

*ROMAN
RAKHMANNY* **IN**
DEFENSE
OF THE
UKRAINIAN
CAUSE

EDITED BY STEPHEN D. OLYNYK
FOREWORD BY JOHN RICHMOND

IN DEFENSE OF THE UKRAINIAN CAUSE

By

ROMAN RAKHMANNY

Edited by Stephen D. Olynyk

Foreword by John Richmond

Books by Roman Rakhmanny

The UPA in Western Europe (1949)

Blood and Ink (1950)

Along the 50th Parallel (1969)

Not by Word Alone (1971)

Fire and Cinders (1974)

Conversations With the Young (1978)

In Defense of the Ukrainian Cause (1979)



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*To all the men and women
who have sacrificed their personal liberty and life
in defense of the Ukrainian cause*

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FOREWORD

Time present is contained in time past.

Where injustice occurs it is necessary to know not only the nature of the injustices themselves but their genesis. The author of this volume, concerned with the present and its future reverberations, has analyzed the more significant (and little known) aspects of the Ukrainian situation. He has done so not from a parochial point of view but rather as an object lesson. An English poet, Blake, has said that infinity is contained in a grain of sand.

To many the Ukraine, the systematic destruction of its culture, may appear a matter of little moment. But the planned death of a particular way of life, enriched by its past, valid as to its present, and condemned by those who can rein only over areas where the bulldozer has done its work is of consequence to us all. In a world increasingly smoothed out so that it can be controlled by those for whom human nature exists only that it may be conditioned according to non-human specifications, the fate of the Ukraine is an element of vital concern.

It is a microcosm of what the future may hold in store for all who wish to retain their identity as part and parcel of a life lived with a heart and not a mechanical appliance. Death is the great leveller. It is essential that life does not share its same status.

John Richmond,
The Literary Editor
of *The Montreal Star**

*This foreword was written by John Richmond shortly before his death in 1977.

PREFACE

In Defense of the Ukrainian Cause is a collection of political commentaries and essays by Roman Rakhmanny on the contemporary aspects of the Ukrainian situation. The majority of the pieces in this collection are recent, those of earlier years having current relevance for they reflect Roman Rakhmanny's personal insight and understanding of the problems of the Ukrainian liberation movement in which he was intimately involved both as an objective journalist and political activist.

Many of Roman Rakhmanny's writings have appeared in Ukrainian publications, others have also been published in major newspapers and journals of Western Europe and North America in a number of languages, among them Dutch, English, French, German, Norwegian. The more pointed of these contributions have been selected for republication here to making them available in one volume to English speaking readers.

This collection is divided into seven parts within which the articles are arranged chronologically. Brief annotations are provided where it was considered appropriate.

The transliteration from the Cyrillic is based on the Library of Congress system with some hopefully useful modifications. Some names of persons and places have been retained in their common English form. In a few cases the titles of articles (originally in newspaper headline form) have been modified to suit the book's format.

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CONTENTS

Foreword	5
Preface	7

Part I. Insurgency in the Ukraine

1. Ukraine's Struggle for Freedom	15
2. The Inclined Plane	20
3. The Unknown Front	26
4. Ukraine Advises How to Rock Kremlin	31
5. The Roots of Insurgency in the Ukraine	36

Part II. Ukrainian Nationalism and Soviet-West Relations

6. The Kremlin Woos the Ukrainians	55
7. Message on Prison Cloth: A Plea for Freedom	59
8. Ukrainian Nationalism	62
9. The Emergence of a Submerged Nation in the Soviet Union	66
10. Comrade Enko—The Warhorse of Russia	71

Part III. Man, Society, and Religion in the USSR

11. Why Russia Needs Time and Peace	79
12. The Lonely Soviet Man	83

13. Church-State Relations: Live Issue in Kremlin	90
14. The Revolution and the Bureaucrat	95
15. The Great Witness	99
16. The Jewish Fact in Russia	104
17. Eight Nations Die	109
18. Magadan and the Rising New Humanism	113

**Part IV. Ukrainian Nationalism:
Fifty Years After the October Revolution**

19. Ukraine: The Specter of Nationalism	121
20. Ukrainian Nationalism Fifty Years After the Bolshevik Revolution	125

Part V. Intellectual Dissent in the Ukraine

21. "Exchange Along the 50th Parallel"	133
22. The Chornovil Papers and Intellectual Liberty	136
23. Ukrainian Writer Dzyuba Criticizes Russification	139
24. Clandestine Soviet Paper Tells All	142
25. Wives of Soviet Dissidents Lead a Difficult Life	147
26. Moroz Rocks the Empire of Soviet Cogs	152
27. Stalinism Reappears in the Ukraine Colony	159
28. Suppression in the Ukraine	168
29. Spirit Under Oppression	171
30. Ukrainians View Canada as the Last Haven	175
31. The Tale of Two Archipelagos	179

**Part VI. International Communism and
Ukrainian Nationalism**

32. Ukrainian Dissenters Being Heard	185
33. Peking's Involvement with the Ukraine Problem	190
34. Canadian Reds Have Hardest Time Explaining Policies	193
35. Kremlin Strategists Worried About Ethnic Variety	198

36. The Escalators of Madness	205
37. The Second Circle of Terror	210

Part VII. Ukrainians in Diaspora

38. The Saga of the Youngest Brother	217
39. The Prague Group of Ukrainian Nationalist Writers and Their Ideological Origins	238
40. Canadians with a Difference	250
41. A Life of Distinction	256
42. The Canadian Option for 1975 and Beyond: Unity Through Diversity	261
43. The Invisible Ethnic	281
44. To Ukrainians, He Is a Man For All Seasons	288
Index	293

PART I
INSURGENCY IN THE UKRAINE

EDITOR'S NOTE

UPA? What do the initials stand for?

During the Second World War resistance movements in Eastern and Southern Europe were in the main communist and anticommunist or nationalist. In the Ukraine these forms of resistance existed side by side, and, on occasions, against each other. The communist "partisan" movement was strongly supported by the Red Army.

The noncommunist Ukrainian nationalist resistance, represented by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), fought against both the Nazi and Soviet rule in the Ukraine in pursuit of the goal of national liberation and the establishment of a Ukrainian independent national state.

Unlike other resistance movements in Europe at that time, the UPA was not supported from outside by anyone, morally or materially. It was an independent force whose power base was its own Ukrainian people. Roman Rakhmanny witnessed this struggle as an active member of the political underground.

1

UKRAINE'S STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM

One had hoped that with the end of the Second World War the totalitarian police-state would have vanished. But the "armed peace" brought a new dictatorship, with its executions, its special courts—and, in Eastern and Central Europe, its "Neo-Resistance," with thousands of political refugees and the whole world split into two armed camps. So far Russia has been able to determine the battlefields on which the "Cold War" is to be fought; but now the question arises whether a purely negative defense is enough.

George F. Kennan, Russian expert in America's State Department, wrote last year in a memorandum: "There are elements buried within the Soviet Union which in the course of a single night could bring this nation from its present power to a state of extreme weakness."¹ These elements are mostly to be found in the Ukraine, where Russia in the time of Peter the Great seized the strategic gate to Europe in the direction of the Balkans and the Dardanelles. In the Ukraine, in the war against Charles XII of Sweden (1709), the fate of the Baltic States, Poland, Belorussia and the Caucasus was decided. Catherine the Great's most earnest desire was that all these should become Russian. In her

Reprinted with permission from *World Digest* (London), XIX, No. 111 (June, 1948), 63-65. It is a condensed version of the original article first published in *Die Weltwoche* (Zürich), March 25, 1948, where it appeared under another pen-name, *Romain d'Or*, and was entitled, "Ukraine—die vergessene Barrikade" (Ukraine—the Forgotten Barricade).

instructions to the Procurator General, Count Viazemsky, she wrote: "The Ukraine, Finland, and Courland are to be no more than Russian provinces. These provinces, as well as that of Smolensk, are to be Russianized. As soon as the Hetman dies in the Ukraine, everything must be done to stop a successor being chosen, so that the very title of Hetman will disappear."²

Yet the national consciousness of the Ukraine has survived for nearly two and a half centuries, and from the beginning of the Bolshevik Revolution down to the present has been a thorn in the flesh of the new regime.

Lenin knew that an independent Ukraine meant the end of the Bolshevik Revolution.

The Allied Powers of the West, which had intervened against Bolshevism, never decided to apply Wilson's Fourteen Points to the Ukraine, but supported the monarchists of Imperial Russia.

Thus the Ukraine found itself crushed between two Russian Empires, the hammer of Red Russia and the White Russian anvil, opposed to one another but both agreed to restore the frontiers of the former empire. In this war on two fronts, and also in consequence of the conflict between its own reactionaries and its peasant-anarchist tendencies, the Ukrainian Republic collapsed. Moscow set up a "Tito Government," which immediately declared its "voluntary accession" to the Russian federation.

It was the seizure of the Ukraine that laid the foundation of Russia's new strength. Expressed in figures, this means today: 40 million inhabitants, an area of 232,000 square miles, half the Soviet mineral wealth, one-third of the steel and coal production, two-fifths of the locomotive output. Recent events in Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and above all in the oppressed states of the Baltic region, are a repetition of all that took place in the Ukraine between the two World Wars.

In the Ukraine, too, the collectivization of agriculture was not introduced until Russian power had been established; and the Ukrainians received a special cultural and economic autonomy. For a time, even an opposition was permitted. This was a clear way of showing who had been the supporters of Ukrainian independence, and made the subsequent liquidation the easier. The opposition of the Ukrainian peasants was crushed by the great famine, which cost the Ukraine more than five million dead and

which was ended by compulsory collectivization. The defenders of Ukrainian independence, including hundreds of famous scientists and even those "Red Quislings" who had helped Moscow to sovietize the Ukraine, fell victim in the trials and the purges. In their place non-Ukrainians came forward. Every sign of resistance in the Ukraine—political, economic, religious, and cultural—was compelled to go underground. Only the purges in the Ukraine stand as witness that the battle for the Ukrainian barricades goes on.

In this battle, hope of liberation from without, from the West, played its part. National Socialism seemed to many Ukrainians to be a part of "Western civilization," and Germany the only land in the West to take a keen interest in the Ukrainian question. Long before Hitler had power, there was a Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Berlin, and the German nationalist propaganda was certainly not without its full effect on the Ukrainians in the Soviet Union.

When the Second World War was over, the Ukrainians found themselves disappointed once more. Now there is the first appearance of something of which little is known in Europe.

During the German occupation, Ukrainian partisan groups were established. There were the "Forest Brothers" in Estonia, the Belorussian "Peasants' Army" in the area between Smolensk and Pinsk, the Polish "Armia Krajowa" and WIN (Freedom and Independence). At the end of 1941 the "Ukrainian Insurgent Army" (UPA) was organized under the command of General Taras Chuprynka. Politically, the UPA is under the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council (UHVR), the highest organization in the battle for Ukrainian liberty. Since the spring of 1947, UPA units have carried out armed operations in the rear of the Russian armies stationed in Central Europe. Indeed, a Three Power Pact had to be concluded by Russia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland in order to liquidate the UPA bastion in the Carpathians. But some UPA groups fought their way through to Yugoslavia, to the British and American zones of Germany, and to Austria.³

It was the peoples of the border states who, between 1917 and 1923, called a halt to the Russian plans for aggressive conquest. The Russian advance then came up against the barricades of the Ukraine, the Caucasus, the Baltic States, Poland. And now?

In 1947, while the thirtieth anniversary of the Bolshevik

regime was being celebrated in Moscow, the MGB, the “Red SS troops,” were on the march through the Ukraine and all the satellite states of Moscow. Moreover, for the first time, in place of the former purely selfish resistance, the attempt is being made to co-ordinate the liberation movements into an organization—the ABN, or Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations.⁴

The deadly threat to Russian expansion lies not in the machine-pistols of the UPA and the other underground armies, but in the effect that can be made with the words: “Liberty for all and for each.”⁵ That which goes without saying in the West is, under the Russian despotism, of explosive power. The aim is to drive the military and police forces of Russia from the Baltic States, from Belorussia, from the Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan to enable the peoples to decide their political lives for themselves.

The West either does not really know about these aims or it underestimates and distorts them. Napoleon in his Moscow campaign achieved no positive solution; Hitler was unable to bring freedom to these peoples.

Today, when the survival of mankind is at stake, it can no longer be reasonably asked whether Russia’s expansion can be halted in Greece or Korea, for to ask is to balk at the real problem—the existence of Imperial Russia’s need to expand. The barricade of freedom begins not at the farthest limit of Russia’s advance, but in the very heart of Russia. There is the secret weakness that is the cause of her aggressive “need for security,” and there, too, lies the best hope for the final triumph of the free Western democratic forces in the cold war between the two worlds.

REFERENCE NOTES

¹Reference is made to a policy memorandum prepared by George F. Kennan, then on the staff of the US Department of State, for James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy. The text of the memorandum was subsequently published in *Foreign Affairs*, under the title: “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” and signed anonymously with an “X”. The so-called X-Article eventually became regarded as the first conceptualization of the American

“policy of containment” with respect to the Communist Bloc. See, *Foreign Affairs*, XXV, No. 4 (July, 1947), 566–82.

²Quoted in S.M. Soloviev, *Istoria Rossii s drevneishykh vremen* (History of Russia from Ancient Times), (Moscow: 1965), Book XIII, p. 340.

³In April 1947, the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia signed a tripartite agreement to coordinate their anti-guerrilla operations against the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) along their contiguous borders. See *The New York Times*, May 13, 1947.

⁴The idea for ABN—Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations—originated during a conference of representatives of Captive Peoples of Eastern Europe and Asia in November 1943 in the forests of Western Ukraine. The ABN as a political action organization was formally established in West Germany in 1946, where it still maintains its headquarters today. Its members are representatives of the various captive nations (Ukraine, Belorussia, Bulgaria, Hungary, *et.al.*).

⁵“Liberty for All and for Each” (or in another version, “Liberty to Peoples and the Individual”) was a political slogan adopted by the Ukrainian Liberation Movement during and after World War II.

THE INCLINED PLANE

Some Observations on Russian Expansion

It has happened. The last country in Europe with a Slav population, hitherto posing as a mediator between East and West, has been occupied by Russia; Czechoslovakia has become a "Protektorat" once more. This has come as a surprise to many people. However, events in Czechoslovakia have laid bare the inclined plane on which the states in the Soviet orbit repose and which inevitably leads to occupation by the USSR. A brief survey of some almost unknown occurrences which took place in Czechoslovakia and her neighbor states in 1947 may shed some light on this problem.

The Triangle of Death

The Second World War restored bi-national Czechoslovakia's sovereignty. Her immediate neighbor is the Ukraine, a country occupied and exploited by Russia since 1920. Between 1941 and 1945, a vigorous political and military liberation movement has operated in the Ukraine. Both the UHVR—the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council—and the UPA—the Ukrainian Insurgent Army—have been extremely active against the Russians as well as the Germans.

Reprinted with permission from *The Baltic Review*, II, No. 2 (June, 1948), 48-51.

In the Carpathian Mountains on both sides of the "Curzon Line" (the Polish-Ukrainian frontier) heavy battles were fought in 1946 and 1947. Communications were cut, Russian and Red Polish garrisons were disarmed, the kolkhoz system was obliterated, the Soviet commissars and NKVD officials were liquidated—though not on any larger scale than elsewhere in the Ukraine. Nevertheless, the combat in this district became increasingly irritating to the Russian aggressors: the thunder of the guns was audible in Western Europe and foreign correspondents (e.g., the correspondent of *The Times*) could state on personal evidence that a struggle for elementary human rights was going on there.¹ When, moreover, General Swierczewski, Stalin's "Plenipotentiary for Poland," fell in a battle against UPA on March 28, 1947, Moscow decided to crush this hornet's nest.² Accordingly, a "Treaty of Three" for the coordinated combating of the UPA was signed by the USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia in April, 1947.³ Under this treaty Czechoslovakia agreed to put up a brigade of mountain troops, her police and constabulary at the disposal of the Russians to cut the westward retreat of the UPA detachments and to liquidate them in this "triangle of death."

Cutting Across Czechoslovakia

General Taras Chuprynka, the Commander-in-Chief of the UPA, whose headquarters are in Central Ukraine, gave his menaced troops very explicit orders: (1) The troops are to use the tactics of evasion and avoid decisive battles and possible annihilation at any cost; (2) A large group is to break through to the Prypet marshes (operational section of the UPA-North) and another to Odessa (operational section of the UPA-South); (3) Three smaller groups are to attempt a raid through Czechoslovakia and contact the Yugoslav (anti-Tito) resistance movement.

It should be evident from this why the great Russo-Polish-Czech annihilation offensive proved a washout. When the Czech mountaineers had linked up with the Polish infantry and a Russian armored corps and were celebrating their "victory" over UPA, "small mobile detachments of the UPA were swarming all

over Slovakia and Central Czechia," to quote the Czech press. Some of them crossed the Danube south of Lake Balaton in Hungary and reached Yugoslavian territory, others reached the American or British zones of Germany or Austria and were disarmed there.⁴

The UPA command has explained the objectives of its operations on the Czechoslovak territory in numerous pamphlets and at no less numerous meetings: its aim was to establish and organize cooperation between the Soviet-oppressed nations with a view to throwing off the Russian yoke. The UHVR appealed to the Czechs and Slovaks to resist the Russians immediately with all their might and, above all, to give up their Russian orientation and their illusions about Russia.

This appeal did not go unheeded. The Czech troops hardly fought the UPA units and the Slovak troops did not do this at all. Heavy fighting took place only near Svaty Martin and Ruzomberk, where the cadets of a military college were sent against the UPA. The Slovak population fed and housed the UPA soldiers and gave them useful information.

For Russia—Against the Fighters for Freedom

It may sound incredible, but the leaders of the Czech nation, who have idolized Pan Slavism for centuries, have actually taken up arms against other Slav nations for the sole reason that these nations have fought Russia. For centuries they have identified Slavdom and the Slav cause with Russia, in spite of the fact that the Russians have oppressed other Slav peoples in the most barbaric way.

The activities of the Prague Government have caused the UPA and the Slovak underground some appreciable losses. Thus, e.g., Burlaka, the commander of an UPA group, was captured thanks to their efforts. Imitating the methods of the NKVD, the Czech police have addressed an appeal "to the members of the UPA on Czechoslovak territory" in the name of Burlaka. Another appeal, signed by the Minister for Internal Affairs, contained the following injunction: "Kill your commanders, throw away your weapons and report to the NB (the Czech security police);" and again: "Surrender! You will live and work! The Slav Truth will win!"

The UPA soldiers who for five years have read similar appeals by SS-Obergruppenfuehrer von dem Bach (the Nazi plenipotentiary for combating the insurgents in the Ukraine in 1943) and by Russian commissars, would not let themselves be taken in by the "Slav Truth."

Then General Svoboda,⁵ also a trustee of Moscow, organized a volunteers' division consisting of "Red guerrillas." It is a well-known fact that these Red guerrillas had never fought the Germans but that they were the mainstay of the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia. In consequence of its very low fighting value this division proved extremely ineffective in the field and its positions were easily overrun by the UPA. Nevertheless, the "neutral" General Svoboda had thousands of armed communists at his disposal during the recent crisis in Prague, when they demonstrated for Gottwald⁶ as . . . "armed workers."

Meanwhile the Prague Government thought fit to announce that it considered the "military and police action against UPA," which had only compromised it, as having ended. In spite of this official position, appeals by the Ministry for Internal Affairs to the UPA were posted "unofficially" in the towns and villages of Czechoslovakia as late as January, 1948. In February of this year [1948] UPA Commander Burlaka succeeded in escaping from a Czech concentration camp in Kosice and the majority of the UPA detachments have transferred their activities back to the Ukrainian territory.⁷ The Czechs, who were recently repatriated from the Ukraine, state that the UPA troops in the district in question seem to be endeavoring to break through to the north and the east. This information is corroborated by recent Russian measures in the Ukraine: garrisons have been increased and railway stations fenced in with barbed wire and provided with machine gun posts.

The Great Dilemma

Although the UPA raid across Czechoslovakia was not of long duration, it has been of great importance to the struggle for independence of nations united in the ABN. Western Europe has seen that mighty national liberation movements are afoot against the Russian dictatorship and the underground move-

ments in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia and Poland have received a new impetus, these nations having in fact joined the ABN.

In order to prevent this "new European resistance" from developing and growing and at the same time to bring down the iron curtain more securely, Moscow has decided to annihilate what was left of Czechoslovakia's independence. Under the pretext of economic and cultural collaboration and of a united front against UPA, Russia managed to put its agents in key positions in the secret police, the constabulary, and the judiciary, in addition to "neutral" high commissioners in the army and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The above-mentioned "Red division" was the foundation of Gottwald's "action committees." The Czech leaders had nothing with which to oppose this Russian attack. They had relinquished their only weapon when they sanctioned the sending of thousands of Czechs and Slovaks into battle against the Ukrainian and Slovak fighters for freedom. Now Prague sees whose abject tool it has been. It had neither the courage nor the determination to put its trust in the West, to proclaim an uncompromising adherence to Western ideals and to combat Russian aggression together with the other oppressed nations.

Meanwhile in the Ukraine, the Baltic area, Belorussia and the Caucasus the struggle has not abated. "Deep raids by the UPA—in the vicinity of Kiev, west of Kharkov, north of Odessa—gave the impression of a general insurrection in the Ukraine," says a Reuter message from Shanghai. Actually UPA can work so successfully in the Ukraine only because it enjoys the support of the whole population. A general revolt must and will take place not only in the Ukraine but simultaneously in all the countries under Russian occupation. It is, therefore, essential that all nations envisage the fact that they will slip down an inclined plane if they collaborate with Russia and lay themselves open to peaceful penetration. The Czech nation, too, will have to undergo a spiritual revolution and to dig up the weapons buried in Jan Huss' time, and use them in regaining its independence.

Today, right now, every nation is facing a great dilemma: it

must either acknowledge every other nation's right to freedom and independence and fight with the struggling nations for a new and free world, or resign itself to slipping, slowly and inevitably, down the inclined plane that leads to the Russian yoke.

REFERENCE NOTES

¹Reference is made to two correspondents for *The Times of London*—John Curtiss and Derek Robinson—who covered the UPA operations and Communist Polish Government's counterinsurgency efforts during 1946-47.

²General Karol Swierczewski fought in the Spanish Civil War on the Republican side under the name of "General Walter." During World War II he commanded the Second Polish Army on the Soviet side against Nazi Germany. After the war he was appointed Deputy Minister of Defense in the communist-dominated Polish Government. During one of his inspections of the Polish army counterguerrilla operations in the Ukrainian ethnic region of Eastern Poland he was killed in an ambush set up by an UPA unit. See article No. 3 below for an eyewitness account of the ambush.

³See note 3 to article No. 1 in this collection.

⁴See, *The New York Times*, September 19, 1947.

⁵General Ludvig Svoboda commanded Czech communist units on the Eastern Front during World War II. After the war he became Minister of Defense (1945-1950) and President of Czechoslovakia (1968-1975).

⁶Klement Gottwald, Czech communist leader, Premier of Czechoslovakia under the Beneš regime (1946-1948), and President after the communist take-over of the country (1948-1953).

⁷Contrary to reports circulating at the time about his alleged escape, Commander Burlaka was extradited by the Czechoslovak authorities to Poland where he was sentenced to death. See, for example, M. Kvapil, "The Night on Mt. Lupča," *Československý Vojak*, XVI, no. 19 (1967), 4-7.

3

THE UNKNOWN FRONT

September 1947: A fair-sized group of soldiers belonging to the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) broke its way out of encirclement in the Ukraine reaching the West via Czechoslovakia.¹

I interviewed members of these detachments—remarkable for having achieved this feat of determined valor.

Among them I met a guerrilla fighter who took part in the so-called attempted assassination of Poland's Vice Minister of Defense, General Karol Swierczewski.

The General was killed in the encounter with an UPA detachment.²

"This was no terrorist attempt on his life," objected Mykola Prykui, a burly 30 year old UPA non-commissioned officer.

He added: "We are, in principle, opposed to individual terrorism and we regard ourselves soldiers of a regular Ukrainian army fighting Moscow and its janissaries. General Swierczewski, one such representative of Russian imperialism, was a legitimate target in justifiable military combat."

"It was, indeed, a typical guerrilla action," confirmed his comrade-in-arms B. Sokolenko.

Prykui continued:

"In the winter months of 1946-47, the Polish communist authorities made another in a series of attempts to resettle the

This is an English rendering of the article which had originally appeared in the Swiss weekly *Die Weltwoche* (Zürich), November 12, 1948, and is reprinted here with the permission of its editors.

Ukrainian population, forcing people from their homeland along the new Polish-Soviet border. At the same time they were anxious to clear the same districts of our UPA units, as was then demanded from the Warsaw authorities by Moscow.

"The winter was harsh with high snowdrifts hampering our movements. The Polish and Soviet army units pressed us ever closer to the Sian River and the high ridges of the Carpathian Mountains. Incidentally, quite a few enemy troops were regular Soviet soldiers. When we took prisoners they admitted having been given Polish uniforms thus buttressing the Polish Communist Army.

"Nevertheless, our two most experienced commanders, Burlaka and Khrin, continued to weaken the blockading units of the Warsaw regime's army.

"It is not surprising, then, that the commander of the Polish garrison in the provincial capital city of Peremyshl, General Wieckowski, encouraged his troops in the following way: He promised extra clothing and footwear to every soldier of the detachment which brought in Burlaka or Khrin, dead or alive.

A Hospital Destroyed

"Early in March of 1947, when the snow on the slopes began melting, our military sector suffered a terrible setback. A well-camouflaged underground hospital, situated close to a small creek in the Sianik district, was discovered and destroyed by the enemy.

"It happened in this way. A UPA convalescent was spotted by a Polish patrol as he fetched water from a creek. The soldiers tracked him to the hidden area. Two companies of regular army and police, supported by a detachment of the MO (*Milicja Obywatelska*—Civil Guard) encircled the fortified hospital.

"There were then four medics, four nurses, five seriously wounded and four convalescent UPA soldiers.

"The attack on the hospital continued for over 26 hours. With no one left to put up active resistance, the survivors finished themselves off with handgranades, refusing to be taken alive.

"Once the details became known, every detachment, naturally, was eager for revenge. At that time, our unit operated in

the vicinity of Balyhorod and Tisna — a triangular region formed by the borders of Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Soviet Ukraine.

“At dawn on March 28, 1947, our leader, Commander Khrin (a very genial fellow despite serious bullet wounds suffered in both arms) put our company on the alert.

“Our reconnaissance learned that some high ranking officers from Warsaw were due for a tour of inspection of the Polish troops in the region. Thus, the hour for vengeance had struck,” he said.

“The objective of the announced movement order was a section of the road between the towns of Balyhorod and Tisna. It was a pleasant morning. No snow. No footprints. The sight of the budding green filled us with assurance that hunger and severe cold were no longer going to be the allies of our enemies.

“Having reached our objective, we received additional information from our reconnaissance: four armored vehicles and four army trucks were coming our way. They were full of Polish soldiers.

“The lead column passed by without noticing anything unusual although enemy soldiers were keeping both sides of the mountain road under observation. The stillness reassured them.

A Regular Battle

“Our commander ordered us to take up assigned positions along the road. I was to cover the road with my machine-gun from the edge of the woods. The commander himself stood just a few paces behind my post. Our three squads were taking cover in the brushwood to the right of me. Then I spotted through my binoculars a staff car and a truck with about a score of soldiers in it rapidly advancing towards us. I still remember seeing three officers in the car, with their caps off and their bald heads reflecting the sunshine.

“Soon, the action started without warning. As our units were still taking up their positions, the staff car reached the point of no return.

“It was within my line of fire. A sudden burst of fire from the machine-gun and other weapons immobilized the car almost at

once. A somewhat heavy-set officer jumped out of the vehicle and frantically tried to organize the surprised soldiers into battle order. Courageous but altogether futile. Moments later he fell and I still believe I heard him say: ‘Colonel, I am done for. . . .’ “But Colonel Gerhard (we learned his name later) was helplessly wounded. The same Colonel Gerhard who had ordered his soldiers to destroy a Ukrainian Catholic church in the town of Lisko barely three months earlier.³

“I cannot say with any certainty whether General Karol Swierczewski fell hit by my machine-gun bullets or someone else’s. There was no time to confirm such detail entangled as I was in the exchange of fire with enemy shooting at us from behind the truck. What I do know, however, is that not far from my own position Lieutenant Hran’, former Soviet soldier and a veteran of the Soviet-Finnish War of 1940, occupied a commanding position. A sniper, he could have hit the prized target General Swierczewski in the confusion of such a surprise attack.

“The whole encounter lasted about 15 minutes. Balyhorod signalled that a relief force was being rushed to the scene. Our orders were to break contact. To withdraw into the depth of the forest.

“No point in risking a protracted battle with a better armed and larger enemy force. We had accomplished our task.

“Late on the same night, a peasant travelling along the road from Sianik told our people that five killed and six wounded had been brought into his town. Among the dead was General Swierczewski, Polish Vice-Minister of Defense, or ‘General Walter’ as he had been known during the Spanish Civil War.

“Next morning, we crossed the border and entered Czechoslovakia.”

The Road of Vengeance

“The road between Balyhorod and Tisna, however, witnessed yet another encounter of a similar kind. A UPA detachment operating there under orders of Commander Bir avenged our friends murdered in the underground hospital in the early spring.

“It happened on April 2, 1947.

"A group of officers and men from the Polish units stationed in and around Tisna were travelling to Balyhorod. It was pay day. . . . As they neared the point where General Swierczewski was killed in March, they got off their truck and guardedly followed the vehicle, weapons at the ready. Before long, their commanding officer, having taken another quick look around, reassured his subordinates: 'Well, boys, all clear! Board the truck!'

"But before they could speed off, they were enveloped in concentrated fire from UPA automatic weapons. . . . At least five officers, eleven non-commissioned officers and five men (including the commandant of the local police) were later reported to be among the killed or seriously wounded.

"Our intelligence learned afterwards that most of those under that attack had taken active part in the destruction of the underground hospital," said M. Prykui.

"Both events—the destruction of the hospital and the act of vengeance—took place in the same district, close to the same mountain creek," added another UPA soldier, one of the members of the group that broke through to West Germany, across Czechoslovakia, from the Ukraine in September 1947.

"The democracy of our dead had not registered their hopes in vain."

REFERENCE NOTES

¹See, *The New York Times*, September 19, 1947.

²See note 2 to article No. 2 in this collection.

³For an eyewitness account of this battle from the Polish side and Colonel Gerhard's role in the counter guerrilla operations against the UPA, see his memoiristic work *Luny w Bieszczadach* (Fires in the Beskids), (Warsaw: MON, 1958), pp. 586-604.

4

UKRAINE ADVISES

HOW TO ROCK KREMLIN

Recently, Mr. Edward W. Barrett, United States Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, was greatly surprised to receive a letter from the Ukrainian Underground in the Soviet Ukraine. This letter was written by Major P. Poltava,¹ a leading member of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), and sent to Washington. There, Mr. M. Lebed, Foreign Secretary of the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council, made a literal translation of the letter for the State Department.²

The conditions under which that letter, written in some hiding-place in the Ukraine—which with its forty million population, is dominated by the Soviets—was then passed through underground lines of communication, made it a sensational event when it finally reached Washington. This was the first time in history of the "Iron Curtain" and the "Cold War" between the West and East, that a letter had come from the depth of the Russian secret empire, written by an underground leader and addressed to the State Department, specifically to its branch the "Voice of America."

Reprinted with permission from *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto), April 14, 1951.

"Frog in Its Throat"

This letter points out just how successfully the "Voice of America" has done its work and how it might be more successful in this same work if it employed suitable approaches toward the nationalities of the Soviet Union.

For, to them, the "Voice of America" has been giving its "true information" for almost two years in the Russian language, and over a year in the Ukrainian. The State Department has received many criticisms from the Ukrainian emigres. In the current debate on the effectiveness of the "Voice of America" between Senator Benton of Connecticut and the State Department, the former has charged that "the Voice of America has a frog in its throat" and that it is not what it is supposed to be: "the voice of peace and freedom for the free world."

Now, one of the many listeners in the Soviet Union gives his views on this subject.

He says, "My fellow-countrymen and I are constantly surprised by the fact that, while the Kremlin's propaganda never neglects to take advantage of even the smallest discontent of some labor organization in the USA nor does it fail to make use of forms of anti-regime opposition such as in the Philippines, yet at the same time American propaganda does not take advantage of the fight of the Ukrainian people against Bolshevism inside the USSR."

35,000 Destroyed

This observation is more understandable when it is realized that Soviet inhabitants live in a paralyzing fear of the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) and the police system of the Soviet empire. The success of the Kremlin in stifling opposition inside the Soviet Union forced these people to believe that all such effort is useless. The Kremlin itself seeks to promote this belief by saying that it knows everything and that all conspiracies will be found out.

To illustrate this, the MVD creates fake conspiracies, which it supposedly uncovers, and the mass arrests begin. The Kremlin would rather have ninety-nine innocent people die than to have one "counter-revolutionary" escape.

The Ukrainian Liberation Movement and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army exposed the myth of the invincible power of the Kremlin in the Ukraine. This underground has been active for six years, during which time, according to the latest report of the headquarters of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, 35,000 MVD troops have been destroyed in the Ukraine.

Indeed, broadcasting these tremendous results of the Ukrainian resistance over all the Soviet Republics would contribute greatly to releasing the Soviet citizens from their hypnotic fear and would also encourage them to a passive opposition to the Kremlin, and perhaps to an active one.

The Ukrainian underground cannot be simply relying only on its own means and strength to carry on this work effectively over such vast territory stretching from the Baltic to Korea. But the "Voice of America" can do this, for it has at its disposal innumerable means which are out of the reach of the Ukrainian or any other underground in the world.

However, in order that the people in the Soviet Union react favorably to the information that is broadcast to them from the United States "psychology must be taken into account, the trend of thought, the disposition and outlook of the people under the Soviet regime have to be taken into consideration as well," Major Poltava says in his letter.

Appeal to Nationalities

He adds, that for want of this the program does not have the desired effect in the Soviet Ukraine. In his opinion the American radio should appeal to the non-Russian nationalities of the USSR who are enslaved by Moscow. Their national oppression by czarist and then by communist Moscow should be shown, and their national sentiments should be encouraged. The arguments that these nationalities have against Bolshevism, based on their culture and historical backgrounds should be utilized.

For instance, during its broadcast in the Ukrainian language the people of the Soviet Ukraine were not told that Mr. Harold Stassen, president of the University of Pennsylvania, demanded that the USA should strive "for the reestablishment of separate national sovereignty and true independence of the Ukraine,

Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Hungary and Romania.”³

On the other hand, criticism of Bolshevism should be carried on from the point of view of the Soviet people, but not with the purpose of restoring the conditions prior to 1917. For “the Soviet people hate Kremlin’s socialism, but in the prevailing majority they are also against restoration of capitalism in their countries,” said Major Poltava.

It is evident that neither Major Poltava himself, nor the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council, and the Ukrainian anti-communists generally, in whose name he speaks, are against the economic policy of “free enterprise.” However, he realizes that the people in the Soviet Republics grew up in the fight against private capitalism — magnates of czarist Russia — and today remain in the struggle against state capitalism. The American broadcasts should also take this into consideration, he argues.

Of course, it is possible to disagree with his opinions and demands. Nevertheless we cannot overlook them. His voice is the voice of many millions behind the Iron Curtain, which really begins on the western border of the Soviet Ukraine. Indeed Major Poltava stresses the possibilities of their being allies of the West. He is saying, that, as an active member of the struggle for liberation from Bolshevism in the Ukraine he feels himself in unison with the free world in its struggle against Bolshevik aggression and tyranny. He is convinced that “the people of the United States of America and the Ukraine are striving for the same common aim: victory over communism.”

REFERENCE NOTES

¹Major Petro Poltava was a leading ideologist of the Ukrainian National Liberation Movement during 1940’s under the Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine. He was killed by Soviet security police in an encounter with the UPA in 1951.

²For the full text of the letter, see *The Ukrainian Insurgent Army in Fight for Freedom* (New York: 1954), pp. 178-88.

³Reference is made to “Victory Without War,” an address by Harold E. Stassen, *Round the World Report*, The American Broadcasting Company, January 15, 1951, Washington, D.C.

H.E. Stassen was an American statesman, Governor of Minnesota, President of the University of Pennsylvania, and twice candidate for the presidency of the United States.

conglomerate of nationalities in the Soviet Union might prove an inestimable addition to our studies regarding both defensive and offensive encounters with Soviet Russia. But, at the same time, an effective approach to the nationalities situation of the Soviet Union might develop into a powerful means for preventing the outbreak of another world war.

This may sound depressingly theoretical, on the surface at least. In practice, however, the issue is very explosive. You may be aware that the Kremlin leaders heartily dislike anybody who, raising this issue, tries to tamper with the delicate and very sensitive structure of the so-called Union of sovereign Soviet republics. When, last July, the United States Congress approved a resolution inviting the American people to study the plight of Soviet-dominated nations,¹ it aroused the wrath of the Kremlin rulers. Comrade Khrushchev himself intervened in that well-known publication *Foreign Affairs*.² In a special, signed article in the October issue of the American quarterly, he said:

The authors of the resolution call for the 'liberation' of the Ukraine, Belorussia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Armenia, Azerbaidjan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and even a certain 'Ural area.'

In his opinion "this ill-starred resolution was regarded by the Soviet people as an act of provocation." Why? Because, as Mr. Khrushchev saw the implication,

It would be interesting to see, incidentally, how the authors of this resolution would have reacted if the parliament of Mexico, for instance, had passed a resolution demanding that Texas, Arizona, and California be 'liberated' from American 'slavery.' Apparently they have never pondered such a question, which is very regrettable. Sometimes comparisons help us to understand the essence of a matter.

This excerpt from Mr. Khrushchev's article represents the gist of the whole problem about which I intend to speak and about which I would like to hear your comments.

One might scrutinize the problem starting from the point of view taken by many Western writers, and some statesmen,

5

THE ROOTS OF INSURGENCY IN THE UKRAINE

The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union

As I have done before in talks addressed to your predecessors in this illustrious military college, I shall discuss one of the most basic, and perhaps the most crucial, of the USSR's covert problems—its nationalities question.

I am aware that at least some of you, like, I suppose, some of your predecessors, may take a dim view of the topic and think: Now, here comes another civilian to lecture us on how to win a war, if and when it comes.

Well, I have no objections to so open an appraisal. Nowadays far too many civilians are inclined to believe that "war is much too serious a matter to be left to the generals." Recently, indeed, a certain major retired from the Canadian Army perhaps because he believed that as a civilian he would be in a better position to criticize the generals.

And I also will readily agree with you that the subject being discussed today is, in fact, closely related to that of another war, or that of lasting peace.

A satisfactory answer to the question of how to approach the

A lecture delivered to student officers at the Royal Canadian Air Force Staff College in Toronto, Ontario, on January 18, 1960.

namely: the Soviet Union is a monolithic nation—Russia; her so-called Soviet republics are Russia's administrative provinces; the numerous nationalities of the Soviet Union are Russian subjects "satisfied with their system of government and economy."*

Even though this viewpoint is now current in the official circles of the West, historical facts and the policies of Soviet leaders concerning the question of their nationalities do not justify the conclusion I have just mentioned.

Soviet newspapers and publications never fail to stress the fact that such republics as the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Georgia are established sovereign nations. During the current session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the delegates of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic mounted the rostrum to accuse Great Britain and France of nineteenth-century colonialism in the Cameroons. At the same time, the Ukrainian delegates pointed out that the Ukrainian people—"free and sovereign"—sympathize with the plight of all African colonial peoples. They stressed the fact that the Ukraine also contributes fair aid to the underdeveloped peoples.

Now, it becomes more and more evident that the Ukraine serves the Kremlin leaders as a show-window for the Afro-Asian peoples' inspection.

Since Stalin's death in 1953, the Ukraine's capital Kiev has witnessed a procession of visiting leaders and representatives of nations of many colors—Chinese, Indian, Egyptian, Sudanese—in addition to those from European satellite countries.

The stress of Soviet propaganda in these cases is always on the productivity of the highly-industrialized Ukraine—remarkable even by North American standards. The argument follows a well set and richly embroidered pattern: the Ukraine, in the past one of the most oppressed nations, attained her sovereignty and was able to develop her industrial power *only* under Leninist socialism, and *only* thanks to the friendly help of the Russian people.

One suspects in these tactics a shrewd propaganda maneuver designed for and created by external purposes only. Nevertheless, there are indications that this policy pursued by the Kremlin rulers is also the result of certain internal pressures.

*"Text of the Governor's Report on the Soviet Visit," *The New York Times*, August 1, 1959.

When a resolution was put forward by Representative Smith of Wisconsin in the United States House of Representatives, in July 1953, calling for the establishment of direct diplomatic relations with the governments of the Ukraine and Belorussia, the Kremlin jugglers reacted immediately, and vehemently.³

The following January, on the occasion of the anniversary of the union between czarist Russia (or rather Muscovy, as it was known then) and the Ukraine in 1654, the Presidium of the Soviet Union, formally and with the accompaniment of powerful state propaganda, handed over the Crimea to the Ukraine.⁴

The Crimean Peninsula had until then belonged to the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. Lenin and Stalin regarded the Crimea as a Russian Gibraltar controlling the Ukraine and the southern approaches to the Soviet Union. The Ukrainians seemingly did not have any rightful claims to the Crimea before 1953. But after the Russians felt themselves outmaneuvered by a group of American politicians, they acted swiftly and without paying much attention to previous considerations. According to the Soviet press which reflected the official line of thinking, the Ukraine had the fullest claims to the peninsula: historical, economic, cultural, strategic, etc.

The Soviet mass media as a whole did not fail to stress the magnanimity of the Russian nation inspired by Marxism-Leninism. The transfer of the Crimea was "a gift" from the Russians to the Ukrainians—an example of friendship in deed as well as in word.

In my opinion, this proves that the nationality question remains the most vulnerable chink in the Soviet Russian armor. And it has been so from the inception of the Soviet Union; or even earlier—since the revolution in czarist Russia. The Soviets have since been trying to solve that problem. As in other instances, they claim they have succeeded.

Facts tell a different story.

Let's review briefly the historical events leading to the present situation in Eastern Europe.

In February 1917, revolution swept Russia, ending bloodily the Romanov dynasty and opening up new vistas for the hitherto submerged non-Russian peoples. These non-Russian peoples stood thus on the threshold of national emancipation. Heavily burdened by a centuries-old colonial past, they found the road to nationhood not

an easy one. Almost without exception, each went about establishing its national statehood in stages marked by hesitant gradualism, hoping at the same time that the former Empire would be transformed into a federation of national republics.

Like their neighbors, the Ukrainians first demanded only regional autonomy, but soon moved towards the establishment of a republic in the face of vacillations and protestations on the part of the newly formed Russian "liberal" government. Once the Bolsheviks seized power in Petrograd, however, the Ukrainians, like other nationalities, committed themselves irrevocably to separate statehood. Following the example of Finland and Latvia, the Ukraine proclaimed independence from Russia on January 22, 1918. Soon to be followed by Lithuania, Estonia, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.

No sooner were these declarations made than the young states became victims of outright aggression.

The Ukraine was attacked from every direction: from the west by Poland and Romania; from the south by the White Guard Russians of General Denikin, supported by the French and British; from the north by the Red Army of Lenin and Trotsky. In the more than two-year-long turmoil, Lenin succeeded in setting up a Soviet Ukrainian government in Kiev even as he came to terms with the Poles who had taken Western Ukraine with the city of Lviv.

At the same time, Belorussian and three Trans-Caucasian Soviet republics were set up.

Until 1922 all these republics, the Ukraine included, existed as autonomous states. Lenin, as we know from recent research, prevented Stalin and his Russian centralist supporters from annexing these republics into the Russian Federative Soviet Republic. Moreover, in his now famous "testament" Lenin also warned his Kremlin colleagues against the coming rise of Stalin to power, and against the dangers arising from the Russian centralist:

It is quite natural that in such circumstances the 'freedom to secede from the union' by which we justify ourselves will be a mere scrap of paper, unable to defend the non-Russians from the onslaught of that really Russian man, the Great Russian chauvinist, in substance a rascal and a tyrant, such as the typical Russian bureaucrat is.⁵

His forebodings were soon justified. During Stalin's long reign, the Soviet Union took on a purely Russian character. The Ukrainians, Belorussians, Georgians, and other nationalities were often accused of bourgeois-nationalist deviations. The Russian language and culture were presented as the only worthwhile expressions of the proletariat. The Ukrainian Communist Party itself was purged almost regularly, and during the all-union monster purges of 1928, 1933, and 1937 — the Ukraine's government and the party's leadership were liquidated almost to a man. Two of the chief human instruments in the bloody purge of 1937 in the Ukraine survived Stalin's regime and are today the men at the top in the Soviet Union — Nikita Khrushchev, Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party in 1938, and his assistant at that time, General Ivan Serov who later helped the former to liquidate Beria.⁶

Ukrainian resistance to Moscow's encroachment was broken in 1933, chiefly by mass-famine. Over five million people died of hunger, the result of forced collectivization and the requisitioning of foodstuffs by the Soviet government.

Later, the Second World War seemed to the majority of the non-Russian nationalities in the Soviet Union the lesser of two evils. They expected *the West* to liberate them from the clutches of Stalin's centralized communist empire. This is one of the reasons why the hard-driving Germans scored such great victories during the first months of the campaign against the Soviet Union in 1941. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians, Belorussians, Georgians, Uzbeks, Azerbaijanians, and Russians themselves surrendered to the Germans in the belief that they would be set free — or even that they might be able to fight against their Russian overlords. Some of them dreamed of setting up independent national states based on economic free enterprise.

The Germans frowned upon such ideas. They maltreated prisoners of war, and put Hitlerite colonialism into practice in the Ukraine and Belorussia — the two original republics of the Soviet Union entirely occupied by the Germans. Thus they roused against themselves well-nigh all the Ukrainians and Belorussians, who then had to fight against the Germans for their own survival, either in the ranks of the Red Army, or as insurgents in occupied territory.

I had ample opportunity to observe these developments at close quarters. During the summer and autumn of 1941, I took part in the movement of those allegedly “crazy” Ukrainians who attempted, in the midst of the war, to bake the Ukrainian nationalist cake, and eat it too.

Some of the leading members of our underground organization—OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists)—proclaimed an independent government of the Ukraine, with Iaroslav Stetsko as Prime Minister, as soon as the German armies entered the city of Lviv, on June 30, 1941. Others followed the fast-moving German columns, sometimes actually outrunning them in their advance eastward. The idea was to set up Ukrainian local administration in the liberated territories and, in this way, to compel the Germans to accept Ukrainian independence as a fact. This was planned in spite of Hitlerist racist policy. We were also busy setting up our underground network encompassing for the first time all Ukrainian ethnographic territory.

To illustrate the idea underlying our moves of the period, I'll use our own group of Ukrainian revolutionaries as an example. There were eleven men in the group whose final destination was Sevastopol in the Crimea. We travelled sometimes by the horse-drawn carts used in the Ukrainian steppes, sometimes on bicycles, occasionally on foot, but always independently of the Germans. For the latter approach we had a good reason. Special units of Himmler's police, the dreaded *Einsatzkommando*, attached loosely to the regular army groups, were busy searching out our men and either liquidating them on the spot or delivering them to prisons and concentration camps. According to the Nuremberg Trial documents, Himmler's directive for the three *Einsatzgruppen* concerned the Ukrainian nationalists as much as it did the Soviet commissars. The instruction read in part:

To weed out professional revolutionaries, officials of the Comintern, people's commissars . . . and all Jews.⁷

The Nazis were unable to catch up with our unit only because we stayed too close to the frontline. On the river Inhulets we even lost track of the German front troops. What happened was that we had simply outrun them. We had entered the gap between two German pincers—one aimed at Dnipropetrovsk, the other

having as its objective the towns of Kakhivka and Kherson on the lower Dnieper, the gates to the Crimea.

But soon we roamed in Dnipropetrovsk-Mariupol-Kherson no-man's-land region setting up nationalist city and village administration, and hoisting everywhere the Ukrainian blue-and-yellow flags. In a number of places, the German troops would arrive in a town only to be met by a new local Ukrainian administration which expressed its allegiance to the reconstituted Ukrainian sovereign state and its government. The German commanders did not like it but, for the time being, they had to lump it. They did not bother the representatives of the nationalist self-government for about two months. Only after the frontline had moved on far beyond the Dnieper, towards the Donets River, did civilian German administrators gradually begin replacing our local men with their own hirelings. Often these were the communist agents whom the party apparatus had left behind for some specific purposes. In combatting Ukrainian patriots the communists were equal to the example set by the Nazis.

Meantime, our nationalist unit—all the time posing as “local activists”—had reached the shores of the Sea of Azov. The entrance to the Crimea was still barred by the frontline fighting. We had to wait for the inevitable breakthrough which we would again utilize for our own Ukrainian designs as we had done before in other regions.

Unfortunately, we were detained by the terrible *Einsatzgruppe D* that prided itself later on in having killed 91,678 persons in the area assigned to it. It was only thanks to some misunderstanding at the headquarters of General (later Field Marshal) von Manstein, the commander of the 11th Army to which the *Einsatzgruppe* was attached, that we survived the ordeal. It was decided to send us back to Lviv and hand us over to the Gestapo there. It meant—concentration camp at Auschwitz or Buchenwald.

On our way back, we succeeded in “detaching ourselves” from the convoy. Some of my friends entered the Crimea early the following year, as we all were supposed to do. Some of them were caught again by the *Einsatzgruppe* at Dzhankoi, Crimea, and shot. Others spent over three years in the Buchenwald concentration camp. Myself and two other friends, having escaped the clutches of the Nazi network, continued our underground activities.

By that time, members of our revolutionary government set up at Lviv were already behind bars in German prisons, along with the top cadres of our underground organization. The few leaders who had eluded the Gestapo in September–October 1941 rebuilt the underground network and, through their activities in the wooded regions of the northwestern Ukraine, laid the foundation for the now-famous Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA).

The UPA consisted of small mobile groups—in time combined into battalion-strength units—that fought German administration and its police, and Red partisans as well.

German allies—Hungarian and Romanian troops—soon came to respect the fighting abilities of the UPA units, willingly supplying them with arms and ammunition, sometimes in exchange for foodstuffs, sometimes to be left unmolested.

In July 1944, the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council was set up to co-ordinate the activities of the underground organization and of the underground army (UPA) under the leadership of General Roman Shukhevych-Chuprynka. These three underground formations were composed of men and women from various districts of the Ukraine, from all walks of life. They represented many social and political views—from radical rightists, to moderate to leftists, and even some former national-communists of the later Tito-type.

This represents an indication of the mood of the Ukrainian people at the time of the German occupation, at a time when Ukrainians were in a good position to express their attitude actively. This they did by supporting our nationalist underground with men, clothes, food, and medical supplies. There were districts where the Germans were unable to control anything but the main supply routes to the eastern front. Their routes were not attacked because our leadership unknowingly agreed with Mr. Truman's suggestion: Let the Germans and the Soviets fight each other until both are weakened by the bloodletting. . . .⁸ But actually the ultimate objective of the Ukrainian underground during the German occupation was to prepare itself for the return of the weakened Soviets into the Ukraine.

Stalin, that great juggler of nationalities in the Soviet Union, was aware of the true mood of the Ukrainians and that of his other subjects. And he knew that the same process had been going on during the German occupation of Belorussia, Lithu-

ania, Estonia, and Latvia, with a difference: the Ukrainians were able to organize their freedom movement on a larger scale and with somewhat greater efficiency due to their past experience and the greater human resources for such activities against the Russians.

That is why Stalin insisted, during his negotiations with Roosevelt and Churchill at Yalta in 1944, on the recognition by their governments of the annexations of the Western Ukrainian territories (formerly Polish and Romanian) concluded by the Soviets in 1939–1940. He literally said that the Ukrainians would be angered if he did not defend that point at Yalta. Besides, Stalin demanded, and was granted, the admission of the Ukraine and Belorussia to the United Nations as members. This was supposed to compensate these republics for their horrendous losses during the war, and for their contributions to the allied victory over Germany.

That it was not solely a sly diplomatic move to gain two additional votes in the General Assembly is borne out by quotations from Soviet papers. After the Second World War, the Soviet press played more than ever on the theme of the nationalities question: "Only in the Soviet Union, thanks to Marx, Lenin, and Stalin, the nationalities problem has been solved. . . ." The Ukrainians were often held up as the perfect model—a people who had attained their independence and sovereignty against the greatest odds ever encountered by any nation.

Pravda, on August 1, 1950, enlightened its readers thus:

The Ukrainian people were able to build their own independent state only because Lenin and Stalin stood at the cradle of Ukrainian statehood. . . . Only because the Ukrainian people were helped by the Russian people, were they able to defeat all foreign imperialists: Polish, German, French, British, American. . . .

And three years ago, when Nikita Khrushchev denounced Stalin's mistakes and crimes at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [1956], he added another page to the story of the nationalities question. He said that after the Second World War Stalin had intended to deport all the Ukrainians from their lands as punishment for their unfaithfulness to

Russia and to communist ideology. The Ukrainians avoided meeting the fate of the Karachai Republic, the Crimean Tartars, the Volga Germans, and the Chechens, "only because there were too many of them and there was no place to which to deport them," said Khrushchev.⁹ And, of course, he must have had his information from the prime source.

Thus the main problem of the Soviet Union has been stressed once again: the non-Russian nationalities are too numerous and their vitality too great to allow the Russians to shake them down. That is why the Kremlin rulers are compelled to balance these nationalities against each other, and to woo them constantly toward the Soviet nesting ground. The perfect example of such wooing was the mentioned Crimean gift to the Ukrainians.

There are other examples, too.

Belorussia has been introduced, along with the Ukraine, as a member-state in the United Nations. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have national anthems and national flags of their own. Unlike the Ukraine and Belorussia, though, they are not deemed worthy to have representatives at the United Nations.

Lately the Soviets have begun to pay more attention even to the problem of the Cossacks. There are three different Cossack groupings, besides the Ukrainians who traditionally call themselves the "descendants of the Cossacks of Zaporozhe." The other three groups are: the Don Cossacks, Terek Cossacks, and Kuban Cossacks. (The latter are the descendants of the Ukrainians who settled in the region of the Kuban River in the 18th century.)

In 1917 the Cossacks proclaimed their republics but were overrun by the Red Army which was, by default, unwittingly helped by the army of General Denikin and his Great Russian chauvinist policy. As usual, Soviet republics were proclaimed for the Cossack regions, but soon they were liquidated and the Cossacks incorporated into the Soviet Russian Republic.

During the Second World War, the Cossacks were given more freedom by the Germans than any other nationality under their rule in Eastern Europe. They were allowed to preserve their military formations and traditions, and carry weapons. The re-occupation of the Cossack lands by the Soviets was a most tragic event in the history of the Cossack population. Today their case is being revived in a slightly more liberal way. In 1952, *Pravda* broke the silence on this subject and, since then, scores of books

have been devoted to it. Every effort is being made to convince the Cossacks that only the Soviet Union can bring them happiness in the future. Recently, at the Soviet exhibition in New York, a map was displayed of the Soviet Union's territory as it was in 1917; and it showed the territories of the Don, Kuban, and Terek Cossack republics.

On the other hand the Kremlin rulers still keep a close watch on the nationalities of the USSR lest they get too many ideas into their heads, and start a search for their own roads to socialism and sovereignty. The journal *Voprosy filosofii* recently printed an article in which the writer complains that some officials have incorrectly understood the extension of rights of Union Republics. Consequently, there is a tendency in some Republics to give precedence to local personnel over those belonging to other nationalities.¹⁰

And *Pravda*, August 13, 1959, reported that in Uzbekistan "nationalist survivals make themselves felt here and there in various forms."

Various examples can be given from every Soviet non-Russian republic indicating the silent struggle of these peoples for the preservation of their national, spiritual, and political identity in the face of Russification. To counteract the undiminishing waves of resurging nationalism in the Soviet Union, the Kremlin leaders use the well-tried method of pushing overboard the unwanted elements so as to make republics like the Ukraine, Lithuania, Belorussia, or Georgia more easily steerable.

The campaign for volunteers to settle permanently on the "virgin lands" of Kazakhstan is still in full swing in these republics. The results of that campaign of persuasion and pressure from officials of the Party and government are these:

The population of the Kazakh Republic increased, according to the 1959 census, to 9 million from 6 million in 1939. In the same 20-year period, the Ukraine's population grew barely a million-and-a-half from its more than 40 million in 1939. In the same way, the population of West Siberia increased by 24 percent, and that of Lithuania decreased.

An analysis of the newspapers published in the USSR (according to languages) shows an increase of Russian and Ukrainian newspapers in the regions of Asia. In the Uzbek SSR, Russian and Ukrainian newspapers constitute 20 percent of all news-

papers published there. In the Kazakh Republic the increase is even greater; there, 55 percent of the newspapers are in Russian and Ukrainian.

There are also some indications that the Soviet leaders are quite concerned about this region that faces, generally speaking, the Chinese Province of Sinkiang. Reportedly, Sinkiang has recently displayed tremendous economic development and might perhaps become the base for Chinese expansion in the direction of the weakest side of the Soviet Union.

As you must have noticed, I have talked particularly of the Ukraine. I did this not for any sentimental reasons but practical ones. The Ukraine is the second largest republic in the Soviet Union, and the largest among the non-Russian nations within the Soviet Russian orbit of domination.

In terms of population, the Ukraine ranks approximately with England, France, and Italy. According to the 1959 census, roughly 42 million persons lived in the Ukraine. Her territory is somewhat larger than that of France: 232,000 square miles.

But the Ukraine's potential in raw materials, food, and industrial production is much greater than any of these countries. In 1958 the Ukraine provided 43 percent of the coal in the Soviet Union, 56 percent of the iron ore, 51 percent of the pig iron, 40 percent of the steel, and 41 percent of the rolling-mill products.

Now the Ukraine produces as much pig iron as West Germany; in the production of the rolling-mills she has caught up and surpassed France and Belgium together. The coal industry of the Ukraine occupies third place in Europe, and fourth place in the world. "Except for platinum, gold, and copper, we have actually every necessity for our industry," Anatoly Baranovsky, First Deputy Premier for State Planning in the Ukraine, explained to Western newspapermen last year (1959).

Today, many Ukrainians—civilians, bureaucrats, administrators, managers, technicians, scientists, and military commanders as well, occupy important positions in the Soviet empire.

This is not only a tribute to their personal astuteness as communists, but a sure sign of the importance the Kremlin leaders attach nowadays to the Ukrainian problem. The policy of "sharing the rule of Soviet empire with the Ukainian younger brothers" emerged soon after the death of Stalin in 1953. Since

then Ukrainian names have begun to chime all over the Soviet Union.

The active resistance of Ukrainian nationalists during the war and in the first years of the post-war period was also instrumental in forming the current policy of the Kremlin toward the Ukraine and other Soviet nationalities. The extent and the intensity of the activities of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army is illustrated best by the following statistics: in the period 1944-50 about 35,000 officers and soldiers of the special Soviet police force died in combat against the Ukrainian insurgents. In 1947 and 1948 a number of detachments of the UPA broke out from the Ukraine through Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Austria, and reached the American zone of Germany.¹¹ That unusual feat of arms was achieved by the Ukrainian insurgents by order of the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council, which decided it was necessary to attract the attention of Western democracies to the plight of the Ukraine, and to demonstrate her desire for freedom.

If that romantic approach to diplomacy went more or less unheeded by the leaders of the West, it was taken into account by the Kremlin leaders who began after that to stress Ukrainian independence and statehood in their propaganda.

Of course, military and organized political resistance cannot be continued indefinitely. Year by year both types of resistance wear out, until there are more nationalist fighters in the concentration camps than in the woods.

It is to be stressed, however, that various appeals addressed by Soviet authorities to the Ukrainian insurgents during Stalin's reign were unsuccessful. Furthermore, Ukrainians captured by the Soviet forces brought their idea of active resistance to their new homes: to concentration camps in Asia, to the places of their compulsory settlement in Western Siberia, and in the Arctic area of European Russia. We have a number of authors (such as Dr. Sholmer, Mr. Noble, Dr. Varkonyi) who, while telling of their experiences in Soviet concentration camps, stress in their books the role of the Ukrainians as organizers of resistance in those camps.¹²

Soon after the death of Stalin, the Ukrainian inmates of Soviet concentration camps in Vorkuta, Norilsk, and Karaganda organized a mass-strike of slave-laborers there. Their demands concerned better living conditions in the camps and review of

sentences—or, if I may use Khrushchev's term, “the application of socialist justice” not only to the communists mistreated by Stalin, but also to the average Soviet citizen. As you have probably read, Soviet security forces have broken these strikes only with the help of armored columns.

In 1956, when the word spread in the West that Soviet authorities had disbanded all the concentration camps and liquidated every trace of slave labor introduced by “the worst enemy of the Soviet people—Lavrenti Beria,” Mr. Wadsworth, the American representative to the United Nations, received a unique document. It was a letter from Ukrainian inmates of the Soviet concentration camps located in the Mordovian Autonomous Republic, that is on the territory of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. This letter, written on a piece of prison shirt-cloth, made an eight-month trip through Ukrainian underground channels to reach the representative of the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council, Mr. Lebed, in New York. He handed this document to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights—as it was so addressed.¹³

In their letter the Ukrainian prisoners testified that Khrushchev's collective leadership was still carrying out widespread genocide in the Soviet Union. “Yezhov, Beria, Abakumov and others, whose executions were ordered by the security organs in order to deceive people at home and abroad, cannot be made to hold full responsibility for everything because crimes against the enslaved nations are still being perpetrated.”

By way of inference I would stress one detail. It is perhaps of no great consequence how many Soviet Russians have been killed in their encounters with Ukrainians or other insurgents in the Soviet Union. It is perhaps not of much importance whether the Ukrainian struggle gained any recognition in the West for the Ukrainian cause. Of great importance, however, is the fact that the citizens of the multinational empire called the Soviet Union received proof that the police forces of the totalitarian Russian system *were not invincible*. For decades the Kremlin leaders endeavored to convince their citizens that it was useless to resist them because every conspiracy would be immediately discovered by the NKVD;¹⁴ that no nationality has any chance against the combined forces of communism and the Russian nation—at least inside the USSR.

The struggle of the Ukraine put that contention to severe test

and proved it false. Without any foreign assistance, the Ukrainian resistance lasted for more than a decade; and then it developed into dynamic “passive resistance” on an all-Union scale.

Thus, if we combine this internal situation which faced the post-Stalin Kremlin leadership with the fact of the staggering losses the Soviet Union suffered during the Second World War, we are able to explain the frantic moves toward peace by Mr. Khrushchev. The Soviets lost about 17 million men in the war. In the decade we are entering, the Soviet Union is going to feel the results of those losses. There is, and there will continue to be, an acute shortage of laborers and soldiers as well. At the same time, the non-Russian nationalities can be less relied on than ever in the history of the Soviet Union. Consequently, the Kremlin rulers have to put their big house in order first, before entering the warpath against the Western democracies.

One of the most urgent items on the agenda of the Soviet Union is, of course, the nationalities question. The Soviets try to solve it, or rather to adjust it to the views of Lenin and to the current needs of their global policies. We should not be surprised if, in the near future, we might be faced by some startling new moves in that field.

What does the West have to offer in that respect? This is the question that occupies many minds inside the Soviet Union.

But this is the question which has to be answered, first of all, by the military men of the West, by themselves and for themselves. I say this not because I am advocating another war of intervention. I am very much aware of the destructive force of modern warfare. But we must always take into account the possibility of another war. And, for such eventuality, I do not see any reason why we should not study, and exploit the right approach to our enemy's underbelly. After all, why should military men always try to attain their objectives the hard way?

REFERENCE NOTES

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²N.S. Khrushchev, “On Peaceful Coexistence,” *Foreign Affairs*, XXXVIII, No. 1 (October 1959), 1-18.

³See note 1, article No. 6 in this collection.

⁴See *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, No. 4 (March 9, 1954), pp. 170-76.

⁵V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works* (4th ed.; Moscow: 1971), vol. 36, p. 606.

⁶On the role of Ivan Serov in the Soviet purges, see Boris Levytsky, *The Uses of Terror: The Soviet Secret Police 1917-1970* (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1972).

⁷The so-called Heydrich's Order No. 8, July 17, 1941. Quoted in the *Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals*, vol. IV, pp. 123-24, Document No. 3414. Documents referring to the Einsatzgruppe D, and specifically to the Einsatzkommando 10A, are published in the same volume, pp. 16-21.

⁸*The New York Times*, June 24, 1941. See article No. 2 in this collection.

⁹"The Crimes of the Stalin Era," *Special Report to the 20th Congress of the CPSU by N.S. Khrushchev* (New York: The New Leader, 1956), p. 44.

¹⁰I. P. Tsamerian, "The Development of National Relations in the Period of All-round Construction of Communism," *Voprosy filosofii*, XIII, No. 7 (July 1959), 45.

¹¹*The New York Times*, September 19, 1947.

¹²Joseph Sholmer, *Vorkuta* (New York: Holt, 1955), 304 pp. John H. Noble, *I was a Slave in Russia: An American Tells His Story* (New York: Devin-Adair, 1958), 182 pp. Cf. Michael Solomon, *Magadan* (Montreal: Chateau Books, 1971), 243 pp. Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, *The GULAG Archipelago, 1918-1956: An Experiment in Literary Investigation*, 3 vols., (New York: Harper & Row, 1973-76), Part V.

¹³See article No. 7 in this collection.

¹⁴NKVD—People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (after 1946, Ministry for Internal Affairs—MVD); the most feared and repressive Soviet institution in charge of militia, secret police, internal security forces, and concentration camps.