

PART II
UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM AND
SOVIET-WEST RELATIONS

EDITOR'S NOTE

After the defeat of overt armed insurgency in the Ukraine, the national resistance movement transferred its activities into the political sphere.

Inevitably, it became interwoven with the broader issues of the evolving cold war between East and West.

Roman Rakhmanny comments.

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THE KREMLIN WOOS THE UKRAINIANS

There have been many editorial comments in the American and Canadian press on the big "celebrations" being held in the USSR to mark 300 years of "fraternal association between the Ukraine and Russia." These comments are friendly to the Ukraine and well-intentioned; most of them assume that nobody back home in the Ukraine or anywhere else is being fooled by Soviet hypocrisy. The Ukraine is confidently presented as a thorn in the side of the Russians.

Most of these commentators presume too much on the very slight effort the West has made to encourage Ukrainian resistance. It is true that Ukrainians carried on a never-ceasing resistance to Russian rule during the war and for several years afterwards, and that even today the underground struggle goes on. But how little the West has ever done to help! During the war their politicians and diplomats were much too tactful to embarrass their Soviet ally by any suggestion of support for Ukrainian independence. The dreadful scenes in Germany in which Ukrainian patriots—so-called "DPs"—were handed over at bayonet point to the Russians, immediately after the war in accordance with the Yalta Agreement, can never be forgotten.

It was not until 1949 that the "Voice of America," and not until 1952 that the "Voice of Canada," began broadcasting in the Ukrainian language. But *never* is anything said over these pro-

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grams committing the Western nations to the cause of Ukrainian liberation. On the contrary, when official spokesmen enumerate the peoples now living in Soviet slavery they don't even mention the 42 million Ukrainians, though they never forget to include the one million Albanians.

Perhaps the most significant move made in any Western country is the resolution put forward by Representative Smith of Wisconsin in the U.S. House of Representatives some time ago, calling for direct diplomatic relations with the government of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and with the Belorussian government, too.¹ The idea behind this was that the Soviets, in trying to gain favor with the Ukrainians and Belorussians by giving them a facade of independence through their membership in the United Nations, had laid themselves open to exploitation by our diplomacy, if only we were bold enough to see the opportunity. Let us not only recognize, but proclaim Ukrainian and Belorussian independence. This idea, up to now, has been too radical for Western diplomatic minds.

But the West has done just enough to spur the Russians to make a real effort on their side. There was first of all the separate flag and national anthem "granted" to the Ukraine in 1950. Since then, more Ukrainians, or at least people with Ukrainian names, have appeared in high civilian and military posts in the Ukraine than ever before in the Soviet era. A General Halytsky now holds the command of the Odessa Military District formerly held by Marshal Zhukov, and Vice-Admiral Parkhomenko commands the Black Sea Fleet. There was even a moment, after the death of Stalin, when "Russification policies" in the Ukraine were publicly denounced. But the celebration of the so-called Treaty of Pereiaslav of 1654 has topped anything to date.

This began in spectacular fashion in January of this year, when the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet formally handed over the Crimea to the Ukraine. There is a long history behind this. During the 16th and 17th centuries the Turks had controlled large reaches of the Ukraine through their Tartar vassals in the Crimea. In 1918 the Germans had categorically refused the Ukrainian claim to the Crimea in the treaty they wrote at Brest-Litovsk with the Ukrainian National Republic. This gave rise to skirmishes between the Germans and the Ukrainians, who had freed the Crimea from the Bolsheviks. The following

year the Crimean port of Sevastopol was used, along with Odessa, as a base for British and French support for the White Guard offensive of Denikin and Wrangel against the Ukrainian National Republic.

The Soviet Russia of Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin regarded the Crimea as a Gibraltar controlling the approaches to the Ukraine. It therefore attached this peninsula — just as has been done more lately with strategic East Prussia — to the *Russian SFSR*, though there was no geographical connection, and all ethnic, historical and economic factors were against it. Suddenly, at a word of command, the Soviet press cites all these reasons why the Crimea should now belong to the Ukraine.

The Kremlin, it seems, is prepared to take some slight risk with its "aircraft carrier in the Black Sea" if it can lure the Ukrainians from the "deceitful propaganda of the Ukrainian nationalists and the capitalists of Wall Street." In reality this is a premium paid on an insurance policy intended to avert, in any future war, a repetition of the mass desertions of Ukrainian and other non-Russian peoples from the Red Army such as occurred in 1941.

I have been moved to this warning by the news that my old friend V. Okhrymovych, allegedly parachuted into the Ukraine by "American counter-espionage," has been caught and put to death. I knew Okhrymovych before the war, and I met him several times during the war in the Ukraine.

After the war I shared a room with him in a West European city, until the day he decided to return to the Ukraine. Why did he go back? The place for those who directed the Ukrainian underground, he believed, was home in the Ukraine and not abroad. Officially, he was "requested" to go back by the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council, the political body which directs the activities of the UPA, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.

The Kremlin, of course, calls Okhrymovych an "American spy." It depicts him and his fellow Ukrainian nationalists as nothing more than collaborators of the United States. And it doesn't fail to point out that the United States, to quote from its recent Ambassador to Moscow, George Kennan, looks upon the Ukraine as "just as much a part of Russia as Pennsylvania is of the United States."² If this, or the concept of the reactionary Russian emigres of the American Committee for Liberation

from Bolshevism of a “democratic federation” of the Ukraine and Russia, is all that U.S. policy can put forward, we cannot be confident that we are winning the struggle for the soul of the Ukrainian people.

REFERENCE NOTES

¹See, U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Hearings, on H.C. Res. 58, Favoring Extension of Diplomatic Relations with the Republics of Ukraine and Belorussia*, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1953, 112 p.

²See, George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 135.

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MESSAGE ON PRISON CLOTH: A PLEA FOR FREEDOM

A Special News Dispatch

One of the first documents ever smuggled out of the Soviet concentration camp was handed over to the U.N. Secretariat, declared Mykola Lebed, Secretary-General for Foreign Affairs of the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council, at a press conference held today in New York City.

Written on a piece of prison cloth and signed by Ukrainian inmates of a Mordovian slave labor camp, the document is a 2,400-word appeal for human rights.¹

The prisoners' appeal, printed in Ukrainian Cyrillic letters, was translated into English here by the staff of the Foreign Representation of the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council.

The appeal asks the United Nations Commission on Human Rights to investigate genocide in Soviet concentration camps, both during and after Stalin's rule.

The Ukrainian prisoners charge that Khrushchev's collective leadership is still carrying out widespread genocide in the Ukraine.

Reprinted with permission from *The Telegram* (Toronto), July 23, 1956, where it appeared under the headline title "Message Smuggled From Red Slave Camp on Shirtcloth, Pleads for Freedom."

"Does the civilized world know that over the mass burial sites of the prison camps, new camps and cities are built, canals dug, and stadiums erected in order to obliterate the traces of these crimes?" the authors of the appeal ask.

They state that "in the Abez (Komi ASSR), Camps No. 1, 4, and 5 stand on prisoners' mass graves. At Zavod No. 5 in Leplia (Mordovian ASSR), the 1st and 2nd polishing shops, technical laboratory, and the forge were erected on human bones. . . ."

The prisoners' document throws some new light on Nikita Khrushchev's campaign for developing the virgin lands of the USSR by volunteers and members of the *Komsomol*.

It states that hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians "are exiled to the virgin territory of Kazakhstan, Krasnoiarsk and the Far North" while Khrushchev proclaims that only volunteers and members of the *Komsomol* go out to these areas.

The Ukrainian prisoners in Mordovia voice a demand which might be the truest expression of the beliefs of millions of Soviet citizens.

They say: "Whereas every criminal act against the enslaved nation is perpetrated with the knowledge of the Politburo and of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, we demand that the entire ruling class of the Soviet Union be brought before international justice."

Crimes Continue

"Yezhov, Beria, Abakumov and others whose executions were ordered by the security organs in order to deceive people at home and abroad, cannot be made to hold full responsibility for everything, because crimes against enslaved nations are still being perpetrated."

The document took eight months to reach representatives of the Ukrainian Liberation Movement in the West.

The Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council, an underground committee, was established in the Ukraine twelve years ago for the purpose of directing all Ukrainian anti-Nazi and anti-communist activities.

Its charges are substantiated by recent Soviet and Western reports of the blowing up of a Soviet military train by a group of

Ukrainian Insurgent Army soldiers, and the subsequent mopping up in the forest region of Shepetivka (west of Kiev) by MVD security troops.

Former soldiers of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and of the Ukrainian civilian underground network make up a considerable percentage of the population of the Soviet concentration camps.

And it was they who initiated the first prisoners' strike in the Karaganda camp system in 1952 while Stalin was still alive. Because of that strike, over 300 were transferred to the ill-famed camps of Vorkuta and Norilsk where they started another three-month strike in 1953.

According to the testimony of a Hungarian physician, Dr. F. Varkonyi, who was released from the Vorkuta camp, these and subsequent strikes, supported by prisoners of all nationalities including Russian, turned into minor rebellions and were only put down with the aid of tanks and aircraft.²

REFERENCE NOTES

¹For a complete text of the document, see "They Speak for the Silent; an Open Letter," *National Review* (New York), II, No. 5 (August 1, 1956), 13-16.

²On the prisoner strikes in Soviet concentration camps following Stalin's death and the role of former Ukrainian freedom fighters in these strikes, see references cited in note 12 to article 5 above. Also, see Volodymyr Kosyk, *Concentration Camps in the USSR* (London: Ukrainian Publishers, Ltd, 1962), 108 pp.

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UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM

*Unwilling Collaborators Cause
Concern to Soviet Rulers*

Despite appearances the nationality problem is still much alive in the Soviet Union, and it is being nourished with the news from Africa. This is the conclusion of this writer after having interviewed a score of Western visitors to Soviet Russia and Soviet Ukraine, and talked to a number of Soviet visitors to Canada and the United States during the past year. The conclusion is also supported by the writer's daily explorations in the dull grey waters of the Soviet press and radio reports.

To be sure, the restlessness of Soviet Ukrainians or Soviet Estonians falls somewhat short of the expectations cherished by their nationalistically minded countrymen and former revolutionaries who, like the writer, have settled in Canada for good. Yet, the dissatisfaction of Ukrainians, Belorussians, Baltic peoples and Georgians with the management of Soviet affairs by their big Russian brother is widespread, and deep enough to cause some uneasiness among the Kremlin rulers.

This internal situation explains to a degree the violent reaction of Mr. Khrushchev and his Soviet colleagues to a very general remark made recently by Mr. Diefenbaker at the United

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Nations.¹ The angry reply to a few words concerning the inability of Baltic peoples and of "freedom-loving Ukrainians, and other peoples of Eastern Europe" to elect freely the government of their choosing, contained a significant claim. Mr. Khrushchev's lieutenant in the Ukraine, M. V. Pidhorny, boasted his country was industrially more powerful, economically better developed, and possessed a higher proportion of university-trained young people than Canada, or, for that matter, France or Great Britain.²

But it is exactly this industrialization of their country that changes the Ukrainians' position in the Soviet Union; they cannot be bullied as much today as they could in Stalin's time. Even Stalin, if we believe Khrushchev's words, found the limit when he conceded that it was impossible to deport all the Ukrainians "because there were too many of them."³ So much less so today when the Ukraine's industrial and agricultural power has surpassed that of France, and the Ukraine's productivity constitutes the backbone of the Soviet Union's foreign trade and the aid to the underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa. This industrial and economic power gives more weight to the Ukraine's political position in the Soviet camp, a position resembling that of Communist China: it is an unwilling collaborator of Soviet Russia.

Unwilling, but not unaware of her own situation. More and more Soviet Ukrainians are awake to the fact that their wealth and industry are being used to further Soviet Russia's political ambitions both in Africa and in Asia. "We work and suffer many privations only to provide food and clothes for Mr. Lumumba,"⁴ was the wry comment of a collective-farm manager in the region of Kiev, Soviet Ukraine's capital.

There are also many signs to show that Soviet Ukraine's economy, and its agriculture in particular, are beginning to feel the drag of the many Soviet commitments abroad, and the weight of the bribes offered the Afro-Asian countries. There is a far greater shortage of food in the Ukrainian villages than a year ago; and court proceedings against the collective farm workers who have dared to appropriate a little grain from the *kolkhoz* fields are more numerous in the district towns than ever before in Khrushchev's period.

At the same time a growing number of Soviet Ukrainians are marvelling at the strange fortunes of the newly established inde-

pendent African nations. They are being helped by West and East alike, they are treated as full-grown states by all the established powers, big, medium and small; and they enjoy the right of managing their own internal affairs without interference from any white "big brother," be it capitalist or communist.

"Our foreign trade is entirely in the hands of the Russians at Moscow, and our limited autonomy in economic planning (so-called decentralization) is now withering away. Our country is not even represented in the capitals of such Socialist countries as Hungary and China." These are the complaints of a Ukrainian student in Lviv, Western Ukraine. On the other hand, a Russian student of Moscow University, recently on leave from the Red Navy, had another reason to complain: "But you Ukrainians aspire only to be officers, generals and marshals. . .". This was in reference to the growing number of Ukrainians in high military and technical posts in the Soviet Union.

The hard-driving Ukrainians apparently do not confine their aspirations to military matters, however. From the Olympic Games in Rome this year, Ukrainian athletes took home 13 gold medals, 9 silver and 5 bronze, thus qualifying their country for the third place in the unofficial Olympic score. "Yet our sovereign republic is not allowed to be represented by a separate Ukrainian team of athletes," a Ukrainian sport fan remarked heatedly to a Canadian visitor in Kiev. But he would not comment on the incident of July 19 this year in the Moscow stadium, when Russian players and a yelling crowd verbally and physically abused the Ukrainian soccer team from Kiev.

These and other similar points of contact and complaints compelled Mr. Khrushchev to stage a more forceful show for the Soviet Ukrainian delegation at the United Nations. Its head delegate, M. V. Pidhorny, expounded his views and his scorn for the West in the Ukrainian language, just to show how independent his country is.⁵ His line of defense against the "interference of Mr. Diefenbaker in the internal affairs of the Ukrainian people" is being followed faithfully by the Soviet press and radio, both in Ukrainian and Russian. Articles are being published, letters from the readers are being arranged to voice the "indignation of the Ukrainian people" against the "ridiculous remarks" of the Canadian leader.

It seems that Canada's Prime Minister has found the soft spot

in the Soviet armored mask. With a few words concerning Soviet Russian colonialism in Eastern Europe, Canada's leader struck at the Red sea of propaganda and exposed, just for a wink, the hidden iceberg beneath its surface: the nationality problem that looms larger and colder for the Kremlin rulers now when exposed to the rays of the African sun of independence.

REFERENCE NOTES

¹See, U.N. General Assembly, *Official Records*, Fifteenth Session, Plenary, Part One, Vol. I, pp. 108-12 (September 26, 1960).

²*Ibid.*, pp. 373-80 (October 4, 1960). The name *M. V. Pidhorny* is the Ukrainian version of *N. V. Podgorny*, former First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, and the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, i.e. Soviet Union's president.

³See note 9 to article No. 5 in this collection.

⁴Patrice Lumumba, Prime Minister of the Republic of Congo; dismissed and arrested, he was killed in prison in 1961. Communist bloc propaganda exploited his name during the 'sixties; a Moscow university for foreign students was renamed "Lumumba University."

⁵See note 2 above.

THE EMERGENCE OF A SUBMERGED NATION IN THE SOVIET UNION*

Most Western analysts of Soviet affairs have failed to note the changed position of the Ukrainian SSR within the communist camp. During Stalin's long reign the Ukraine became so submerged in the Russian superstate that even many Western statesmen and scholars still regard the country as an integral part of Russia. The partial decentralization of the economy and administration of the Soviet Union in 1957 has given the Ukraine a new role. In contrast to the late 'thirties when the republic had jurisdiction over only 14 secondary ministries, the Ukraine now has jurisdiction in 29 departments, including defense, foreign affairs and agriculture. After thirty years of virtual isolation, its people are making political, cultural and economic contacts with the outside world. In this respect, the foreign contacts the Ukrainian SSR has established during the last three years of peaceful coexistence both with the People's Democracies and the "capitalist" countries have a certain meaning that sheds some light on the internal development of the whole Soviet Union.

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*This *Note* is based on the paper, entitled "Three Years of Peaceful Coexistence in the Life of a Soviet Republic," presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association in Montreal, June 8, 1961.

Since the herding of the Soviet Republics into the Soviet Union in 1923, the Ukraine had enjoyed only a paper independence. In 1944, however, the Ukraine was permitted, along with Belorussia, to form some of its own ministries and to sign some international treaties and conventions. But the Ukraine still has no diplomatic representatives abroad, and no foreign country is directly represented in Kiev. Though a charter member of the United Nations the Republic had no permanent delegate until P. P. Udovychenko was appointed in 1958. In the same year the Ukraine was admitted to several of the United Nations specialized agencies.

All of this meant little to the Ukrainian public. The changes began to affect everyday life only when in 1958 it became possible to subscribe to some foreign newspapers and magazines, and when visitors from abroad began to appear in Kiev. The Czechoslovak foreign minister arrived to open a consulate; President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic paid a courtesy call; Wladyslaw Gomulka of Poland came to help the citizens of Kiev celebrate Ukrainian-Polish friendship, and assured them that "the Polish people recognized unequivocally the unification" of the former Polish eastern provinces with the Ukraine "as an act of historical justice." The astute Mr. Harold Macmillan was one of the few Westerners to recognize the new importance of the Ukraine, and he received an unexpectedly enthusiastic welcome when he visited Kiev in 1959.

Friendly relations with European neighbors and with other People's Republics have been particularly encouraged since 1958 through the activities of Ukrainian branches of the mutual friendship "societies"—Soviet-Polish, Soviet-Hungarian, Soviet-Romanian, Soviet-Chinese, Soviet-Albanian, Soviet-Czechoslovak and, later on, Soviet-Korean, and Soviet-French. Each branch has a chairman and five directors who are responsible for the various portfolios of cultural *rapprochement*—science, culture and art, youth organizations, foreign contacts, sports and tourism. The public activities of the societies usually include ten-day festivals to celebrate the culture of the designated country. Festivals of Ukrainian culture were, in turn, arranged in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Albania, Mongolia and Czechoslovakia.

The Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kiev, besides receiving

many delegations of foreign scholars, is reported to be conducting "a systematic book exchange" with several hundred institutions in communist countries. Less systematic exchanges were also carried on with some non-communist countries, but these seem to have been somewhat hampered by Soviet red tape. Even so, the contacts between Ukrainian scholars and the world continued to grow.

In the three-year period, the Ukrainian press constantly carried reports of contacts of many other kinds: groups of foreign experts, artists and sportsmen visited the Ukraine; Chinese technicians were being trained in the Ukraine, while Ukrainian scientists were teaching at Shanghai, Harbin and Peking; Ukrainian industry was providing technical and material assistance to India, as well as China and other People's Republics; the Ukraine has established trade relations with 59 countries. Taken together, all these reports help to trace the threads of the intricate web of new responsibilities that tend to reorient the Ukraine out of its pre-war isolation and concentration within the Soviet Union.

But the new outlook must have brought Ukrainians to realize even more sharply than ever their dependent status in foreign relations. Moscow still carefully regulates foreign contacts of the Ukraine and more often than not tends to present the Ukrainian achievements as an integral part of Russia's activities. Ukrainian scholars, scientists, writers and artists are able to visit the "capitalist" countries—and particularly those of North America—mostly as members of all-union delegations. Only under the pressure both from within the Ukraine and from abroad (the emigre criticism showing the colonial dependency of the Ukraine from Russia) did Moscow agree reluctantly to allow the Ukrainian SSR to have its own exhibition at the 1958-59 trade fair in Marseilles.

The Soviet Ukrainians are increasingly annoyed by the preference Russian culture receives in the Soviet performances abroad. When the programme of a group of Ukrainian artists visiting Warsaw turned out to be two-thirds Russian, a Kiev monthly *Vitchyzna* charged that the "concert could not have been called a show of Ukrainian musicianship...nor did it represent the whole of the Soviet Union." On the other hand, the Soviet Ukrainians are annoyed, as was a representative of the

Ukraine at the UNESCO conference on adult education at Montreal in August, 1960, when they are referred to by Western speakers and by the press as "Russians."

The Soviet Ukrainian press makes a supreme effort to cover up these deficiencies in the foreign contacts of the Ukraine. It displays an evident anxiety to make the most of every possible aspect of the changed position of the Ukrainian SSR since some decentralization has been effected in the USSR. At the same time it urges citizens to be vigilant in uncovering anti-Soviet influences creeping in with foreign tourists, through radio broadcasts, films or publications. Admittedly, young Ukrainian technocrats and intellectuals, however carefully indoctrinated by the party, are still capable of developing some affinities for "rotten bourgeois" culture and aesthetic tastes; some have evidently even ventured to doubt the wisdom of the Soviet way of life, and to criticize Soviet achievements.

This illustrates the kind of problems Moscow has to face when it feels compelled to let her submerged non-Russian nations emerge even partially. That is why the official Ukraine and its press reacted so violently when Mr. Diefenbaker, at the Fifteenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, hinted that the Ukrainian people and other Eastern European nationalities were deprived of their freedom to "establish orders in their countries of their own will and choice." For the first time the chief Ukrainian delegate, Mr. Pidhorny, was allowed to make his counterspeech before the United Nations Assembly in the Ukrainian language.¹ The Soviet Ukrainian press and the speakers at the public "indignation" meetings all over the Ukraine echoed his protest against the alleged interference in "the domestic affairs" of the "sovereign" Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Yet tourists who visited the Ukraine after this particular three-month campaign found no evidence of any increased enmity toward Canada among the Ukrainians they met.

Thus from 1958 till 1961, the Ukraine was evidently being allowed a limited opportunity to play the role of model communist state, the perfect demonstration of the communist solution to the national aspirations of the Afro-Asian peoples. The increased economic and cultural exchanges between the Ukraine and the People's Democracies undoubtedly has the object of forging closer integration of the Soviet commonwealth through in-

creased interdependence. Continued on a still larger scale, these new friendly relations between neighboring countries might eventually lead to a permanent pacification of Eastern Europe. The cultural intercourse of the Ukraine with non-communist states has been kept within the narrow bounds of circumscribed book exchanges, limited tourism and restricted participation by Ukrainian scholars in international conferences. The Ukrainian SSR has not been given such free a hand in this respect as, let us say, Poland. Nevertheless the effect of even these limited interchanges must be disproportionately greater than their number or scope might suggest, since they come at the end of thirty years of virtual isolation for the Ukraine.

In the political and diplomatic field the enlarged role of the Ukrainian SSR in the period 1958-1960 represented a partial return to the status enjoyed by the Ukraine before she was compelled to join the Soviet confederation in 1923. The caution with which the Soviet leaders proceed in opening up the Soviet non-Russian nations to the advantages of foreign political contacts shows how keenly aware they are of the dangers the nationality question presents to the unity of the communist "family of nations." The economic and cultural potentialities of such non-Russian Soviet Republics as the Ukraine lend themselves to the Kremlin leaders as useful means to their avowed peaceful conquest of the non-communist world. In this respect, the Western powers, with the exception of the British who made the attempt in 1947,² have played into the Soviet hand by neglecting to establish direct diplomatic relations with the government of the Ukrainian SSR in Kiev.

REFERENCE NOTES

¹See note 2 to article No. 8 in this collection.

²See, Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, Vol. 472, No. 9 (March 13, 1950), p. 28.

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COMRADE ENKO — THE WARHORSE OF RUSSIA

Today, as in the past, the lonely Russian people are in search of loyal friends. Through the 14th and 15th centuries the Russians were able to withstand Mongol domination. They confounded Napoleon and twice repulsed the German *Drang nach Osten*. They have built a mighty new empire and have begun to conquer outer space. But neither the pan-Slavism of the czars, nor the internationalism of the Soviet leaders of this century, has succeeded in placating their neighbors or providing Russia with friends or reliable allies. The present ideological conflict with China brings this ancient truth once more into focus.

The centuries-long bloody feud between France and Germany seems at last to be dying out. Presumably, the belief is growing on each side that mutual destruction is the only alternative to peaceful coexistence. The parallel feud between the Soviet Union and Poland has also subsided into "peaceful coexistence," but it is a peace in which Poland has no choice. The October rising of 1956 demonstrated quite clearly that Wladyslaw Gomulka's communists have not yet given their hearts to their Russian brothers.

Moscow is well aware of the unreliable quality of the Polish

Reprinted with permission from *Military Review*, XLIV, No. 6 (June, 1964), 75-79, where it appeared under the author's real name, Roman Olynyk.

friendship. And more or less the same can be said of other neighbors and unwilling comrades in Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. The great Yugoslav-Soviet friendship of the war period ended in a bitter feud that is slow to heal even now, eleven years after Joseph Stalin's death.

We must even doubt the sincerity of the devotion to the Soviet cause of those people who come within the inner circle of Russian influence—Ukrainians, Belorussians, and the Baltic and Caucasian nationalities.

Conflicts of Inner Circle

For 300 years the Ukrainians have been exposed to the "fraternization" efforts of the Russians. Catherine the Great, while imposing a barbarously harsh regime, urged the Ukrainians not to regard her Russian subjects as "wolves of the forest." Stalin invented an official vocabulary of jargon for upholding "the Russian people" as the beneficent source of material and spiritual gifts to the Ukraine.

In spite of all these efforts, the average citizen of the Ukraine today knows that only cunning and force brought the Ukraine into the Russian orbit. In the middle of the 17th century the Russians watched while the Ukrainian nation was bled white in struggles with the Poles and the Tartars. Then, as insurance against Ukrainian resurgence, they shared the territory with the Polish feudal republic. Again, in 1923, the four-year-old Ukrainian Socialist Republic, established on the basis of Vladimir Lenin's promise of complete and unrestricted independence for Ukrainians, was cajoled into union with the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic and then deprived of her sovereignty by the USSR Constitution.

Thanks only to their numbers, the Ukrainians survived Stalin's extermination policy. Premier Nikita Khrushchev stated as much publicly in 1956, testifying again to the fact that the Russians cannot trust even their closest neighbors, who are also relatives of sorts. For over three centuries this web of mistrust and suspicion, of hatred and contempt, has been woven between the two nationalities which, perhaps more than any others in Eastern Europe, have common interests and must learn to coexist and cooperate if they are to survive in the nuclear age.

Not by Whip Alone

Perhaps awakening at last, Soviet Russian leadership seems to be evolving new tactics to try to win more willing Ukrainian support. Some long-overdue benefits are being offered. The appearance of Ukrainian sovereignty has been improved by the membership of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in the United Nations and by increased responsibilities for her delegations in various UN agencies and institutions. Ukrainians are beginning to take on a role in the Soviet Union that reminds one of the Scotsmen who "ran the British Empire." The sturdy Ukrainian Enko—as he is popularly dubbed from the typical ending of Ukrainian surnames—seems to be making his influence felt throughout the Soviet empire.

This influence cannot be entirely explained on the basis of Ukrainian population density and economic development. Russia is no longer dependent on the resources of the borderlands. She now has developed rich resources of her own and has built a mighty industrial network in Europe and beyond the Urals. The Ukraine, as a separate republic, is useful as a link between Russia and the newer satellites, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania. But, most important of all, the Ukraine is vital to Russia as a reservoir of trained and trainable manpower.

The Ukrainians are, in fact, the traditional empire builders of Eastern Europe—the first Eastern European empire to extend from the Black Sea to the shores of Finland had its center at Kiev, the capital of the Ukraine today. The Polish feudal state of the 16th century reached its greatest power after it had integrated into the ranks of its nobility the best educated and wealthiest families of the Ukraine and Belorussia. The Ukrainians also played a leading role in the Europeanization of czarist Russia in the 18th and 19th centuries.

The Ukrainian contribution to the growing military power of Russia has been overlooked by many Western Soviet specialists. In the 18th century the Russians succeeded in pushing the Turks from the north shore of the Black Sea only after securing the cooperation of the Ukraine's Cossack regiments. In 1877 the Russian breakthrough into the Balkans was led by the Ukrainian General I. V. Hurko. General R. S. Kondratenko organized the successful defense of Port Arthur in the Russo-Japanese War of

1904-05, although he was later killed and the inept commander of the fortress surrendered it to the Japanese.

The only really imaginative action of that war was carried out by General A. V. Mishchenko who led 6,000 Cossacks 160 kilometers into Japanese territory to destroy communications. The last Russian offensive of World War I was possible at all only because the Ukrainian regiments, little affected by communist propaganda, had preserved their discipline.

On the other hand, Ukrainians made important contributions to the revolutionary movement. Zheliabov, the successful organizer of the attempt against Czar Alexander II, and a number of other prominent social revolutionaries were Ukrainians disenchanted with the "organic approach" of the liberals to the liberation of the Ukrainian people.

The 1905 revolt on the battleship *Prince Potemkin* of the Black Sea Fleet was organized by Oleksander M. Kovalenko. (He died last year in Geneva where he once served as a member of the diplomatic mission of the Ukrainian National Republic.) The first commander in chief of Lenin's army, before Leon Trotsky took over, was M. V. Krylenko, without whose cooperation the marines of the Baltic Fleet and the soldiers of the southwestern front would hardly have supported the October Revolution.

Warhorse of Russia

There were other Ukrainian Soviet commanders of the revolutionary and interwar periods, including such names as Kliment E. Voroshilov and Semen K. Timoshenko, indicative of the fact that Comrade Enko is still the warhorse of the Russian empire.

In the first month of the German advance in 1941, the Ukrainians with other nationalities of the USSR—including many Russians—staged mass surrenders in protest against the miseries of Soviet life and the burden of Russian centralism. To them the Germans had long been thought of as representing the enlightenment and freedom of Western Europe. They soon realized, however, that they could not reach out to the Western World through Hitler's Germany.

Groundwork Laid

The German Field Marshal von Paulus learned how well they could fight when he reached Stalingrad. The Ukrainian Soviet General A. I. Ieremenko commanded the Stalingrad front in 1942-43. Ukrainians were also in command on the Don River in 1942 when the Germans and their allies were dealt crushing blows. When the great German strategist, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, took charge of the effort to relieve von Paulus' 6th Army, he was thwarted by Lieutenant General Rodion I. Malynovsky (now Marshall and Minister of Defense for the USSR). The groundwork for the destruction of the German forces at Stalingrad was thus laid.

Behind the German lines Soviet guerrilla operations were largely led and sustained by Ukrainians. The deep raid from the Pripet River into the Carpathians in 1943 was the work of the Ukrainian partisan, S. Kovpak. The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), a nationalist Ukrainian force, opposed both the Germans and the communists until 1944, and withstood Stalinist onslaughts up to 1953. They achieved tactical retreats by Soviet authorities in various sectors of Soviet life, to the advantage of the Ukrainians.

When Ukrainians like Malynovsky, the Soviet Minister of Defense, and Kirill Moskalenko, the Soviet rocket chief, rise to commanding positions in the USSR, they represent the natural pressure of the Ukrainians for acknowledgment of their share in the empire. This also reflects the dependence of the empire on the Ukrainian reservoir of specialized manpower. Ukrainians are winning similarly influential posts in other fields than the military. It has been estimated that Ukrainians make up at least one-third of the skilled personnel in Soviet technology, research, and scholarship.

The Russians are also largely relying on the Ukrainians to build Kazakhstan into a bulwark against the Red Chinese in Sinkiang. The more restless elements of the Ukraine are being drawn off to continue development of the immense, empty "virgin lands."

Historically, the European facing the Russian enigma has been as prone to miscalculations as we are today. Napoleon failed to grasp the advantages of his Istanbul Ambassador's plan

for supporting the Ukrainian case against the Russians. When Adolf Hitler refused to give consideration to the Ukrainians' political aspirations, he pushed them into the camp of their oppressors.

The Russians cannot leave the Ukrainians out of their calculations. Comrade Enko has become indispensable, even though from time to time he may still be out of favor and regarded with suspicion as he was in Stalin's day.

In our studies of Soviet activities, probably we should not leave Comrade Enko out of our calculations either. When "Russian" teams negotiate at the United Nations, or at Warsaw Pact conferences; when Soviet engineers and technicians appear on building sites in India, in Cuba, in Egypt; when missions are sent to put gentle pressure on Romania, Hungary, or Czechoslovakia, might it not be useful to calculate how many among them are Ukrainian? And to what extent Ukrainian nationalism is being satisfied and integrated into the empire building of the "elder brother?"

Whoever can locate accurately, and interpret in modern terms, the age-old aspirations of Comrade Enko will discover a valuable key to the Pandora's box of Russian weaknesses.

PART III
MAN, SOCIETY AND RELIGION
IN THE USSR

EDITOR'S NOTE

The unbelievable became feasible, and the wishful acquired real forms. Former members of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army impressed their own brand of human dignity and their will to resist on many minds of the multi-national population in Soviet prisons.

By shedding the scales of fear, the theoretical "Soviet man" turned out to be a real human being of a given nationality. The lonely Soviet crowd found alternatives to both the official state ideology and the state protected Church structure.

Thus, in the atmosphere of a growing new humanism the concepts of both nationality and religion have regained their values.

WHY RUSSIA NEEDS TIME AND PEACE

What the Soviet leaders do not like to admit is that their major moves on the chessboard of internal or external policy are usually a response to necessity. And the staunchest anti-communists in this country hardly ever grant such a possibility. No matter how strange this sounds, Soviet spokesmen and their doctrinaire anti-communist opponents agree in stressing the ideological aspect of every Soviet-Russian decision.

Thus the latest Soviet peace drive, ably steered by Premier Khrushchev to the very gates of Washington, has been represented by the official Soviet outlets as an essential, integral part of communism, Leninist "socialism" and, for that matter, a basic trend of the Soviet way of life as well. The anti-communists, on the other hand, view it as just another devilish stratagem of Bolshevism devised for lulling the free world and for getting a foothold on its shores.

Such views might be quite helpful in raising the morale of the Soviet ruling class and of the *Komsomol*. The same way of thinking might also keep up the fighting spirit of those in this country who suffered at the hands of the Soviets, and for that reason oppose them. Yet, it does not change the basic fact of life, that necessity governs the country of socialism as much as it does the countries of capitalism.

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So, the Soviet decision to increase the volume of their trade with Great Britain was not meant to embarrass the Conservative Government of Mr. Macmillan, but was a sound manifestation of the Soviet need to acquire sterling for their purchases from the sterling trading area.

Similarly, Mr. Khrushchev's noisy campaign calling for the Summit meeting and for establishing a term of peaceful coexistence was dictated, not so much by the ideological requirements of his communist faith, as by the sheer necessities of his empire, strained by internal and semi-external pressures.

The latest data of the recent census in the Soviet Union must have stirred into a sense of reality the Kremlin rulers who are the administrators of the empire first and communists second. For the Soviet Union lost, during the Second World War, roughly 10 million men in uniform and about 7 million civilians. The full weight of these staggering losses is beginning to tell: for the next decade the labor population of the USSR will be increasing by only a few hundred thousands yearly as compared with one to two million annual increase during the previous decade. At the same time, the crude birthrate is going to fall to 20 per 1,000 from the 1938 peak of 38 per 1,000.

This is more than enough to justify the cutting of the number of Soviet armed forces carried out within the last two years. At the present time in Kiev and Kharkiv, details of the Soviet Army are being used as a special labor force to spur civilian construction.

The shortage of labor in the USSR manifested itself also in the decree of the Soviet government compelling all students of Soviet secondary schools "to engage in socially productive activities," that is, to work in industry or on the collective farms. There is some substance in the claims that the Soviet government was moved to release thousands of political prisoners, not by any higher sense of "Socialist justice," freely abused in Stalin's time, but by an acute shortage of labor.

Another kind of pressure on the Kremlin is being exerted by the non-Russian nationalities. The Ukraine, the second largest and industrially most advanced of Soviet Republics, is more restless than ever. The people are eager for more economic freedom, more cultural independence from Russia, and local bureaucrats covet a larger share of power and economic planning.

Perhaps no other people in the world is more aware of the real price of war than the Ukrainians. The Second World War was, as Edgar Snow put it, "the Ukrainian War," having resulted in the virtual ruin of the country. Therefore it was a masterstroke on Mr. Macmillan's part, when he went to Kiev and its districts last May, to carry his message of peace to the Ukrainians. Their warm response proved they understood his message.

To disregard these feelings of 41 million Ukrainians, and not to recognize their lack of enthusiasm for a war against the "capitalists," would be great folly on the part of the Kremlin rulers. It might invite, in case of such a war, the disaster Stalin had suffered in the early campaign of 1941; then, over a million, mostly non-Russian Red Army soldiers, surrendered to the advancing Germans.

Nor are the Ukrainians or, for that matter, the Belorussians and the Baltic peoples, unaware of the Kremlin's attempts to reduce their potential by the "volunteer" deportation of their youth to the "virgin lands" of Kazakh Soviet Republic beyond the Caspian Sea. They see, as any student of Soviet affairs can't fail to notice, the Kremlin rulers' eagerness to kill two birds with one stone.

While unloading some unwanted ballast from the Ukraine, Belorussia, Georgia, and the Baltic States so as to make them more steerable, Soviet leaders endeavor to thicken the thin crust of population over Kazakhstan, and, generally speaking, the whole region that faces China's Province of Sinkiang. Reportedly that Province of China, more densely populated than its Soviet counterpart, recently underwent a tremendous economic development. By its sheer population and economic weight it threatens as a dagger at the soft underbelly of the Soviet Union.

Driven by the necessity to avert all possible surprises in that area, Soviet leaders have had to bypass the commandments of their communist creed, and put an all-out effort into the settling of Kazakhstan by so-called "volunteers" from the European Soviet Republics. Small wonder then, that the population of the Kazakh Republic increased according to the 1959 census to nine million—from six million in 1939. In the same 20-year period, the "blossoming" Ukraine grew by barely a million and a half from its 40 million of 1939. In the same way the population of

West Siberia (part of the Russian Soviet Republic) increased by 24 percent, and that of Lithuania decreased.

So time and peace are the essential prerequisites for putting in order the big house called the Soviet Union. And its leaders are responding to the need in a most appropriate way. They call for coexistence — not by virtue of their communist creed, but for the sake of their own survival.

12

THE LONELY SOVIET MAN

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) is in control of a super-state, and in that sense is by far the most powerful of all Communist parties. But in revolutionary spirit, it may well be the weakest. Revolution has ceased to be the motivating force within the party and in the Soviet Union. A sincere believer in Marxism-Leninism is a lonely man there; the modern Soviet way of life must almost literally bore him, if it does not distract him, to death.

This loss of spirit is what lies behind the tragic self-destruction by fire of a Soviet Ukrainian in the central district of Moscow last April. Mykola Didyk's suicide, "because he was not allowed to join the war in Viet Nam," (according to Soviet official version) has dramatized a process that started decades ago. The erosion of Russian communism began with the establishment of the centralized Soviet Union and the final merger of the national Communist parties into a monolithic party under Stalin.

The old Bolshevik party of 1917-21 carried in itself the seeds of a revolutionary movement bent on changing the face of Eastern Europe. It promised social justice to all the under-privileged classes, and unqualified emancipation for the peoples under the oppressive czarist regime of Russia. Inspired by the idea of social

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justice and national self-determination, Russian communists with the help of their fellow travellers from other nationalities all over the disintegrated Russian empire, swept away their opponents: the Russian "whites," helped by the Western Powers, and the National Democrats in the non-Russian borderlands.

But with the stabilization of the Soviet regime, the spirit of the old Russia reasserted itself in the CPSU once it was in power. As Mykola Khvylovy (a Ukrainian Djilas of the 1920s) wrote at the time, the party had developed into a new class of Russian empire-builders. By committing suicide in May 1933, he registered his protest against the strangling of true internationalism in the community of Soviet nations. His death was preceded by the suicide of the Russian communist poet Vladimir Maiakovsky in 1930. Both writers refused to countenance the transformation of the international movement into a new Russian *petit bourgeois* class.

In the 1930's, the Spanish Civil War revived the hopes of Marxist idealists in the Soviet Union. Like many Canadian, British, French, and American leftists, they saw in the war a basic confrontation between the forces of "true democracy" and the forces of "totalitarian racism." To them it seemed worthwhile to share the burden of fighting with volunteers from many countries, and even to die for the cause of Republican Spain.

Stalin, however, having finished both his personal and state business in Spain, made short shrift of these dedicated men. All the Soviet participants in the Spanish war eventually came under a cloud of suspicion. Most of them perished in the purges of 1937-1939; the remainder survived in the Siberian concentration camps only to see the "patriotic" war of 1941-1945.

Even regular party-men entered the Russo-German war with the feeling of impending doom. At the front, hundreds of thousands of troops surrendered to the Germans; the party apparatus seemed about to disintegrate; and the long-planned guerrilla activity bogged down. Only the stupid barbarism of the Germans, who treated all Eastern Europeans like cattle, enabled Stalin to make a telling appeal to the national spirit of the Soviet peoples.

Thus the national traditions of Russian and Ukrainian peoples were revived and acknowledged by the party, and the German tide was stopped; a powerful guerrilla force appeared

behind the German lines in Belorussia and the Ukraine. Significantly, in this crisis, the party had to turn for inspiration to such old-fashioned heroes as the Russian Mikhail Kutuzov¹ and the Ukrainian Bohdan Khmelnytsky.² Marx and Lenin as hero-figures failed to rally the people; the gods of communism were dead, and with them had gone the original revolutionary spirit of the CPSU. All that was left was a bureaucratic machine.

In the early post-war years, the magnitude of the task of reconstruction overshadowed gnawing doubts in the Soviet republics. Then Stalin's death seemed to give the party a new lease on life and the people new hope. Although dazed by the revelations of Stalin's "mistakes" after the 20th Congress, the younger generation dreamed of restoring revolutionary "socialist justice," so brutally violated by Stalin, and of pioneering a wondrous new life in the "virgin lands" in Kazakhstan.

But the frontier ventures failed economically and, what was more important, psychologically as well. The young pioneers, recruited largely from the Ukraine and the Baltic countries, saw for themselves that the party had failed to organize the venture efficiently. It was even plain to see that the party cared little what happened to the drive or to the settlers. They were simply left in the desert to fail without the necessary equipment. The upper echelons of the party were obviously more interested in the European power struggle than in the venture that seemed so promising to the young communist settlers.

Hopes of restoring "revolutionary legality" foundered as well. This failure has been crowned by the ridiculous trial and barbaric sentencing of the Moscow critics, Siniavsky and Daniel.³ Recently, two Ukrainian critics were dealt with equally harshly. Ivan Svitlychny⁴ was secretly sentenced by a Kiev court to hard labor in Siberia for allegedly helping to smuggle out of the Ukraine a diary and some not-so-Soviet poems by Vasyl Symonenko.⁵ Ivan Dzyuba⁶ received a suspended sentence only because he had incurable tuberculosis.⁷ (About 30 young Ukrainian communists, mostly men of letters, were arrested in March and April.)⁸ Svitlychny was born in 1929, and Dzyuba in 1931. They both grew up under communism and can hardly be labelled "remnants of the old order."

Their only crime was that they believed, as Symonenko put it, that there was "nothing more terrible than unlimited power in

the hands of a limited man"; but "too many of our people — have saved their lives at the cost of their dignity, and have turned into animals. . . ."

The war in Viet Nam, illuminated by the best Soviet propaganda (which heavily relies on reports of protests by American students), might have appeared to many young communists as a new escape from the stale, grey frustration of Soviet reality. Under the daily pressure of the high-sounding slogans blared out at home, at school, at work, and at play, they long to join the fight for the cause they believe in—in order to be truly alive among the truly living people. Again, the vested interests of the super-state cut off these idealistic hopes and dreams. The battlefields of Viet Nam are closed to them by the unwillingness of Soviet authorities to get involved in the war. Meanwhile, Chinese accusations levelled at the Soviet Union for having betrayed the revolutionary cause strike deep into the hearts of young communists in the USSR.

They are a frustrated generation. They see their own party growing fat and stodgy, their society dominated by a new class not unlike the czarist nobility. And they feel themselves being cast into the role of the "superfluous men" of nineteenth century Russia, the role they despise. They cannot easily turn to religion for comfort even though Christianity in the Soviet Union has in some ways grown lean and ascetic, and is gaining ground in its struggle with communism.

The Russian Orthodox Church, having established a *modus vivendi* with the party in the fateful days of June-July 1941, has developed into an established church not unlike the one that served the czarist regime. It rejects scornfully any suggestion of decentralization, or hierarchical autonomy for Belorussian and Ukrainian believers. In return for support of its position, the Church cooperates with the Soviet government more than is good for religion. This, and a flourishing sectarianism among Christians in the USSR, repels young people seeking inspiration and direction for their lives.

Nationalism combined with utopian ideals has always had a strong appeal for East Europeans. But the idea of nationalism is disparaged by the Soviet mass media in campaigns that go on literally day and night. Moreover, to become an effective motivating force in the Soviet Union, national-

ism has to get rid of all fascist connotations, both real and imaginary ones.

In the meantime, young people in the Soviet Union seek ways to become involved in the world's problems without submitting to the pressures of the mighty: "Be silent, America and Russia, while I am speaking with my Mother-Ukraine," wrote Symonenko. Thus aroused, some of them protest against the party's policy of Russification in their own republics. Some of them attempt to defend the persecuted writers and artists, Russian, Ukrainian and Jewish alike; some shout in public: "Give us something to believe in."

The authorities are aware of the problem. Like true bureaucrats, they blame its existence on "lack of ideological watchfulness" on the part of intellectuals, and "bourgeois nationalist ideas" disseminated by foreign powers. "Our enemies have cast many rusty nationalist fishhooks bated with rotten worms into the airwaves: some fool may come along and swallow one." Such was the colorful warning of Ukrainian writer Oleksander Korniiichuk, (a member of the CPSU Central Committee) at the Party Congress in Kiev last March. He went on: "We still have some young people whose ears are swollen from nightly listening to the sly and deceitful anti-Soviet radio propaganda." He urged the erring ones to come to their senses, "because if you have to face the people, they might take away your Soviet passport and say: Leave our sacred land."

The despair of these lonely seekers who have lost faith in the Soviet way of life has, over the years, led many to the extreme form of protest—suicide. The public self-immolation of Mykola Didyk indicates that rank-and-file young communists find as much to protest about as (to say the least) young idealists in the capitalist countries. The lonely despair of frustrated youth in the Soviet Union has been aptly described by the controversial Ukrainian, Symonenko:

*Often I am as lonely as
Robinson Crusoe,
Scanning the skyline for a
sail. . .
Dressed in the skins of
slaughtered hopes,*

*I probe in the sky with keen
eyes. . .
Send me, O God, at least an
enemy,
If you don't wish to send me
a friend.*

REFERENCE NOTES

¹Mikhail I. Kutuzov, Russian field marshal and commander-in-chief of the Russian armies in the war against Napoleon, 1812-1813.

²Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Ukrainian Cossack Hetman, led a successful revolt of the Ukrainian Cossacks against Poland in 1648 and served as head of the Ukrainian Cossack State, 1648-1657.

³A.D. Siniavsky (pseud. Abram Tertz) and Iu.M. Daniel (pseud. Nikolai Arzhak), two Soviet writers and literary critics; after having their works published abroad under assumed names, they were arrested and tried in a well publicized Moscow trial in 1965; sentenced to 7 and 5 years of hard labor respectively. Both since released and permitted to leave the Soviet Union; they now reside in Western Europe.

⁴Ivan Svitlychny (b. 1929), a Ukrainian literary critic. Arrested in January 1972, he was sentenced in March 1973 to seven years in severe regime labor camp and five years in exile.

⁵Vasyl Symonenko, a young Soviet Ukrainian poet, died at an early age of 29 (1963). In his writings, he was critical of the Soviet life and official policies. Most of his poems and his diary were never published in the Soviet Union, but they came out in their original Ukrainian version in a book, V. Symonenko, *Bereh chekan'*, (The Shore of Expectations), New York: Prolog, Inc., 1965. His diary was also published in English in *The Yale Review*, LVIII, No. 4 (June, 1969), 563-71.

⁶Ivan Dzyuba (b. 1931), a Ukrainian literary critic and a leading representative of the young Ukrainian dissident movement during 1960s. He is best known for his major work *Internationalism or Russification?*, dealing with the Soviet nationality policies in the Ukraine. R. Rakhmanny reviews this work in article No. 23 in this collection. Beginning in 1965, Dzyuba was

under progressively heavier official attacks and ceased to be published in the Soviet Union for a number of years. In 1972 he was arrested, released and expelled from the Writers Union of Ukraine. The following year, he was arrested again, interrogated at length, and released upon the issuance of a full retracting confession of his "errors" and a promise to write a refutation of his ideas as expounded in his book *Internationalism or Russification?* Such an officially blessed "refutation" appeared in his book, *Hrani kryshkala* (The Facets of Crystal), (Kiev: "Ukraina," 1976), 126 pp.; 2nd and enlarged edition appeared in 1979.

⁷As subsequent information confirmed, of the two men only I. Svitlychny was arrested and interrogated for over six months. I. Dzyuba was only interrogated by Party and KGB officials.

⁸On political mass arrests in the Ukraine during 1965-66, see Part V of this collection.

13

CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS: LIVE ISSUE IN KREMLIN

Religion may have become irrelevant to the policies of Western leaders, but to the Kremlin religion and church-state relations are live issues that still influence the course of Soviet internal and foreign relations. Recent repressions against some minor religious groups in the Soviet Union reflect the pragmatic approach of the Soviet leaders to the subject, which may be defined as "strike at any living religious institution and favor those which show a weakening of the spirit."

A few days ago, the Soviet government's chief overseer of religious affairs made one of the toughest attacks on the Baptists who broke away from the officially recognized Evangelical Christian Baptist Church because of the latter's subservience to the regime. It is evident from Vladimir Kuroiedov's article in *Izvestia*, that the government felt hurt by the critical views of the break-away group.

Neither did they like the criticism of the Russian Orthodox Church levelled at it by some Orthodox dissenters, such as Anatoly Levitin; he was arrested eventually in September. Earlier this year, the remnants of the Ukrainian Catholic Church were put behind the barbed wire.

All this took place at the time when the Kremlin has been busy

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encouraging the dialogue of the Moscow Patriarchate with the ever-ready-to-talk Vatican.

The repressions are explained by Soviet insiders as being caused both by internal pressures and external expediency. The Soviet leaders became worried by the growing numbers of Soviet people believing in God and practicing religion. Neither the party nor the youth organization *Komsomol* is immune to the infectious "prejudices." Then, the Chinese stung the Kremlin leadership with a charge that under the "revisionists of Moscow" there has been a brisk revival of religious feeling among the Soviet people.

The charge, hard enough because religion is not supposed to have any place in a communist society, was the more painful as it was made on the eve of the World Communist Conference in Moscow, last June. The participants, prodded by the Soviet hosts, were about to endorse a resolution calling for a new co-existence between Communist parties and the Christians in the capitalist countries.

The resolution advised the communist followers all over the world that "the mass of religious people can become an active force in the anti-imperialist struggle and in carrying out far-reaching social changes..." Apparently, "conditions have arisen in many capitalist nations for an anti-monopoly and anti-imperialist alliance of the revolutionary working-class movement and broad masses of religious people."

Voting for the resolution, the delegates at the World Communist Conference in Moscow must have been impressed by the successful handling of the Russian Orthodox Church, demonstrated by the Kremlin rulers during the last 50 years. The spokesmen of the church claim to have about 50 million active believers, which is a feat in itself if one recalls the blows the church had been receiving at the hands of such less than subtle anti-religious campaigners as Stalin's secret police chiefs Iagoda, Iezhov and Beria.

But the Russian Orthodox Church's survival has been as much due to the tenacity of its believers as to the accommodation its hierarchy has been able to secure for itself with the Kremlin rulers. During the Second World War, the church supported the Kremlin policies for patriotic reasons at least; the fate of the people themselves was in balance at the time of Nazi-Germany's

onslaught. But in peace time, the Patriarch of Moscow, Alexei, and his chief adviser, Metropolitan Nikodim of Leningrad, were loath to abandon the hard won status of the established church in the Soviet Union. Thus, a strange symbiosis of the God-fearing with the godless continued; for a price of course.

Gained a Foothold

By accepting governmental supervision and embracing long-range Kremlin policies the Russian Orthodox Church has gained a foothold in the outside world; it was allowed to make direct contacts with other Christian churches, the Roman Catholics and the Vatican included. Within the Soviet Union, it became again (as it was in the days of the czars) the chief spokesman of the Christians there. Moreover, the Kremlin has legitimized the ageless aspiration of the Russian Orthodox Church to unite, and assimilate within its framework 10 million Belorussians and 45 million Ukrainians.

This is why the two nationalities, while recognized as sovereign political entities in the USSR and in the United Nations, are not allowed to form autonomous church structures under their own orthodox hierarchs.

Since the aims of the Moscow Patriarchy coincided with the official thesis on the "merging of all nationalities," events took a tragic turn especially for the Ukrainians. In the 1920s, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was completely destroyed by harsh police and administrative measures. In 1946, the communist regime helped the Moscow Patriarchy to liquidate the Ukrainian Catholic Church. Of the six hierarchs deported to Russia only the Metropolitan Josyf Slipyj has survived the 18-year long ordeal.¹ The believers were integrated by force into the ranks of the Russian Orthodox Church.

It is to the credit of the Russian people that this tendency of the church-state collaboration would not go unchallenged. Even the Soviet authorities had to admit that there are "quite a few elements within the church and around the church" who are trying "to overcome this crisis of Orthodoxy by means of a political protest."

Indeed, many a believer was shocked by the price their church had to pay for the protection of the Kremlin. The price was revealed, without blushing, by the editors of *The Journal of Moscow Patriarchate*: "The cause of the revolution is the cause of the Orthodox Church."

And at the conference of all state-controlled religious groups held in Zagorsk July last, Metropolitan Nikodim publicly endorsed the resolutions of the World Communist Conference. Yet, he must have been aware of the Soviet regime's unyielding determination to uproot any religion in the USSR. He had been informed, by means of numerous appeals and "open protest letters" from his believers, priests and some bishops, about the continuous attempts of secret police at infiltrating the local church councils with the purpose of disrupting their work; how the authorities are seizing church property; that a number of churches and monasteries, both in Russia and Ukraine, were burned by some unidentified villains. And he knew that, as of January 1969, there were over 200 Baptists in Soviet jails.

Gave Explanation

This lack of any serious concern with the real condition of Christians in the USSR on the part of the church leaders is explained aptly by the dissenter-priest Anatoly Levitin (Krasnov)² in his public indictment of the Patriarchate's policies: "There are bishops in the church who resemble branches of a dead fig tree.... Therefore the Russian Church is very ill.... The most serious ailment is the age-old one, that of Caesaro-Papism."

Recently, this voice of the Russian Christian conscience has been stifled, temporarily at least, by Soviet police. And so much poorer has become the average Soviet man. The Marxist-Leninist creed has failed him in his aspirations. Now, the Russian Orthodox Church, having become an established Soviet institution, has abandoned him in the face of an evermore complicated world.

REFERENCE NOTES

¹See article No. 44 in this collection.

²Anatoly Levitin (Krasnow) (b. 1915), a religious writer, former Russian Orthodox priest; sent to a concentration camp for seven years, released in 1956. Represented the so-called "Christian-Socialist" point of view in the Russian dissident movement; former member of the Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights in the USSR; in 1974, permitted to emigrate to Switzerland. For a selection of his writings, see documents No. 50 and 51, in *Problems of Communism*, XVII, No. 4 (July-August, 1968), 104-109; also, *Stromaty* (Frankfurt am Main: "Posev," 1972), 155 pp.

14

THE REVOLUTION AND THE BUREAUCRAT

"Bureaucrats of All Communist Countries Unite!"

Here is, perhaps, the best fitting substitute for the dated and worn out slogan "Proletarians of All Countries Unite!" that once used to stir deeply millions of underprivileged people all over the world.

To begin with, this modernized slogan would more closely represent the essential change that occurred in both the working class and the Communist parties now in power in a dozen countries. As of now, there is little of the social stratum once called proletariat, if one applies to it a strict Marxist-Leninist ruler. And hardly anyone wants to be a proletarian.

In the underdeveloped countries that are still with us, the real poor people do not possess either the qualifications or the consciousness of a proletariat, usually attributed to the alienated and exploited agricultural laborers who, given some capital and a plot, and perhaps some export possibilities for their produce, would easily overtake the long suffering *kolkhoz* laborers of the USSR.

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More Benefits

And wherever there is any significant industrial development, the workers "in the clutches of capitalists" get more in benefits than the workers in the countries under communist blessing.

All this is a well-known creed to the workers of the Soviet Union and of the so-called People's Democracies of Eastern Europe. They, like their comrades in the West, are motivated today by the profit incentive and desire to live better and happier rather than by some lofty ideology.

To be sure, the Marxist-Leninist jargon still remains much in use there but it is somewhat like sand in a city surrounded by desert; it is there and it must be borne with patience but it is alien to human beings.

Meanwhile, every citizen of a communist country is really interested in reaching the standard of living which would put him on par with a white collar employee in the West, not to "overtake America" but to be able to enjoy life in the prosperity and cultural amenities of the atomic age.

Hence, the massive exodus to schools that has been a headache to the Soviet authorities since 1945 because literally no one there wants to remain voluntarily on a collective farm, in factories or in mines.

Social Conflict

Herein lies a deeply buried social conflict that one day might turn the "socialist" countries upside down. The people want to live a human life both in the material and the spiritual meaning of the word. They want to have freedom of expression and the freedom of sharing their experiences with other nations of the world, for a simple reason not to be left forever on the fringes of forward moving mankind.

But this desire, natural and understandable for once in the Russians as well as in other peoples of the Soviet empire, runs counter to the interests of the ruling circles.

And the situation is hardly different in other communist countries. Once real proletarians, real revolutionaries used to lead the masses; men who had worked from the underground or who had

suffered in prison for their beliefs and activities. Their words usually matched their deeds and they were able to rely on some personal and popular support.

Great Disappointment

Nowadays, the leadership of the Communist parties in power consists of bureaucrats who occupy comfortable chairs in their mahogany offices and who send to prisons and concentration camps their own people for some flimsy transgressions.

To a sincere communist, this is the greatest disappointment of his life, that his mighty ones are not ideologists of Lenin's stature, or military geniuses like Trotsky or even masters of mass terror like Stalin was, but that they are just mediocre bureaucrats.

Indeed, there is little difference between the reportedly severe Brezhnev and mild Gomulka, enlightened Tito and conservative Ulbricht. To stay in power, they all have built up for themselves their own pyramids of self-supporting bureaucracies that must prop up one another so as not to be swept away by the restless people once supposed to be proletarians at heart and still urged by the bureaucrats to act as if they were.

No wonder then it was a relatively easy task for East Germany's Ulbricht to promote to Brezhnev the idea of a move into Czechoslovakia and to enlist the support of Poland's Gomulka, Hungary's Kadar and Bulgaria's Zhivkov for the deplorable venture. All of them, including Husak and General Svoboda of Czechoslovakia, came to see that to allow the people a real freedom of thought and of choice would speedily end their own power in their respective countries.

The same fear of losing their foothold in their own societies has prodded the bureaucrats to suppress the dissident intellectuals in Russia and Czechoslovakia, in the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and the Baltic countries.

Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the Russian author of remarkable novels dealing with human beings in communist concentration camps under Stalin, was recently expelled from the Soviet Writers' Union because his writings and his stand against censorship had admittedly made the ruling circles tremble again.

And he is not alone in danger of losing his already limited basis of subsistence in the Soviet regimented society. His Ukrainian colleague, Ivan Dzyuba, has been expelled from the Kiev Regional Writers' Organization for writing a treatise on the anti-Leninist policy of Russification in the Ukraine.¹ Dzyuba has made himself known also as a courageous advocate of Ukrainian-Jewish co-operation for the purpose of defending the two peoples against growing discrimination.

Like Solzhenitsyn before him, Dzyuba is now being reviled by his colleagues—writers and journalists alike—for allegedly giving food for thought to “bourgeois nationalist writers abroad” and “slandering their holy Fatherland.”

To these official critics it does not really matter that Dzyuba's book, published only abroad, was not brought to the Fatherland's public opinion; Solzhenitsyn's accusers admitted not having read his suppressed novel.

It was enough for them to be notified that the establishment regarded the book as “alien” to the interests of the ruling circles; meaning, it might stir the people to do their own thinking and, perhaps, to forming their own ideas about the subject.

To prevent the revolt of the as yet-inert masses from occurring in their lifetime at least, these ruling circles in every communist country would do anything to prevent free-thinkers from crystallizing an independent public opinion. They are doing this by forming a united anti-people front of their own.

Indeed, their slogan must be “Bureaucrats of All Communist Countries Unite!”

REFERENCE NOTES

¹I. Dzyuba's membership in the Kiev Regional Writers' Organization was reinstated on December 26, 1969, after a closed hearing on his case by the Presidium of the Writers' Union of Ukraine, at which he was forced to issue a public statement disassociating himself from the Ukrainian emigres and disavowing “nationalist ideology.” See, *Literaturna Ukraina* (Kiev), January 6, 1970. On subsequent developments with respect to I. Dzyuba, see note No.6 to article No. 12, and articles in Part V of this collection.

15

THE GREAT WITNESS

If the ability to see one's own mistake and to admit it publicly while being at the apogee of power is a true measure of human greatness, then Lenin certainly deserves that appellation.

The year 1970 has been proclaimed Lenin's Year in all the countries that are goose-stepping in the wake of the Soviet Union.

And in its 15 republics the official public adulation has already over-reached humanly reasonable proportions. Lenin himself would be shocked to see the Byzantine icon he has been transformed into by this sterile propaganda campaign.

True enough, he is called “great” there but not for the right reasons. As seen through the goggles of Soviet ideologists, officials, scholars and writers, the founder of the first communist state in the world emerges as nothing bigger than a superficially benevolent Russian czar who had succeeded in preserving Moscow's grip on the 14 non-Russian nationalities.

But if one forgets for a while all the ideological trappings as well as the differences in political and economic systems between their federation and ours, then one might discover a trace of a genuine greatness in the man, however buried under the avalanche of slogans.

Reprinted with permission from *The Ottawa Journal*, April 21, 1970, where it appeared under the title “Propaganda, Slogans Hide Lenin's Real Greatness.”

First "Protester"

About fifty-six years ago, when Russia's citizens of every walk of life were ardently dying for the czar on the battlegrounds of Europe against the Germans, Austrians and Turks, Lenin single-handedly was trying to stem the tide of the misplaced enthusiasm of the Russian masses.

He became the first "protester" of the century in the name of a principle: the world war had been unleashed by the power-seeking cliques and the duty of every honest man, and above all of a Social Democrat, was to undermine that anti-peoples war.

All the socialists, the Russians and the West Europeans alike, abandoned this principle agreed upon in theory long before the outbreak of the carnage. When it came, only Lenin with his small faction stood by and for the principle.

Czarist propaganda eagerly took advantage of the situation, and Lenin's group was accused by indignant Russian loyalists of being unpatriotic and serving the interests of the enemy. Against this grave accusation which, if sunk into the minds of the people-turned-soldiers, would have destroyed any prospects of the Bolsheviks in Russia, Lenin came out with a forceful and dignified argument.

"Scoundrels"

He wrote that in the name of the Russian national pride "all sorts of scoundrels shouted for the victory in the war" in order to keep Russia "a prison of nations," and to "crush the freedom of Hungary, Poland, Persia and China."

"Only slaves could obey the call of those who were campaigning for the oppression of other nations while covering up their designs by means of patriotic phrases."

In Lenin's opinion, a slave who "justifies and embellishes his slavery (i.e. calls the throttling of Poland, Ukraine, etc., 'defense of the fatherland of the Great Russians') is a menial and a cad, who inspires legitimate anger, contempt and disgust."¹

To raise one's voice aloud in protest against these abuses, even in time of war, is the patriotic duty of every good Russian, Lenin argued.

Admittedly, Lenin did not weaken the Russian front line, nor did he gain in stature in the eyes of the German or French socialists who shared as much enthusiasm for the war as the Russian socialists, and who were equally devoted to their national cause.

But Lenin's stand, taken in December, 1914, came in most happily for the Bolsheviks in the turbulent year of 1917. Then the war-weary peasant-worker-soldiers regarded Lenin's party as the only true anti-war group whose prediction turned out to be right; the war did bring the end of czarism.

Catchy Slogan

Moreover, Lenin's stand gained for the Bolsheviks an unassailable plank for their agitation among the non-Russians who woke up to demand self-determination for their countries. Lenin was able to coin a catchy slogan of "self-determination up to separation" for all the peoples of the Russian empire as long as they would embrace his economic and political order.

Under the fluid conditions of 1917-19 in the Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central Asia the Bolsheviks would make a lot of hay with this approach. The nationalist movements there would be eventually defeated and the formation of the Soviet Union conceived.

But on the eve of its proclamation (December 1922) Lenin was already on his deathbed and all the power in the newly re-established empire was again in the hands of the traditional Russian bureaucracy. The ruling party of Bolsheviks, under a deft handling of Joseph Stalin, would make a misalliance with that vital force and soon the non-Russian nationalities would feel the familiar noose tightening again around their necks.

Built a Monster

It takes a truly great man to have noticed the trend and admit to have built a monster in spite of himself. But Lenin did more than that. He tried to prevent the inevitable from happening right before his own eyes.

Being partly paralyzed, he dictated a letter to the Central

Committee and warned them against such men as Stalin and his like because they were adherents of too harsh measures.

At the same time, in an article "On the National Question" he implored his followers not to repeat the mistake of the Russian bourgeois bureaucracy—never try to Russify the minorities of the confederation presently being formed.²

Lenin's article was published only in 1956, after de-Stalinization took some root in the USSR. Together with other documents and revelations, it prompted many a Russian and Ukrainian to start thinking on their own. Hence the movement of dissenters came into being.

These men and women, having failed to move the authorities through official channels, began turning out their appeals, protest letters, essays and suppressed information by means of the so-called *Samizdat*, i.e. self-publishing.³ And one of their basic calls in these publications has been for the return to Lenin's ideal of international co-operation.

But in the Year of Lenin, their word is being more than ever suppressed by the authorities. No one in the USSR is allowed to make a claim to be in a true communion with Lenin's spirit but the established ideologists. Unfortunately, these bureaucrats are unable to discern between Lenin's original writing and some quotations by him taken from the book by Otto Bauer, an Austrian socialist and his opponent, whose statements crept into the Central Committee's "Theses" on Lenin's anniversary.⁴

Lenin's Word

There can hardly be a more striking proof of the inference that true Leninism is dead in the Soviet Union, and that Lenin really meant what he wrote in 1922:

"I am afraid, I have committed a great offense against the workers of Russia because I have not interfered with sufficient energy and sharpness in the notorious question of 'autonomization,' which is, it seems, called the USSR."⁵

The slowly dying man attempted to salvage a part of his dream even though it was obvious to him that "the freedom to withdraw from the union, with which we justify ourselves, will prove to be nothing but a scrap of paper, incapable of defending

the minorities of Russia from the incursions of the . . . Great Russian, the chauvinist, in substance a rascal and a tyrant, such as the typical Russian bureaucrat is."⁶

REFERENCE NOTES

¹V. I. Lenin, "On the National Pride of the Great Russians," *Collected Works* (4th ed.; Moscow: 1964), XXI, 102-106.

²V. I. Lenin, "On the Question of Nationalities or 'Autonomization'," *Collected Works* (4th ed.: 1968), XXXVI, 605-611. This article, part of so-called "Lenin's Testament," was published for the first time in the Soviet Union in the Party organ *Kommunist*, No. 9 (1956).

³See article No. 24 in this collection.

⁴Reference is made to Otto Bauer, *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie* (Wien: Verlag der Wiener, 1907), in which a proposal to solve the national question in the Austro-Hungarian Empire was developed.

⁵See note 2 above.

⁶*Ibid.*

THE JEWISH FACT IN RUSSIA

To open a new book on a Jewish question in Eastern Europe often amounts to opening an old wound; it does not tell you much new about the patient and it leaves you with an apprehension: where does this all lead us anyway?

The Jews in Soviet Russia Since 1917 is a different book. Basically historical in its intent, this collection of fifteen essays somehow helps to cure ignorance and heal anguish. That is why, contrary to what Professor L. Shapiro hints in his excellent introduction to it, the reader is left with a comforting impression about the immediate future of the Jews in the USSR. They are going to survive.

Even a cursory perusal of the book convinces you that the Jewish fact in the Soviet Union still exists and the "silent Jews" there are less silent than ever. During the last 50 years, Soviet spokesmen denied this stubbornly and vehemently at times. Maurice Friedberg quotes one such conversation from a Soviet novel which, however, reflects the political reality of the 1930s. A visiting foreign journalist, one Mr. Berman, asked a Soviet official about the Jewish problem in the USSR. "It does not exist!" — was the answer.

"But surely there are Jews in Russia?" he asked warily. — "Yes,

Reprinted with permission from *The Montreal Star*, July 18, 1970. A commentary on the book by Lionel Kochan (ed.), *The Jews in Soviet Russia Since 1917* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970). 357 pp.

there are," the official replied. — "Then you have a Jewish problem" — "No, there are Jews, but no Jewish problem."

The same studied approach is being applied by Soviet authorities today. And together with other "unproblems" . . . it is now tackled only by "underground" Soviet literature. Indeed, the painful dilemma of the Soviet Jew constitutes one of the central themes of that body of Soviet literature that has recently come to public attention in Russia and in the West.

The authors of the collection, under the general editorship of Dr. Lionel Kochan, Professor of Jewish history at the University of Warwick, set out to probe the depth and the forms of the problem. On the whole, they have succeeded in their efforts. The book is the first balanced study of the subject.

To give an inkling of the topics discussed, Professor Etinger introduces the reader into the human condition of Russian Jewry on the eve of the revolution. The demographic and occupational structure of the Jews in the USSR is analyzed by Professor Nove and Dr. Newth. The tragicomic drama of the Soviet attempt at localizing the "non-existing" Jewish problem by establishing a Jewish autonomous territory on the left bank of the Amur River (north of Manchuria) is unravelled by C. Abramsky. For those interested in the legal position of the Jews within the Soviet ideological and constitutional structures, there are two essays—one on Soviet theory and the other on practical application of the theory. Three essays deal with various aspects of Jewish literary achievements in three languages used by their writers—Russian, Yiddish and Hebrew.

Although differing in quality, most of the essays are well written by knowledgeable authors in the given field, and a sincere attempt has been made to see the other side of the coin in almost every subject discussed. The palm of achievement goes, however, to Joshua Rothenberg—for his essay on Jewish religion in the USSR and to Reuben Ainsztein—for his very informative essay on "Soviet Jewry in the Second World War." Even a well-read observer in Soviet subjects will share in the surprise of T. F. Fyvel who admitted in the *New Statesman*: "I had not known that in the Second World War there were over 50 Soviet Jewish generals."

But above all the reader will have become aware of the existence in the Soviet Union of a deep-rooted Jewish problem,

the complexity and the intensity of which frustrated Soviet leaders from Lenin to Brezhnev. "In the 1950s,"—writes Professor Rothenberg—they "concluded that the disintegration of Jewish identity in the Soviet Union had progressed to such a degree that with a suitable policy and a little effort the highly objectionable 'Jewish separateness,' both in the religious and national sense, would completely disappear."

This sentence contains the crux of the matter. Any "little effort" on the part of Soviet administration to solve the Jewish "unproblem" affects all Soviet Jews no matter how assimilated they may be, because the Jewish minority in the USSR constitutes both a nationality and a religious entity. The inability of the Soviet-Russian bureaucrats to see the fact and to adapt their policies to it led them to ever harsher administrative measures against their Jewish citizens who are being accused, as in the old days, of serving foreign interests.

An article on "Anti-Semitism in Soviet Russia" and another on the Soviet Jewish situation, "After the Six-Day War," represent an attempt of the editor to bring the volume up to date. But what is badly missing, in my opinion, is an essay on different roots of anti-Semitism in the areas of Jewish settlement and on the gradually changing social climate in that respect there. Since, until the Second World War the Jews lived mostly on the territory of Belorussia, Ukraine and Lithuania (under czarism, Russia proper was forbidden territory for the Jews), the problem begs for a scholarly probe.

It would show that one of the main causes of anti-Semitism among the non-Russians had been the tendency among the Jews to identify themselves with the dominant nationality, that is the Russians. As Professor S. Goldelman of Jerusalem put it, the Jews in 1917-19 would see their security only in the preservation of a unified Russian empire which would guarantee law and order for its citizens. Consequently, they would spurn all national aspirations of the minorities in Russia.¹

In the Soviet Union the Jews have been again trying hard to live within the limits of the official ideology and hoping for the implementation of a system of law and order. But certain expanded opportunities for them in different fields of the new society had been counterbalanced by anti-Jewish administrative measures and by the glowing embers of anti-Semitism among

Soviet citizens, artificially fed by Soviet Russian bureaucracy.

Fortunately, the enlightened society of the non-Russian peoples is slowly getting wiser in this respect. One of the Ukrainian dissenters, S. Karavansky of Odessa (now serving a 25-year term in Mordovia) raised a mighty call for a redress of the injustices perpetrated by the regime on the minorities. Of the Jews he wrote in 1967: "Where are the Jewish theatres now, the newspapers and publishing houses, the schools?..." (The Jewish Theatre in Moscow was closed in 1949).²

And Ivan Dzyuba, a Marxist Ukrainian critic, made a public plea for Jewish-Ukrainian cooperation in the face of the policy of discrimination and Russification. At the Babi Yar anniversary on September 29, 1966, he declared:

Our common past consists not only of blind enmity and bitter misunderstandings, although there was much of this. . . . The Jews have a right to be Jews and the Ukrainians have a right to be Ukrainians in the full and profound, not only in the formal, meaning of the word. Let the Jews know Jewish history, Jewish culture and language, and be proud of them. Let the Ukrainians know Ukrainian history, Ukrainian culture and language, and be proud of them. Let them also know each other's history and culture and the history and culture of other nationalities, and let them know how to value themselves and others as their brothers.

Dzyuba's speech was never reported in the Soviet press but it has reached the public with the help of private transcripts. In English, it was published for the first time in Canada, by *Commentator* (Toronto) in February 1968.

It would have been worthwhile including in this collection an essay on that recent development in the relations between the Jews and the second largest nationality in the USSR as the Soviet leaders continue the traditional policy of preventing any publicity of the ills afflicting the Russian empire. Such publicity is "the doctor" Russia needs badly, wrote one of Alexander Herzen's friends about 100 years ago.

By presenting the Jewish problem in the Soviet Union in a balanced scholarly symposium, Professor L. Kochan and the Institute of Jewish Affairs in London have done a service both to

their own people and to the nationalities of the USSR, whose plight is being suppressed as an "unproblem" as well. Indeed, it is a service to the Russians themselves, as millions of them are among those who suffer because of the lack of the rule of law in their own police state.

REFERENCE NOTES

¹For an analysis of the condition in which the Jewish minority found itself in the midst of the Russian Revolution and civil war and the attempt of the newly founded Ukrainian National Republic to provide a solution by way of a Jewish national autonomy within the Ukrainian state, see Solomon I. Goldelman, *Jewish National Autonomy, 1917-1920*, (Chicago: Ukrainian Research and Information Institute, 1968), 131 pp.

²S. Y. Karavansky, "To the Council of Nationalities of the USSR," *The New Leader*, LI, No. 2 (January 15, 1968), 12. Karavansky (b. 1920), a Ukrainian writer and journalist, was first arrested and sentenced to 25 years of hard labor in 1944. After serving 16 years, he was released in 1960 under a general amnesty. In 1965, in spite of the fact that the 25-year sentence was abolished in the Soviet Union by that time, Karavansky was re-incarcerated without trial to serve out the balance of his 25-year term for protesting Russification policy in the Ukraine.

17

EIGHT NATIONS DIE

The saying that the poor beetle a man treads upon feels a pang as great as when a giant dies, has acquired a new significance in this work by British poet and writer, Robert Conquest. His study of the tragic fate of eight nationalities within the Soviet Union, deported from their lands by the Politburo, presents the reader both with a lucid account of their historical tribulations and with an insight into the mechanics of the much-disputed Soviet "nationality" policy.

Concerned were Chechens, Ingushi, Karachai, Balkars, Kalmyks, Meskhetians, Crimean Tartars and the Volga Germans. The latter had been deported in 1941, the others in 1943-44.

Much has been written about the alleged disloyalty of these nationalities in the Second World War. But, as Khrushchev officially admitted at the Party Congress in 1956, this sweeping charge was mistaken.

Stalin blamed whole nations for the deeds of the few. He even planned to resettle the Ukrainians but they were too numerous to be deported in secret.

The small ones took the rap.

True enough, they were not physically liquidated as were the millions of victims in the Nazi gas chambers. But they sustained

Reprinted with permission from *The Montreal Star*, January 23, 1971. A commentary on the book by Robert Conquest, *The Nation Killers* (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1970), 222 pp.

heavy casualties. Over half a million—mostly children and the aged—died while being deported to distant territories of the USSR: about one-third of the whole total of 1,600,000 persons affected.

Robert Conquest presents a true historical perspective of their experiences seen against the background of the Soviet theory on treatment of minorities in a communist federal state. All his statements are supported by documentary evidence, mostly Soviet.

The picture that emerges is gloomy: hypocrisy pervades all the declarations and comments by Soviet spokesmen on the subject.

If one is tempted to assert that the Kremlin only pursues the policies of czarist Russia in an endeavor finally to stabilize Russia's boundary somewhere in the Caucasus, then one should remember the following difference between the two regimes.

The czarist regime had spared the life of "its most intransigent opponent when he was finally captured." And it allowed publication of Tolstoy's objective account of the Caucasian hero, Iman Shamil; other Russian sources of the time (1850-60) also "give Shamil at least a certain admiration, however reluctant."

But under the Soviets, "facts of considerable importance can simply never be published anywhere if official policy so decides." The case of the 200,000 Meskhetians remained unknown in the West until 1969. The deportation of the Kalmyks involved an entire republic (about 140,000 people) but no public statement was ever made about it. As history in the USSR is continuously being rewritten, there is little chance for a casual Western observer to fathom the tragedy of the Soviet minorities. Especially today, when only big numbers seem to count and monstrous carnages alone deem deserving of public note.

Robert Conquest is inclined to place the responsibility for the killing of whole nations on the system itself: "... while Khrushchev condemned the policy pursued by Stalin in the matter, even he nowhere condemned in any way the structure of Soviet rule which made such a decision possible."

Here the author echoes General Petro Grigorenko's¹ sentiments, who warned the Crimean Tartars two years ago: "What was done to your nation was not done by Stalin alone. And his accomplices are not only alive but holding responsible offices."

Against this pessimistic assessment, however, there is some hope.

That in the Soviet Union itself such courageous people as Grigorenko, Karavansky, Iakir² and Kosterin³ have raised their voices in defence of the persecuted minorities holds some promise.

Robert Conquest tries to put it into an all-European context this way:

Where there is oppression ordered from outside and carried out largely by foreigners, the inevitable resistance will take national form—even though the original oppressive measures have no specific national character. This proposition, which has been largely forgotten by the Soviet leaders, seems to be the key to the enormous strength of national feeling in the Soviet bloc. The cases of Hungary and Czechoslovakia were particularly striking demonstrations of the theme.

He adds "... the Ukrainians now demanding their own rights have also expressed solidarity with the Crimeans—even though it is to the Ukraine that the Crimeans have lost their land. It is similarly striking that while Ukrainian nationalism had long a reputation of being anti-Semitic as well as anti-Russian, its latest manifestations strongly emphasize solidarity with the Jewish population which the Ukrainians rightly see as also suffering from various oppressive acts."

It seems that the beetles themselves, instead of being engrossed solely in their own miseries, have begun to show some comprehension of the sufferings endured by others under the giant's foot.

But do we?

REFERENCE NOTES

¹P. G. Grigorenko (b. 1906), a retired Soviet Army major general, active in various protest movements of the 1960s, especially on behalf of the Crimean Tartars. In 1964, he was confined to a mental asylum for 14 months; released, he was arrested again for

dissident activities in 1969; was tried and recommitted to an asylum the following year where he was kept until his release in 1977. He now lives in the United States where he continues to work on behalf of the Soviet dissident movement.

²P.I. Iakir (b. 1923), an historian, son of well-known Soviet Army Major General I. E. Iakir who was executed in 1937; the same year, he was sentenced to 17 years in a hard labor camp; rehabilitated in 1956 together with his father, young Iakir became active in various protest movements of the 'sixties and 'seventies, and a member of the Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights in the USSR. Arrested in June 1972, P. I. Iakir was, together with another fellow dissident Viktor Krasin, an engineer, tried in a "show trial" during which both publicly "confessed" and recanted reportedly as a result of torture. Given mild sentences, they were paroled shortly thereafter.

³A. I. Kosterin (1896-1968), writer, former editorialist for *Trud*, *Gudok*, and *Izvestia*. Spent 17 years in Stalin's concentration camps; released and became active in the protest movements of the 1960s, especially in support of the reform movement in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

18

MAGADAN AND THE RISING NEW HUMANISM

You wouldn't recognize him even if you bumped into him while boarding a bus or passing him on a downtown street. He looks just like any other Canadian who enjoys the many good things we have and who mildly grumbles about the weather or the spiralling prices and taxes.

I wouldn't be able to point him out to you either because I never met him. But I seem to know him very well, indeed — from his book.

Into the pathway of my thoughts he has stepped right from the pages of the memoirs entitled simply *Magadan* (Montreal: Chateau Books, 1971) — the man who made an involuntary journey straight down to the bottom of a *human-made* hell. And he came back, apparently with an undiminished zest for life; the sufferings that broke or bent many much stronger men have not impaired his human purposefulness either.

A naturalized Canadian, Michael Solomon was arrested by Romania's communist security police in February 1948 only to be handed over to their Soviet Russian overlords 10 months later. The latter were eager to get him into their claws, because they believed him to be an "expert on Palestine" and a British spy at that.

Reprinted with permission from *The Windsor Star*, March 8, 1972.

The Romanian security men were not loath to making a few roubles and getting additional stripes for their "alertness" by selling to their protectors a co-citizen of Jewish origin, for some time a resident of Palestine under British rule.

When he landed, finally, in the abode of Soviet counter-intelligence at Constanta, Mr. Solomon was astounded to hear: "Don't be afraid. You are among the Jews."

Indeed he was. Facing him were: a colonel of counter-intelligence; a military prosecutor; a major; a lieutenant; and a translator—all with Jewish names and all speaking Yiddish to boot.

The translator, Sasha Roth, turned to these Soviet officers and, with studied indignation, pointed to Solomon's blackened hands—due to the much too tight handcuffs—and at his blood-covered face: "Look, what the Romanian bandits have done to this poor Jew."

Michael Solomon tried in vain to explain that it was the Russian guards that had mistreated him while transporting him from a Romanian prison. But his captors, being Soviet communist Jews, were much too eager to impress upon their own superiors their ability for extracting secrets of state importance from the prisoner of their kind.

Later on, General Smirnov of the Soviet State Security arrived on the scene to try his hand in breaking the stubborn "British spy", whose only crime consisted of writing some good articles in Bucharest newspapers during the brief reign of King Michael after the Second World War.

Beria's Hell-gate

Since Mr. Solomon would admit only to knowing the English language and some British journalists—but no state secrets concerning a never-planned British aggression against the Soviet Union—onward he goes: to Far Eastern Siberia for 25 years. Magadan is the name of his final destination, a veritable hell-gate in Stalin-Beria's empire.

Many a country have I seen with plenty of human misery displayed before my eyes; and a great deal of misery fell to my lot as the due share of any man's destiny. But Michael Solomon's story of experiences on his road to Magadan shook me up, indeed.

For one, on the pages of his book I have met again some of my friends with whom I parted many years ago in the Ukraine.

Take Rev. Onufrii Ivaniuk. He was very close to the Metropolitan Andrii Sheptytsky who saved a group of Jews by giving them a shelter in the St. Iuri Cathedral buildings in Lviv, and on his country estate as well.

And why shouldn't I be moved by Mr. Solomon's description of the strike and resistance organized at Norilsk concentration camps by former Ukrainian insurgents (UPA)?

They fought against Himmler's SS troops during the wartime in the woods and mountains of West Ukraine; then they put up stiff resistance to Beria's NKVD troops. The remnants of the insurgents found themselves inmates of Norilsk and other Arctic construction sites, nowadays visited and praised by some innocent Canadians.

Those of the insurgents who survived the massacres arranged on orders from Comrade R. Rudenko, the prosecutor-general of the Soviet Union in 1953, were shipped to Magadan; and Mr. Solomon vividly describes the scene of their arrival there.

He frankly admits to not having shared in the "delusion" of the Ukrainian prisoners for the idea of a sovereign non-communist Ukraine. But who would in his circumstances, at the time when mighty Soviet armies had reached the heart of Europe, triumphed in the Far East, and when many Ukrainians served the Kremlin mob as servilely as did the Jewish communists who had mishandled him?

Yet, Mr. Solomon tries to be as objective as possible for a man who had never before lived in the Soviet Union and was bound to be puzzled by the complexity of internal cross-currents there. Therefore, one should not pay too much attention to some factual errors in his narrative. These can be weeded out in the next edition.

What should be commented upon here, however, is the painful aspect of Ukrainian-Jewish relations. I think, eventually there must be a more rational explanation of the anti-Jewish bias among Ukrainians, anti-communists and communists alike, rather than repeating the clichés about the traditional Slavic anti-Semitism for its own sake.

Without being aware of it, Michael Solomon helps the reader grasp that complex problem by not sparing even some from

among his own ethnic group. Time and again he shows, by registering specific cases, that along with the good natured Soviet Jews there existed in the Soviet Union also another strain—the communist Jews of Russian hue. By their unswerving support for the cruel Soviet regime they alienated masses of Soviet Ukrainians (as well as Russians) from the Jews in general.

No Motherland

And the Ukrainians outside the Soviet Union would acquire a similarly wrong idea that all Soviet Jews were helping the Kremlin rulers in their effort at the Russification of Ukrainians and a total destruction of the Ukrainian nation—either by mass arrests and summary executions or by an artificial famine which, in 1933, caused about six million deaths in the Soviet Ukraine.

What these and other Ukrainians did not realize (but what clearly transpires from Mr. Solomon's narrative) was that there has been growing since the formation of the Soviet Union in 1922 a class of uprooted men; and these deracinees have been in power ever since.

They have no motherland of any kind; they don't care for any ethnic origin; they adorn themselves communists, but Marxism and Leninism are strange doctrines to them as well. They recognize only one creed and that is their own "power unlimited."

By sticking together and supporting one another in their various capacities—be it as party men or state bureaucrats—they form a mighty pyramid of Soviet power; politburo is its tip and its base consists of policemen and concentration camp supervisors. Under the weight of this pyramid, all the nationalities, with the Russians included, are staggering as no other part of mankind ever has.

From time to time, the pyramid needs some propping up against the ever opening cracks. Then a scapegoat must be found, and the Jews are nowadays as good for that as they were in czarist times when the old-order pyramid was also in dire need of diverting the people's attention from the pressing problems of the day. Ukrainians are usually played as a scapegoat for punishing so-called saboteurs and conspirators against the unity of the empire.

Against this background, it is encouraging to note that during the first post-Stalin decade the new generation of Ukrainians began turning toward humanization of relations among the nationalities of the USSR. For one, Ivan Dzyuba—a Soviet Ukrainian writer and critic who was arrested in January (1972) in Kiev along with 18 other Ukrainian progressive intellectuals—called upon the Ukrainians and Jews to find a common ground for the defense of their distinct cultural identities.

Speaking at the Jewish commemoration ceremony held at the Babi Yar site in September 1966, Dzyuba said:¹

Our common past consists not only of blind enmity and bitter misunderstandings, although there was much of this. Our past shows also examples of courageous solidarity and cooperation in the fight for common ideals of freedom and justice, for a better fate for all nations. We, the present generation, should continue this tradition and not the tradition of distrust and reserve. . . .

Then he came out strongly for human rights of the Jews in the Ukraine as well as in the Soviet Union as a whole:

The Jews have a right to be Jews and the Ukrainians have the right to be Ukrainians in the full and profound, not only formal, meaning of the word. . . . Let them know each other's history and culture and the history and culture of other nations; and let them know how to appreciate themselves and others as their brothers.

Any thoughtful reader, albeit superficially familiar with the changing complexion of the Soviet Union's multinational society, will discover similar grains of a growing mutual understanding among the oppressed nationalities even in the concentration camps, upon reading such memoirs as that by Michael Solomon.

A Sigh of Relief

His testimony is invaluable as another proof that the Soviet pyramid oppresses all the nationalities alike; that without these

hard labor camps the pyramid of the deracinees in power would crumble; and that the suffering they cause only hastens the growth of a new humanism — of a faith that would replace both the established religious hypocrisies and the established Soviet communism. On closing Michael Solomon's book, *Magadan*, a sigh of relief escapes the reader's lips: "Thank you, God, for having spared me an involuntary journey to Siberia. And blessed be Thy name for the few survivors you have brought back from the road to Magadan. By their testimony, they give us all a rare chance to become and to act like true human beings: to know one another better and to cooperate more eagerly for the sake of those who are less fortunate than ourselves, be they Jews, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Georgians or Russians."

REFERENCE NOTES

¹For a full text of I. Dzyuba's address at Babi Yar, see "Ivan Dzyuba on Jewish and Ukrainian Destiny," *Commentator* (Toronto), XII, No. 2 (February, 1968), 12-15.