement now without endangering their precious foreign trade deals, wheat and all.

Even so, one must realize the fact that the Kremlin onslaught is directed, as yet, against the upper planks of the barricade of freedom whose main body is still hidden under the official Soviet uniformity. A quick glance at the writings of such protesters as Anatoly Levitin (Krasnov),³ Ivan Iakhimovich,⁴ Vladimir Lukanin,⁵ Vladimir Dremluga,⁶ or Natalia Gorbanevskaia⁷ will prove even to a sceptic that dissent has a wide base in the Russian masses.

All these average Russians scaled their scaffolds voluntarily. They were not afraid to face long-term prison and hard labor sentences; some were sent into psychiatric police wards for "mentally deranged."

Vladimir Dremluga, at his trial in Moscow, was speaking for all of them when he explained why he did demonstrate against the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia: "All my conscious life I have wanted to be a citizen—that is a person who proudly and calmly speaks his mind. For 10 minutes I was a citizen."

Regrettably, the voices of such idealists have been muffled in most mass media in the West, at least recently. Meanwhile, the continuous strangulation of the democratic segments in most Soviet republics is the grossest Soviet Watergate of the atomic age.

In practical terms, these voices of dissent prove that even in the Russian republic, which dominates the other fourteen republics, there are people who want to establish in their own country *the rule of law* as against the present rule of self-appointed persons.

These dissenters want a democratic system with human relations between the government and the governed. Moreover, as the clandestine "Program of the Democratic Movement of the USSR" informs its readers, they also demand that "all the peoples forcibly attached to the Russians (in the Union) be granted their basic and inalienable rights," including self-determination under the UN guarantees.⁸

Thus, the celebrated Lenin's axiom that "every nation consists of two nations—the oppressor and the oppressed," is applicable even to his own creation: the Soviet Union, allegedly a country of the victorious socialism. Because even in the Soviet Russian Republic—the mightiest component of the Union—there are today two Russias: a despotic Russia, that of the Communist Party establishment, and the rebellious Russia of the oppressed.

It is impossible to foretell the outcome of this confrontation within the Russian nation between the powerful Kremlin establishment and the budding Russian democracy.

But Iuri Galanskov, the Russian poet-dissenter who died last November in the hard-labor camp of Potma ("with the approval of the KGB or by it"), wrote the following sentence in his article, addressed to the Kremlin leaders:

"You may win this battle but you will lose war; war for democracy and Russia."

REFERENCE NOTES

¹Vladimir Maksimov (b. 1932), Russian writer; emigrated from the Soviet Union in 1974; chief editor of *Kontinent*—a journal published in Russian, English, French and German by

former Soviet dissidents in exile (Solzhenitsyn, Siniavsky, Nekrasov, Galich, Brodsky, *et al.*).

²See note 2 to article No. 17 in this collection.

³See note 2 to article No. 13 in this collection.

⁴Ivan A. Iakhimovich (b. 1930), philologist; model collective farm chairman in Soviet Latvia; author of appeal to Suslov, which cost him his job; supported the Dubcek regime in Czechoslovakia (1968); arrested in 1969 and confined to a psychiatric hospital; released in 1971.

⁵Vladimir Lukanin (b. 1945?), arrested in 1969 for protesting Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia (1968), committed to a psychiatric hospital.

⁶Vladimir Dremluga (b. 1940), worker; arrested for protesting in Red Square Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia; released and permitted to emigrate to the United States (1974).

⁷Natalia Gorbanevskaia, member of the Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights in the USSR; arrested in 1969 for protesting in Red Square Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia and committed to a psychiatric hospital in 1970.

⁸The Program of the Democratic Movement of the Soviet Union (DMSU) was drawn up and issued in October 1969 by the members of DMSU—a union of political dissidents in Russia, Ukraine, and the Baltic States. The program, among others, proposes the reorganization of the USSR along democratic lines with the recognition of national rights of the non-Russian nations. In 1970, the group also published its *Tactical Principles* which called on its members to change from open to clandestine mode of operation.

PART VII
UKRAINIANS IN DIASPORA

EDITOR'S NOTE

A persecuted country, struggling for emancipation, needs a diaspora.

A diaspora, in search for identity and self-preservation in the midst of (often well-intended) assimilatory environment, needs a second home.

Why?

Because a diaspora and its relationship to a mother country underscores mutual responsibilities. They can share pride. They can divide sorrows.

Roman Rakhmanny expands the postulate, particularly in the North American context, stressing the importance of the umbilical cord.

THE SAGA OF THE YOUNGEST BROTHER

Of all Ukrainian folk epics, called *dumy*, the Tale of the Three Brothers' Escape from Azov presents perhaps the most tragic episode in the life of Cossack Ukraine.¹ Who in our adolescence would not shed a tear while reading, perhaps in a secluded nook, the poetic narrative unfolding before our eyes:

*From the Town of Azov, from oppressive slavery
Three brothers are fleeing;
Two of them mounted, and the third on foot,
As if he were a total stranger. . .
Trying to keep pace with them,
Leaving footprints of blood,
He is shedding his tears,
He is imploring his brothers with words:*

*"My closest kin, my own brothers. . .
Wait for me a little while.
Take me along with you,*

This article was originally published in the Ukrainian-language journal, *Suchasnist* (Munich), V, No. 10 (October 1965), 93-105. It was translated and made available for public distribution by the Joint Publications Research Service, US Department of Commerce, Report No.: JPRS 33, 292, December 13, 1965.

*Toward Christian settlements,
Give me a short lift at least. . . .*

Remember, reader, how shocked you were. How, in your young thoughts, you simply refused to believe it possible for any Ukrainian not to come to the succour of his younger brother in dire necessity. But the two did exactly that:

*Because we neither would escape ourselves
Nor would we save thyself.*

But now we have become men hardened by many of life's tribulations and we seem at least to have acquired some insight into certain things.

Life is much more complex than such direct feelings infusing our youthful day-dreams. A human may find himself in a marginal situation when, face-to-face with what he considers invincible powers, he feels entirely alone, forsaken by God and kin alike. Poets, novelists, playwrights as well as some perceptive film producers have tried often enough to fathom that human condition. If our own writers were endowed with a spark of creative ingenuity, they too would discover episodes in the lives of their Ukrainian compatriots worthy of the genius of a Sophocles or Shakespeare. As it is, however. . . .

Beyond Good and Evil

Here we are not merely concerned with the artistic aspects of this remarkable tale beautifully rendering a "marginal situation" in a strict philosophic sense. The tragic fate of the Youngest Brother, abandoned by his two older brothers on the desolate and arid frontier steppe of the Old Ukraine, is recalled here bearing as it does strikingly vivid resemblance to the present condition of a large segment of the Ukrainian people. On seeing a tragic occurrence one may often recall a certain book, read long ago, a mirror of the occurrence. For indeed, a well written story is but a slice of life itself—past or future.

The Tale of the Three Brothers' Escape foreshadowed, almost prophetically, the serious situation of the Ukrainians living

beyond the borders of the Soviet Ukraine—in the Russian Soviet Republic, in the Polish, Romanian, and Czechoslovak People's Republics. How many Ukrainians are currently residing there? Who knows? There are no reliable official statistics. The governments of these republics do not appear anxious to provide such figures. Why? Because the fact of figures hampers their drive to assimilate the Ukrainian minority. Does the Soviet Ukrainian government in Kiev show greater interest in clarifying the problem? Some 40 years ago this issue was vigorously pressed both in Kiev and Moscow by Mykola Skrypnyk, the Old Bolshevik and member of the Soviet Ukrainian government. At the 12th Congress of the Russian Communist Party held in Moscow, June 1923, he inquired:²

Why did seven million Ukrainians living within the borders of the Russian SFSR have no guaranteed human rights to safeguard and develop their own culture? Why, of some 500 Ukrainian-language schools recently opened there, over 300 had been already shut down while the secondary schools (of the *tekhnikum* type) with instruction in Ukrainian are subject to phasing out in the near future?

Skrypnyk quoted instances showing that regional leaders in the Russian SFSR had suppressed all manifestations of Ukrainian culture in those districts with a high proportion of Ukrainians. Thus, the provincial Communist Party Committee of the Voronezh *oblast* gave the following reply to the inquiry by the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party: "To organize a Ukrainian section, even for the purpose of party agitation in the *oblast*, would be very inopportune."

The Kursk *oblast* Party Committee maintained "such an attempt was altogether redundant." But the Kuban *oblast* Party Committee, directing a province inhabited by 2,273,000 Ukrainians, "would not even bother to reply" to the inquiry of the Central Committee in Moscow.

"On the whole, what kind of cultural services were provided for the Ukrainians living on the territory of the Russian SFSR by 1923?"—asked Mykola Skrypnyk. He offered the following facts: "In the last two years only two

single brochures in Ukrainian were published in the whole of the Soviet Russian republic. One of these we received two days ago. It contains resolutions of the First Congress of the Soviets of the USSR. The other brochure is an anthology of poetry. In my opinion, this is a far cry from what is needed by these seven million Ukrainians."

Mykola Skrypnyk, speaking in Moscow, June 12, 1923, added that Russification of Ukrainians in the Russian republic had been conducted mostly by the Red Army.

As a result of the last mobilization about 60,000 Ukrainians residing in Russia proper joined the Red Army. But what language is being used to instruct them? Are any educational or cultural activities carried out in Ukrainian? No, the Army remains the instrument for Russifying the Ukrainians and other minorities. . . .

Four momentous tides of change swept across the Soviet Union since Mykola Skrypnyk formulated these arguments for the Kremlin leadership. The Stalin Constitution was proclaimed; the Second World War was fought; and both the post-Stalin thaw and the Khrushchev "liberalization" relevant to the nationality question shook the confederation of Soviet republics. But the situation of the Ukrainians in the Russian SFSR has not improved; on the contrary, it deteriorated. On the territory of what is allegedly the most progressive state in the world, built by the "most humane Russian people," the Ukrainians do not have a single Ukrainian-language school nor are they allowed to organize Ukrainian-language classes in Russian schools. Deprived of their right to publish any Ukrainian newspapers, they even dare not dream of opening a Ukrainian school of the collegiate type.

The Russians in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, however, are provided with all types of Russian-language schools and with every assistance for developing Russian culture; even a separate association of Russian writers exists in the Ukraine. Thus, the Ukrainians in Russia continue to suffocate under the traditional czarist system of Russification.

"The Russians alone should not be blamed for the situation.

You mustn't forget the timidity of our Ukrainian people. Instead of defending their own rights, they prefer suffering humbly," — a visitor from the Ukraine told me.

That may be so, but their "timidity" is deeply rooted in the realization that there is no one to stand up for their rights. They are entirely on their own, deprived of the legal protection usually provided for a stranded minority by the government of their Old Country.

The government of the Soviet Ukraine in this respect shares part of the responsibility for the oppression suffered by the Ukrainians in Russia.

To a certain degree that guilt must be shared also by the cultural circles of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, party members in particular, because implicitly, in their thinking, they have erased from the "census" well over seven million of their own people to the advantage of the Russians. Mykola Skrypnyk was a Bolshevik and a faithful party man himself but he never forgot he was a Ukrainian. He defended the interests of the Ukrainian people on every all-Union council and thereby at least attempted to act as a true Communist of Ukrainian nationality. The present day administration of the Ukrainian SSR, however, has failed to demonstrate even such tokens of good will. And the intellectual circles of the same republic have not dared to prompt these bureaucrats to take some practical steps to protect the Ukrainian minority in the Russian SFSR. Indeed, they have deliberately abandoned their compatriots (forced settlers, migrants, and deportees in the Russian SFSR) on that new "Black Trail"³ which leads them into a modern mode of slavery — Russification.

In a similar situation, comparable to the moral existence outside the power of good and evil, live the Ukrainians of the Polish People's Republic. According to our own incomplete data more than 400,000 Ukrainians call themselves citizens of that country. They do not, however, possess equal rights because their cultural needs are both disregarded by the authorities and restricted by their fellow citizens. Only one periodical publication in Ukrainian appears in Poland: the weekly *Nashe Slovo* (Our Word) together with a monthly supplement *Nasha Kultura* (Our Culture). But many Ukrainians in Poland fear to subscribe to the journal because local authorities and fellow citizens would make

their life even more miserable for having openly declared themselves persons of Ukrainian culture.

Apart from few exceptions, teaching children the Ukrainian language is not permitted, and no courses on Ukrainian civilization or linguistics are given by any institution of higher learning. As of now, there are no textbooks of Ukrainian literature for university students, not even in Polish. Publications of this kind have not yet been authorized by the responsible Polish department, and neither the government nor the intellectual leaders of the Soviet Ukraine ever thought of filling the existing void.

Much is being said and written, both in Soviet Ukrainian papers and radio programs produced for foreign consumption, about ever growing cultural contacts between the Ukraine and Poland. One would expect this, naturally, since the two countries are close neighbors ruled by the same doctrine. Moreover, Warsaw and Cracow are so close to Kiev and Lviv that there should have been many opportunities for impressing upon the Polish leaders the need to consider the plight of the Ukrainian minority. Alas, the lot of these Ukrainians is in many respects no less somber than under the "reactionary" regime in prewar Poland.

Against such a background the recorded experiences of the Ukrainians in Poland reflect their grave sense of frustration as, for instance, when you are told that in Warsaw you cannot obtain any Ukrainian newspapers from the Soviet Ukraine. Polish distributors won't order these periodicals from Kiev themselves, and Soviet Ukrainian book trade officials would not cater to "a few Ukrainian readers in Poland." Ukrainian observers from Poland also report that "there is an abundance of Russian-language books and periodicals in different Warsaw bookstores."

No wonder that Polish citizens of Ukrainian origin are reluctant to ask for a regular supply of Ukrainian books and periodicals in Poland. In practice, a bizarre process is noticeable: Soviet Ukrainians visiting Poland may acquire some specific Ukrainian publications from the Polish-Ukrainian book funds.

Thus, the existence of the Ukrainian SSR as a Ukrainian communist state is of no assistance to the Ukrainian minority either in Russia or in Poland. The Soviet Ukraine has failed to evolve into a source of cultural energy that by its cultural values would

sustain all the Ukrainians scattered over the outlying districts of the Polish People's Republic.

The Older Brother's Guilt

They have been broken up and forcibly uprooted from their native soil and resettled on the Recovered Territories of Western Poland right after the Second World War—an accomplishment of the Bierut regime, with the connivance of the Soviet Ukrainian authorities in Kiev. For more than 600 years the Ukrainians of western Ukrainian borderlands—Pidliashshia, Kholm, Peremyshl, and Lemko regions—successfully resisted Polish ethnic pressure. After these six centuries of pressure and resistance, the Poles could boast of only a narrow strip of land, about 15 miles wide, they had conquered from the Ukrainian highlanders in the Carpathians, the Lemkos. Without overwhelming support of Stalin's Russia, and the timidity of the Kiev administrators, the Bierut regime would probably have not been able to suppress the valiant people either. As it was, however, following a three-year-long struggle, most Ukrainians from the mentioned borderlands were deported to former Eastern Prussia and to other previously German-held lands where they would be robbed of any chance to foster their own way of life, or even to preserve what is allowed constitutionally at least in the Soviet Union—ethnic culture according to the formula of "socialist in content and Ukrainian in form."

Some try to justify that inhuman form of oppression perpetrated against the Ukrainians within the Polish People's Republic by citing the activities of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) on the territory between the Buh and Sian Rivers during 1946-1947.

No one denies that the insurgency may have irked both Warsaw and Moscow and, eventually, may have prodded them into taking a concerted action against the underground network there. But it is also true that foreign oppression in the first place not so much the sentiments of the local Ukrainian population in the contested regions spawned the elements of insurgency there. It was not UPA's activity in the years 1946-47 that resulted in the slicing off of these borderlands from the Ukraine. The Moscow

leaders handed over these lands to their Polish ally in 1943, at the Teheran Conference, with President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill conniving in the deal. The Yalta agreement (February 1945) ultimately sealed the fate of the frontier lands without taking into consideration the Ukrainian population. They had not been asked what citizenship—Ukrainian or Polish—they would prefer. At the time of the two international conferences, the UPA waged no “provocative” military action west of the Buh and Sian Rivers. Thus, no valid reason existed for uprooting the Ukrainian population of Pidliashshia, Kholm, Peremyshl, and Lemko regions in 1947–48 and for settling them by force over the northern and western parts of Poland without any legal right to return to their native land.

One may ask why is it that even after the de-Stalinization of 1956 in the USSR the Kiev government did not try to have the border between the Ukraine and Poland rectified? Was it not the Soviet Ukraine’s official writers who explained that this borderline was drawn by Stalin alone “without consulting anyone?” Moreover, why have no diplomatic steps ever been taken to regain, for the deported Ukrainians, at least the right of an unimpeded return to their native districts?

We are aware of the fact that the government in Kiev did not take any part in determining this borderline, even indirectly, either in 1943 or 1945. It was not consulted by the Kremlin rulers. But neither did the Soviet Ukrainian leaders register their objections to the new and more unfair “Curzon Line” devised by Stalin and Molotov.⁴ The Kiev leadership deliberately washed its hands of any involvement in the problem of the Ukrainians in Poland. But so it must be admitted did the Soviet Ukrainian intellectuals who, in psychological terms, went even further than that.

Even a superficial perusal of the maps and geography textbooks published for use in the Soviet Ukraine schools exposes the fact of both Russification and Polonization of the names of towns, cities, rivers, and lakes by Soviet Ukrainian authors. (Often, owing to poor knowledge of Polish, even some genuine Polish names are distorted, but *always* in a Russian manner.) For example, one of the oldest cities of the Ukraine, Peremyshl, has been rendered in Ukrainian transcription but pronounced wrongly in Polish. The City of Kholm, founded by Ukrainian

King Danylo Halytsky in the 13th century, also bears the Polonized name “*Khelm*” in the Soviet Ukrainian geography textbooks. Similarly, the Sian River is registered on Soviet Ukrainian maps as “*San*,” a Polish rendering of the river’s name.

Soviet Ukrainian intellectuals responsible for these mutations could have acted under duress or intimidation by the proverbial “Muscovite terror.” A policy of Russification is currently applied in the Ukraine by the Soviet centralizers; but does there stand behind every Ukrainian intellectual, day and night, a Russian with a bayonet and orders to Russify Ukrainian place names? It is even more certain that Moscow does not direct the intellectuals to Polonize geographic names. Do Polish authorities influence the thinking of Soviet Ukrainian intellectuals in this respect? Before 1939, when Western Ukrainian scholars lived and worked within the Polish Republic, they were exposed to various kinds of official pressures. But even then it was possible to resist such pressure, provided the intellectual involved possessed a measure of personal and national dignity. To mention one such case: a Ukrainian geographer in inter-war Poland was deprived of his professorship at the University of Cracow for having worked on the publication of an atlas of the Ukraine. This was the reaction of Polish authorities to his refusal to Polonize Ukrainian place-names or to doctor statistical data dealing with the Ukrainian minority in Poland. The professor, however, would neither submit to the arbitrary demand nor would he bend under pressure.

Today in the sovereign Soviet Ukraine, Ukrainian geographers and teachers attempt to educate the new generation of Ukrainians that the lands just beyond the Buh and Sian Rivers “were always” originally Polish lands and so bear “native” Polish names. Those explaining this strange behaviour of Soviet Ukrainian intellectuals by their loyalty to the doctrine of the so-called “progressive merging of nationalities under communism” should be asked: If so, why then should every attempt at closing the gap between various nationalities be usually achieved at the expense of the Ukrainian people? And how is it, that it was always a Soviet Ukrainian intellectual who failed to protest (in a scholarly manner) against such unfair practices often offering a helpful hand in implementing that illegal policy so damaging to the interests of the Ukrainian nation? If one praises the “progressive” structure of the Polish People’s Republic, should

one not also raise some objections against the oppression of the Ukrainian minority?

It seems that such officials and scholars of the Soviet Ukraine act like the oldest brother did in the tale of three brothers escaping from the fortress of Azov. He explained his own practical reasoning to the younger one:

*Our old folks, father and mother, will be gone some day
And we'll divide their land and cattle into two parts;
The third won't then complicate things for ourselves. . . .*

But crafty fate often makes short shrift of such egoistic designs. No sooner had these words escaped from his lips than this happened:

*It was not the cries of the black-winged ravens,
But the yells of the Turkish Janissaries
Charging from behind the mound.
They shot and hacked the two brothers
And took back with them their mounts and their spoils.*

For a parallel, one doesn't need to look far. Sly fortune took similar revenge on a similar "older brother"—literary critics, party and state officials in the Soviet Ukraine of the 1920s who ferociously attacked their sincere Ukrainian compatriots for alleged ideological mistakes.

Mykola Zerov, Mykola Khvylovy, Valerian Pidmohylny, Mykola Kulish, and many others were accused and condemned by those critics—in the newspapers and at public rallies—long before the Soviet Russian police began arresting the "deviationists."⁵ But the triumph of the over-zealous brothers was shortlived. In the early 1930s, those same critics and officials were felled by the same power-axe.

Thus, the highly instructive aspect of the old Ukrainian *duma* should be kept in mind also by our contemporaries who occupy positions of authority in Kiev and other urban centers of the Ukraine. Today they tolerate the intolerable policy of assimilation of their brethren in the Russian SFSR (in Siberia, along the Amur River, in the Voronezh, Bilhorod, and Kuban regions) as well as in Poland and Romania. Tomorrow, they may have to

acquiesce in the Russification of the entire Ukraine, with accompanying diminution of their own authority. As a Ukrainian saying has it, if a tree grows slanted then even goats can climb it. Already even Moldavia is able to Moldavize its Ukrainian population. If the Ukrainians of Romania have for the present a breathing spell from authorities, it is only because the latter raised their claim to Bukovyna—the Ukrainian province of the pre-war Romanian kingdom. The Romanian authorities are trying to convince the Ukrainians of that region—now an integral part of the Soviet Ukraine—that life used to be "much sunnier" when they were citizens of Romania (that is until 1940).

The negligence of the Kiev authorities is best illustrated by the case of the Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia whose situation has recently ameliorated. These inhabitants of the Priashiv (Presov) province in Eastern Czechoslovakia have been granted relatively advantageous opportunities for ethnic-cultural self-expression. Books and periodicals are being published there in Ukrainian; Ukrainian-language schools have come into being; and recently they have obtained permission to broadcast in Ukrainian. The Ukrainians in Poland and other neighboring communist countries eagerly listen to these programs dealing with the life and activities of the Ukrainian minority in the Czechoslovak People's Republic. Even these modest opportunities loom large when compared with their own privations in that respect. Thus, only thanks to the passivity and incomprehensible indifference of the Kiev administrators has the Soviet Ukraine not evolved into a magnetic pole to which all Ukrainians in foreign lands would gravitate. By this failure, the Kiev regime undermined its own position within the system of the Soviet confederation as well.

What then should be done to assure some legal protection for the Ukrainian minorities in the communist countries? The first step would be to establish consular and, later on, ambassadorial representations of the Soviet Ukraine in these countries; diplomatic channels provide best lines of communications between two sovereign nations faced with such a sensitive problem. Even the least developed African nations are making use of that instrument in international relations. The Ukrainian SSR alone has failed to direct its own foreign relations, and its spokesmen continue to shy away from exercising the republic's constitu-

tional rights. Recently, the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Ukraine, Luka Palamarchuk, made a feeble attempt to rationalize this failure by suggesting specific ideological considerations, asserting that the Ukraine has already attained the summit of its sovereignty and that it maintains its diplomatic relations through the intermediary channels of the all-Union department of foreign affairs. But what he would not mention was that the Supreme Soviet restored to the Ukrainian SSR, in 1944, its previous right to enter into diplomatic relations directly. For this purpose a ministry of foreign affairs had been formed in Kiev. Moreover, the same constitutional amendment (passed under the Stalin-Molotov rule) also provides for a separate Ukrainian department of national defense.

Since the "rule of Soviet law" has been reinstated in the Soviet Union, as Soviet spokesmen would have us believe, it is even stranger that the Soviet Ukrainian authorities have not availed themselves of this right. On the contrary, they seem deliberately to avoid asserting themselves. To placate their own citizens, a ridiculous substitute of the so-called "expanded relations with foreign nations" is being touted. What does it mean in practical terms? There are indeed in Kiev consulates of Poland and Czechoslovakia to protect the interests of their respective citizens. But it is less known in the Ukraine that the Soviet Ukrainian government does not have its own representatives accredited either to Warsaw or to Prague. The only semblance of foreign diplomatic relations is preserved by a special embassy of the Soviet Ukraine at the United Nations where the Ukraine's status is no match for that of Mongolia or the Congo. Incidentally, there also exists a Society for Maintaining Relations with the Ukrainians in Foreign Countries. Composed of intellectuals and party activists, it addresses its propaganda to the Ukrainians in *non-communist* countries.

The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, which should be the voice of the Ukrainian people, keeps docile silence in this matter. So do Soviet Ukrainian experts on international law or other intellectuals, whether of the old or younger generation. It is that slavlike silence that conceals the tragedy of more than seven million Ukrainians left to their own devices beyond the borders of the Ukraine, in other communist countries, abandoned without the benefit of any international legal safeguards

and without that moral support usually expected from a Mother Country.

Or to return to our analogy: the oldest brother who possesses all the legal and material advantages has failed to become a substitute parent to the underprivileged youngest brother.

It would be difficult to find a parallel negligence anywhere in the world. But, then, it is not easy to find in other folklore literatures a tragic epic comparable to the Ukrainian Tale of the Three Brothers' Escape From Azov, reflecting classic simplicity and poetic style of the Bible. One is tempted to ponder: who knows, perhaps we—Ukrainians—do live in a world of our own, separated from the rest of mankind, beyond the limits of good and evil.

The Middle Brother's Guilt

But the Ukrainians living in the West are also responsible for the vicissitudes of the youngest brother. Like him, the Ukrainians of Canada, the United States, Australia, Britain, France, and Latin America are in no way dependent on the support of the "oldest brother" in their endeavors to preserve themselves as a cultural-ethnic entity. Up to now, they have been able to keep their own organizational structures, to stand up for their own rights, and even to contribute to the common weal of the Ukrainian nation. From the "oldest brother"—the Soviet Ukrainian who appears to be in the saddle because he possesses his own republic—they have received nothing but slanderous invectives, threats, and crafty obstacles devised by the Soviet Ukrainian republic.

Nevertheless, we are ready to admit that if the Soviet Ukrainians ever gained the status of a sovereign nation, then it would be much easier for the Ukrainians in the West to bring up their younger generation in the Ukrainian idiom and in accordance with Ukrainian cultural traditions. In educating the young nothing can replace the impact of Mother Country existing as a sovereign state. There is hardly a substitute for the natural influence of a specific spiritual nationality manifesting itself by its state and cultural institutions. The Ukrainian minority in any Western country would acquire much greater

cohesiveness and specific characteristics if there existed a real power behind them — a sovereign Ukrainian nation as a fact and not a fog. In the absence of such moral support, the Ukrainian communities in the West are obliged to continue to rely only on their own resourcefulness.

Since the Ukrainian community in non-communist countries has been able to stand on its own feet (regardless of all the setbacks in the Ukraine), its responsibilities increase rather than decrease. Why? Because we have almost unlimited opportunities for developing Ukrainian culture in the countries of our settlement. We own numerous periodicals (in Ukrainian and other languages) not restricted by censorship. We have established scholarly societies and developed extensive economic and financial structures. We have produced a cadre of young intellectuals imbued with Ukrainian spiritual values and ideals. Having also secured for ourselves a high standard of living, virtually unknown to any previous generation, we are in a position to exert ourselves for benefit of our brethren in the communist countries.

The underprivileged condition of that “youngest brother” is commented upon from time to time in our Ukrainian papers published in Canada, the United States, Britain, Argentina, and Brazil — main emphasis usually on the persecution of the religiously minded Ukrainians in the communist countries. These news items and comments seem to ease the conscience of readers and editors alike, because they appear to be a proof of their participation in the all-Ukrainian effort of self-liberation. But the only real attempt at defending the human rights of their brethren has been made so far by the Ukrainian-Canadians who hail from the Lemko region of the Ukraine. They have for instance constituted a Society for the Defense of Lemkivshchyna. As for other regions detached from the Ukraine in the same manner — Kholm, Peremyshl, and Pidliashshia — these seem to have been forgotten even by their own emigres.

Who would raise the question of the Ukrainians in Romania and Russia? Granted, Professor Volodymyr Kubijowycz in his valuable demographic studies on the population of the Ukraine and other Soviet republics does not allow that problem to be completely forgotten. He reminds his countrymen all over the world that there are some Ukrainian communities also along the Amur and Ussuri rivers in the Far East. Naturally, scholarly

works have much less impact on the general public than do the regular media of mass information.

Thus, whoever excites public criticism of the Kiev authorities for their neglect of the Ukrainians living outside the borders of their republic, must at the same time remind the organized Ukrainian communities in the non-communist countries that their own responsibility for these people is no smaller than that of the Soviet Ukraine's ruling circles.

We need to remind ourselves, at the same time, that far too much time and effort is being wasted on vague universal problems. Our “globalists” in the Ukrainian SSR are preoccupied with such problems as Cuba, Vietnam, or the Congo. On the other hand, the “globalists” among the Ukrainians in the West are anxious to share in attempts at “solving” the problems of China and Korea while some of them earnestly confess their anxiety about the future of the United States and the whole of mankind.

None of these misguided “idealists” on both sides of the curtain that divides the Ukrainian nationality into two opposing forces, seems to remember a very simple fact: that the United States, Vietnam, China, Cuba, and Korea became and still are sovereign nations without any help from Ukrainians. These nations need no such support to remain masters of their own affairs. While standing on guard against some “global windmills,” we neglect the reality of urgent Ukrainian problems.

Much time and energy is consumed by our continuous search for an absolute Ukrainian unity. At present, a debate is going on about the need and the feasibility of forming a World Congress of Free Ukrainians.⁶ There are those who sincerely believe that as soon as the Ukrainians in the West declare themselves obedient to a single leadership, all will be solved.

Purely formal or mechanical unity, without our united society ready to act as an organic unit on behalf of every Ukrainian individual or group in distress, would only furnish us with yet another empty framework for honorific posts to be occupied by different factional leaders. An ability to present a common front even without any specific world organization whenever there arises an all-national emergency is the only true manifestation of a mature society, even more so, of a nation.

The Ukrainians in the countries of the West have already

ceased to be a motley crowd of emigrants concerned about bread alone. Today they form, to a high degree, integral parts of society in the countries of their settlement. From this advantageous position we all can and should act as citizens of these free countries so as to alleviate the lot of our brethren under the communist regimes. It is of no use today to brandish old defeatist slogans about the "total destruction of the Ukraine" or, on the other hand, to boast that Ukraine's flag remains in our strong hands as unblemished as ever. Whoever continues to sing this emigre song instead of *doing* some constructive work resembles the middle brother from the Cossack *duma*.

Instead of helping his barefoot brother, he continued to ride on with the oldest brother and all he did was from time to time hack with his sabre some branches off the bushes along his trail. Once they reached the treeless steppe, he would tear a few strips out of the expensive colored cloth, booty from the Turkish town of Azov. In this way he hoped to mark the way to freedom for the unfortunate youngest brother:

*So that he may find his way
And, following our trail,
He may yet reach the homeland
Of his father and mother, and of his kin.*

Such a ragged and incidental assistance was of no avail. Upon seeing the strips of the familiar cloth, the youngest brother lost all hope for survival; he died of grief, because he had thought:

*It is no accident
That the cloth lies scattered along the trail.
This is a sure sign
That my brothers have been despatched from this world.*

An analogous conclusion may be drawn by our Ukrainian brethren in the communist countries, outside the Ukraine, if they perceive the empty stance of their two older brothers—truly "mounted horsemen" in every respect. For they have never received any assistance from the Soviet Ukraine.

From the Ukrainians in the West they are getting, now and then, only strips of propaganda cloth. Should not they infer from

all this that the end is near—for their two brothers as well as for themselves?

The Ukrainians in the open societies of the West need to undertake a combined mass drive for the protection of their brothers separated from the Ukrainian nation. One is wary of memoranda submitted by dozens of isolated political groups. But a single appeal to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights signed by the Ukrainian Church hierarchy and leaders of all political and civic organizations may stir the public opinion of the world; the basic points of that appeal should be summarized and submitted to the governments of the countries with Ukrainian segments in their populations; all public, humanitarian, and cultural institutions should be acquainted with the content of these appeals.

The leading Ukrainian organizations in North America, the Ukrainian Canadian Committee in Canada, and the Ukrainian Congress Committee in the United States, could take particularly effective steps toward convincing their respective governments to lend a helpful hand in this matter.

Canada and the United States maintain diplomatic relations with the communist countries which comprise a Ukrainian minority. It might be possible through diplomatic channels to obtain from the government of Poland, Romania, the Russian SFSR, and Czechoslovakia permission for Ukrainians who would like to emigrate to North America. Every year Canada admits a number of immigrants. The required quota for 1965 has been set at 150,000 persons, according to the Minister of Immigration John Nicholson. Because of the improved economic conditions in Britain and Western Europe, it is not easy to find suitable immigrants there. Eastern Europe, however, is overpopulated and the Ukrainians there, for one, live under difficult conditions. They could be admitted to Canada where favorable conditions already exist for their integration with the Ukrainian-Canadians. Planned and reasonable communities in the countries of the West, may contribute substantially to easing the lot of our underprivileged brothers.

Joint efforts may create the preconditions needed for a possible resettlement of a large number of Ukrainians from Eastern Europe to North America. World opinion may then become aware of the "human condition" in which a section of our

people has found itself through no fault of its own. This would provide for a strong pressure to be applied on the government of the Soviet Union as well as the governments of satellite countries which may also be induced to grant the Ukrainian minority within their borders a better chance to live as human beings.

At the same time, the Kiev government would find itself under normal pressure to recall its own duty to take care of the youngest brother in the hour of his dire need. The followers of the Soviet system both in Canada and the United States (the so-called Progressives but actually Communists of Ukrainian origin) will feel the pressure as well. They may find themselves obliged to demand from the Soviet authorities some assurance of a better deal for the Ukrainians in the Russian SFSR and other communist countries. If they do not raise such a demand, they would have to admit their own helplessness vis-a-vis Moscow and, thus, in the eyes of public opinion expose themselves for what they have been all the time, obedient servants of the Kremlin.

In a parallel action, moral pressure on Kiev could be exercised through visitors from Ukraine. Nowadays, at last, Ukrainians residing in different countries are able to meet one another without any rancor and in a friendly fashion exchange their traditional greetings "with bread and salt." It is also reassuring that they can sigh compassionately during public readings of Ukrainian poetry and at colorful folklore presentations. But these encounters must not result only in creating the unreal mood that prompts everybody to keep silent about the most painful Ukrainian problem out of fear that truth may hurt somebody's susceptibilities.

By all means, let's keep talking and by our incisive questions concerning the most essential Ukrainian problem, let's gently press the hearts of the visitors from Ukraine as we heartily press their hands upon greeting them. If they respond in a human Ukrainian voice to the youngest brother's plea, this shall be our proof that their heart is Ukrainian indeed, as we do remember how that brother was pleading with his more fortunate brothers in the steppe:

*My dear, my own brothers,
Beautiful like turtledoves.
Stop for a while, let your horses graze,*

*Wait for me a little while,
Take me with you
To Christian settlements,
Give me a lift, at least part of the way.*

Now, our youngest brother is calling us. The plea concerns the urgency to safeguard human rights for Ukrainian minority in the Russian SFSR, Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia; the right to develop their own Ukrainian cultural values. Whoever among us fails to respond to that plea, by word or by deed, will be as responsible as the whole establishment of the Ukrainian SSR for the abandonment of his youngest brother on the arid, hungry, and lawless Black Trail of foreign oppression.

Readers will react differently to this essay clad in the poetic form of the Tale of the Three Brothers' Escape from Azov.

Those who smugly enjoy their prosperity in their adopted countries may sigh with an air of detachment: "Well, but what can we do? Any involvement in the issue would only put an unnecessary burden on ourselves without avail." Others will reply in a congenial manner: "Is it fair to criticize our compatriots in the Ukraine so severely?" On their part, they may retort by asking us why we had not stayed with them in the Ukraine to defend the human rights of the Ukrainian people right there?

Still other readers, confused by the trappings of their ideological beliefs, would hastily cover their ears so as not to hear the voice of their own brother from the Black Trail. For some of these the Chinese may seem to be the closer kin; and to many others the Soviet Russians may have appeared to be brothers in a more veritable way. To most of them, the solidarity of international left extremism may mean much more than the solidarity of the whole Ukrainian nation.

There will be those too who, having grown up in the shadow of the Anglo-Saxon traditions of cosmopolitanism and scepticism, would observe with a condescending smile: "We wonder whether it will ever be possible for a Ukrainian to write anything without the traditional Ukrainian emotionalism."

But fortunately, the general reader who prevails on both sides of the curtain of great silence will respond to the expressed thoughts here in the manner the youngest brother in the *duma*

story did. Upon finding the strips of the rich-colored cloth he pressed them to his heart as a sincere gift from his brothers. Thus, these readers are going to embrace the thoughts by their souls and will join me in saying relevantly:

Verily, without the searing feelings of responsibility for the chances of our youngest brother we shan't ever become a mature nation. So lead us, merciful God, unto the Ukrainian trail of dignity. Free us from foreign oppression—economic, cultural, and political. But above all, help us free ourselves from our own spiritual slavery. So that we may finally become Ukrainians not in name alone. Help us to feel and act as a single and closely-knit family of men and women eager to stand together in need. So that to each of us the name 'Ukrainian' radiates the warmth of dignified pride. So that at last we shall become as anybody else—a nation like any other nation in the world.

Indeed, unless we experience this keen emotion in our daily lives, we shall never escape from the realm of "beyond good and evil." Nay, we may turn into something like the three brothers eternally fleeing from the slavery of the Azov fortress.

REFERENCE NOTES

¹*Duma*—Ukrainian folk ballad or epic tale, normally associated with the Cossack period (16th and 17th centuries), recounting Cossack heroic deeds in their struggle against the Tartars, Turks, Russians, and Poles, and lamenting the fate of Ukrainian frontier settlers falling victim of Tartar attacks and abduction into slavery. For a complete text of "The Tale of the Three Brothers' Escape From Azov," see Plisetsky (comp.), *Ukrains'ki dumy ta istorychni pisni* (Ukrainian Dumy and Historical Songs), (Kiev: 1944), pp. 54–62.

²*Dvenadtsatyi s'iezd Rossiiskoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (bol'shevikov)*; *Stenograficheskii otchot* (Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks); Stenographic Notes), 17–25 April 1923 (Moscow: 1968), pp. 569–73.

³Allusion is made to the strategic highway, called "Chorny

shliakh" (The Black Trail) which the Crimean Khanate Tartars used to conduct their raids deep into the heart of populated Ukraine and carry their booty and slaves back to the Crimea during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

⁴Reference is made to the Curzon Line—an international boundary authored by Lord Curzon and adopted by the Supreme Allied Council in Paris (1919) as Polish frontier in the east, but rejected by Poland. The German-Soviet border (1939–1941)—the so-called Ribbentrop-Molotov Line—roughly followed the configuration of the Curzon Line as does also the present Polish-Soviet boundary agreed upon at the Yalta Conference (1945). Neither the original Curzon Line nor its later successors respected the ethnic delineations between the Polish and Ukrainian nations. In fact, large segments of the Ukrainian ethnic territory were incorporated into Poland. See: US Department of State, *Foreign Relations; The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1942), XIII, pp. 793–94; and *The Conferences on Malta and Yalta, 1945* (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1955), pp. 975–82.

⁵Reference is made to Soviet Ukrainian literati: Mykola Zerov, neo-classicist poet and literary critic, arrested in 1935, died in Siberia; Mykola Khvylovy, literary critic, committed suicide in 1933 in the face of persecution in the Ukraine; V. Pidmohyl'ny, writer, arrested in 1934, died in Siberia; Mykola Kulish, playwright, arrested in 1934, died in Siberia.

⁶World Congress of Free Ukrainians was, eventually, founded in 1967 by representatives of Ukrainian communities in various countries of the West. Its moral basis coincides with the ideal of Ukrainian spiritual unity as expressed in this essay.